This paper develops a new approach to the problem of testing the existence of a level relationship between a dependent variable and a set of regressors, when it is not known with certainty whether the underlying regressors are trend- or first-difference stationary. The proposed tests are based on standard F- and t-statistics used to test the significance of the lagged levels of the variables in a univariate equilibrium correction mechanism. The asymptotic distributions of these statistics are non-standard under the null hypothesis that there exists no level relationship, irrespective of whether the regressors are I(0) or I(1). Two sets of asymptotic critical values are provided: one when all regressors are purely I(1) and the other if they are all purely I(0). These two sets of critical values provide a band covering all possible classifications of the regressors into purely I(0), purely I(1) or mutually cointegrated. Accordingly, various bounds testing procedures are proposed. It is shown that the proposed tests are consistent, and their asymptotic distribution under the null and suitably defined local alternatives are derived. The empirical relevance of the bounds procedures is demonstrated by a re-examination of the earnings equation included in the UK Treasury macroeconometric model. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Bounds testing approaches to the analysis of level relationships

This paper surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world.

A Survey of Corporate Governance

This article surveys research on corporate governance, with special attention to the importance of legal protection of investors and of ownership concentration in corporate governance systems around the world. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DEALS WITH the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. How do the suppliers of finance get managers to return some of the profits to them? How do they make sure that managers do not steal the capital they supply or invest it in bad projects? How do suppliers of finance control managers? At first glance, it is not entirely obvious why the suppliers of capital get anything back. After all, they part with their money, and have little to contribute to the enterprise afterward. The professional managers or entrepreneurs who run the firms might as well abscond with the money. Although they sometimes do, usually they do not. Most advanced market economies have solved the problem of corporate governance at least reasonably well, in that they have assured the flows of enormous amounts of capital to firms, and actual repatriation of profits to the providers of finance. But this does not imply that they have solved the corporate governance problem perfectly, or that the corporate governance mechanisms cannot be improved. In fact, the subject of corporate governance is of enormous practical impor

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This paper documents that strategies which buy stocks that have performed well in the past and sell stocks that have performed poorly in the past generate significant positive returns over 3- to 12-month holding periods. We find that the profitability of these strategies are not due to their systematic risk or to delayed stock price reactions to common factors. However, part of the abnormal returns generated in the first year after portfolio formation dissipates in the following two years. A similar pattern of returns around the earnings announcements of past winners and losers is also documented

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Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers: Implications for Stock Market Efficiency

This paper introduces an ARCH model (exponential ARCH) that (1) allows correlation between returns and volatility innovations (an important feature of stock market volatility changes), (2) eliminates the need for inequality constraints on parameters, and (3) allows for a straightforward interpretation of the "persistence" of shocks to volatility. In the above respects, it is an improvement over the widely-used GARCH model. The model is applied to study volatility changes and the risk premium on the CRSP Value-Weighted Market Index from 1962 to 1987. Copyright 1991 by The Econometric Society.

Conditional heteroskedasticity in asset returns: a new approach

Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 3

In this paper, we assess the degree to which four of the most commonly used models of risky decision making can explain the choices individuals make when faced with risky prospects. To make this assessment, we use experimental evidence for two random samples of young adults. Using a robust, nonlinear least squares procedure, we estimate a model that is general enough to approximate Kahnenman and Tversky's prospect theory and that for certain parametric values will yield the expected utility model, a subjective expected utility model and a probability-transform model. We find that the four models considered explain the decision-making behavior of the majority of our subjects. Surprisingly, we find that the choice behavior of the largest number of subjects is consistent with a probability-transform model. Such models have only been developed recently and have not been used in applied settings. We find least support for the expected utility model -- the most widely used model of risky decision making.

On the Existence and Interpretation of the

This book discusses the issues associated with the capriciousness of capital flows into Latin America, examining macroeconomic and financial sector impact, as well as offering policy recommendations for achieving stability despite volatile capital flows. The authors review recent experience with international capital flows in Latin America, and discuss the policy issues that surround them.

Volatile Capital Flows: Taming Their Impact on Latin America

We propose an explanation for the wide variation in rates of taxation across developed economies, based on differences in labor market institutions. In "corporatist" economies, which feature centralized labor markets, taxes on labor input will be less distortionary than when labor supply is determined individually. Since the level of labor supply is set by a small group of decision-makers, these individuals will recognize the linkage between the taxes that workers pay and the benefits that they receive. Labor tax burdens are indeed higher in more corporatist nations, and non-labor taxes are lower, which is consistent with this theory. There is also some evidence that the distortionary effects of labor taxes are lower in more corporatist economies.

Lawrence H. Summers

Papers

Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 3

On the Existence and Interpretation of the

Volatile Capital Flows: Taming Their Impact on Latin America

Taxation and the Structure of Labor Markets: The Case of Corporatism

Should government learn to live with inflation? Reply