Unlike a general IT environment, an industrial control system is an environment where stability and continuity are more important than security. In the event of a security accident in the industrial control system, physical motion can be controlled, so physical damage can occur and physical damage can even result in personal injury. Cyber attacks on industrial control systems are not simply cyber damage, but terrorism. However, the security of industrial control systems has not been strengthened yet, and many vulnerabilities are actually occurring. This paper shows that the PLC can be remotely controlled by analyzing the connection process and packets for the PLC protocol used in the industrial control system and bypassing the security mechanism existing in the protocol. Through this, we intend to raise the security awareness of the industrial control system.

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A security study for Control Network: Security Threat Using Control Protocol

: We present a methodology to facilitate the design and analysis of secure cryptographic protocols. We advocate the general approach, and a new avenue for research, of restricting protocol designs to well-defined practices, instead of ever increasing the complexity of protocol security analysis mechanisms to deal with every newly discovered attack and the endless variations in protocol construction. In particular, we propose a novel notion of a fail-stop protocol, which automatically halts in response to any active attack that interferes with protocol execution, thus reducing protocol security analysis to that of passive attacks only. We suggest types of protocols that are fail-stop, outline some proof techniques for them, and use examples to illustrate how the notion of a fail-stop protocol can make protocol design easier and can provide a more solid basis for some available protocol analysis methods.

Li Gong

Papers

Fail-Stop Protocols: An Approach to Designing Secure Protocols (Preprint)