In this paper, we study an electric vehicle routing problem while considering the constraints on battery life and battery swapping stations. We first introduce a comprehensive model consisting of speed, load and distance to measure the energy consumption and carbon emissions of electric vehicles. Second, we propose a mixed integer programming model to minimize the total costs related to electric vehicle energy consumption and travel time. To solve this model efficiently, we develop an adaptive genetic algorithm based on hill climbing optimization and neighborhood search. The crossover and mutation probabilities are designed to adaptively adjust with the change of population fitness. The hill climbing search is used to enhance the local search ability of the algorithm. In order to satisfy the constraints of battery life and battery swapping stations, the neighborhood search strategy is applied to obtain the final optimal feasible solution. Finally, we conduct numerical experiments to test the performance of the algorithm. Computational results illustrate that a routing arrangement that accounts for power consumption and travel time can reduce carbon emissions and total logistics delivery costs. Moreover, we demonstrate the effect of adaptive crossover and mutation probabilities on the optimal solution.

https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/12/24/10537/pdf

Electric Vehicle Routing Problem with Battery Swapping Considering Energy Consumption and Carbon Emissions

Recycling channel selection and coordination in dual sales channel closed-loop supply chains

Manufacturer's encroachment strategy with substitutable green products

Largely due to the rapid development of e-Commerce, manufacturers can sell their national brands (NBs) directly to consumers, a business practice known as manufacturer encroachment. To compete with national brands (NBs), retailers can introduce store brands (SBs) as lower-quality substitutes. They can also launch premium store brands (PSBs) to capture top consumers. In this paper, we focus on a supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer, and develop game theoretic models to investigate the strategic interactions between manufacturer encroachment and the retailer's introduction of a PSB or an SB. Our main findings include the follows. First, on the one hand, manufacturer encroachment might not prevent the retailer from introducing a competitive store brand. On the other hand, the retailer introducing an SB can prevent manufacturer encroachment, while introducing a PSB cannot. Second, contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that if the cost of introducing a PSB is low for the retailer, this could make the entry threat of the PSB more credible. Consequently, the manufacturer would encroach and the retailer fails to realize the most profitable scenario. Third, both first- and second-mover advantages are present in the equilibrium outcomes for the two firms. In particular, the presence of the second-mover advantage depends on the quality gaps among different brands. Overall, our results and managerial insights can help a supply chain and its firms formulate their brand and channel strategies.

How to compete with a supply chain partner: Retailer's store brand vs. manufacturer's encroachment

Critical factors influencing carbon emissions of prefabricated building supply chains in China

There has been extensive research on supplier encroachment. That is, a supplier sells to consumers through a direct retail subsidiary in addition to an independent retailer. However, most research assumes centralized encroachment, where the supplier makes decisions for the subsidiary. In this research, we make a major contribution by explicitly analyzing the option of decentralized encroachment, where the subsidiary makes its own pricing and/or quantity decisions. Furthermore, we make another major contribution by studying the retailer's possible use of strategic inventory as a countermeasure to achieve wholesale price concessions from the supplier. In a dual channel consisting of a retailer and a supplier and its subsidiary in a two-period model, we find that when the retailer can employ strategic inventory, decentralized encroachment outperforms centralized encroachment for the supplier and the retailer. Moreover, if the supplier adopts the strategy of decentralized encroachment, the retailer's use of strategic inventory always benefits the supplier, but it benefits the retailer only when the unit inventory holding cost is below a threshold. We also conduct numerical examples to further illustrate our analytical findings and gain more managerial insights.

Liao Yi

Papers

Supplier encroachment strategy in the presence of retail strategic inventory: Centralization or decentralization?