Supply chain coordination with revenue sharing contracts

Improving energy efficiency and mitigating environmental problems through environmental regulations and taxes are considered as fundamental driving forces of climate change policies. However, the current literature on the theoretical and empirical evidence focusing on the inter-linkages between environmental taxes, energy consumption, and environmental quality is rather meager. This article attempts to provide a detailed survey on the earlier literature for developed, developing, and emerging countries analysis by covering the literature up to 2020. The prime objective of this survey is the coverage of different level of economies, modeling, methodologies, time periods as well as empirical outcomes. The study mainly covers three types of causality direction: (i) environmental taxes, energy consumption, and energy efficiency; (ii) environmental taxes and environmental quality; (iii) energy consumption (renewables, non-renewable, and fossil fuels) and environment deterioration. Most of the empirical studies reported that the energy usage for economic activities significantly affects the pollutant emissions. However, the role of environmental taxes is still ambiguous and demands a more in-depth investigation. Comprehending the literature survey has provided the basis to address the policymaking, designing as well as the implementation of environmental regulations.

Environmental taxes, energy consumption, and environmental quality: Theoretical survey with policy implications

Corporate social responsibility and decision analysis in a supply chain through government subsidy

An evolutionary analysis on the effect of government policies on electric vehicle diffusion in complex network

Low carbon strategy analysis under revenue-sharing and cost-sharing contracts

The effect of governmental policies of carbon taxes and energy-saving subsidies on enterprise decisions in a two-echelon supply chain

To study the cooperation of upstream and downstream enterprises of a supply chain in energy saving and emissions reduction, we establish a Stackelberg game model. The retailer moves first to decide a cost-sharing contract, then the manufacturer determines the energy-saving level, carbon-emission level, and wholesale price successively. In the end, the retailer determines the retail price. As a regulation, the government provides subsidies for energy-saving products, while imposing a carbon tax on the carbon emitted. The results show that (1) both the energy-saving cost-sharing (ECS) and the carbon emissions reduction cost-sharing (CCS) contracts are not the dominant strategy of the two parties by which they can facilitate energy savings and emissions reductions; (2) compared with single cost-sharing contracts, the bivariate cost-sharing (BCS) contract for energy saving and emissions reduction is superior, although it still cannot realise prefect coordination of the supply chain; (3) government subsidy and carbon tax policies can promote the cooperation of both the upstream and downstream enterprises of the supply chain—a subsidy policy can always drive energy saving and emissions reductions, while a carbon tax policy does not always exert positive effects, as it depends on the initial level of pollution and the level of carbon tax; and (4) the subsidy policy reduces the coordination efficiency of the supply chain, while the influences of carbon tax policy upon the coordination efficiency relies on the initial carbon-emission level.

Li Jinxi

Papers

The effect of governmental policies of carbon taxes and energy-saving subsidies on enterprise decisions in a two-echelon supply chain

Cost-Sharing Contracts for Energy Saving and Emissions Reduction of a Supply Chain under the Conditions of Government Subsidies and a Carbon Tax