Decision-making and coordination of green closed-loop supply chain with fairness concern

Strategic orientation, capabilities, and performance in manufacturer-3PL relationships

As an important measure of enterprise governance, internal control can enhance the organizational rationality of the enterprise, ensure that the enterprise consciously assumes social responsibility for the protection of the natural environment and resources, and promote the sustainable development of the national economy. Using data from China's A-share heavy pollution industry listed companies from 2009 to 2018, this study explored the relationships among internal control quality, enterprise environmental protection investment, and financial performance. The results show that the quality of internal control has a significant positive impact on enterprise environmental protection investment and financial performance. Enterprise environmental protection investment has a significant positive impact on financial performance and plays a partial intermediary role in the positive impact of internal control quality on financial performance. While expanding the theory of resource-based concepts, this study clarified the positive impact of corporate environmental management and practical behavior on corporate value and provides a theoretical basis for companies to actively implement environmental protection responsibilities, strengthen internal environmental management capabilities, and enhance corporate value. At the same time, it also provides a basis for the government to issue relevant environmental protection policies, strengthen enterprise internal control construction guidelines, and encourage third-party organizations to evaluate the effectiveness of enterprise internal control.

https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/17/17/6082/pdf

Internal Control Quality, Enterprise Environmental Protection Investment and Finance Performance: An Empirical Study of China's A-Share Heavy Pollution Industry.

Cooperative game analysis of coordination mechanisms under fairness concerns of a green retailer

More low-carbon products help fight climate change and environmental problems. Governments consider encouraging the manufacturer’s initiative of producing low-carbon products by providing subsidies. However, when the manufacturer sells low-carbon products through the e-commerce platform, fairness concerns arise because of the profit difference. So, this paper builds game models to study decision behavior in the low-carbon e-commerce supply chain when the manufacturer receives government carbon subsidies and has fairness concerns. Our findings show that consumers’ preference for low-carbon products will be conducive to the operation of the supply chain. So it is necessary to popularize low-carbon products. The effect of government subsidies on supply chain decisions is different from fairness concerns. Government subsidies are positive factors in the supply chain operation, which can stimulate the manufacturer to make low-carbon products as expected and choose the high quality-high price development mode. This will help improve the profit of enterprises in the supply chain but cannot effectively stimulate the e-commerce platform to increase its service level. By contrast, the manufacturer’s fairness concerns are negative factors, which make the manufacturer prefer to adopt a low quality-low price development mode to improve their utility. This offsets the positive effect of government subsidies. It turns out that the profit of both node enterprises and the supply chain system has declined. But, fairness concerns are an important way to express the manufacturer’s demand. Finally, the joint allocation contract of cost and profit designed by comprehensively considering the effect of government subsidies and fairness concerns can make the supply chain coordinated. However, even as positive factors, only within a specific range do government subsidies help coordinate the supply chain, but not the more, the better.

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Decision and Coordination of Low-Carbon E-Commerce Supply Chain with Government Carbon Subsidies and Fairness Concerns

Whether the upstream and downstream members in a supply chain (considering environmental objectives) simultaneously stabilize economic benefits has become an important problem in the process of green development. However, few quantitative studies on green supply chains have considered environmental and economic benefits to realize multi-objective optimization. To study operation and cooperation strategies with a consideration of the different objective on the level of supply chain, we first establish a green supply chain game model with profit and environment objectives simultaneously considered by the manufacturer. Then, we analyze the multi-objective decisions of the supply chain members under centralized control using a manufacturer-led Stackelberg game and revenue-sharing contract. Using the manufacturer’s environmental preference as a variable, the effects of environmental benefits on the supply chain are also investigated. Finally, this study determines that the manufacturer’s profit will be reduced after considering the objective of environmental benefits, while the retailer’s profit, product greenness, and environmental benefits will be improved. Meanwhile, the total profit of the green supply chain will first increase and then decrease. In particular, a revenue-sharing contract can facilitate the coordination of multiple objectives; in this way, both the manufacturer and the retailer achieve higher profits and environmental benefits compared to a decentralized control condition, which is of great significance in achieving a win–win situation for the economy and the environment.

A Multi-Objective Optimization Model for Green Supply Chain Considering Environmental Benefits

In this study, we examined the contract coordination between manufacturers with peer-induced and distributional fairness concerns. A revenue sharing contract was introduced to coordinate a competitive supply chain, in which the manufacturers have different fairness concerns based on centralized decision-making in terms of fairness neutrality. Then, we constructed two game models—the manufacturer’s peer-induced fairness concern model and the manufacturer’s distributional fairness concern model and analyzed the influence of a revenue sharing contract on the pricing decisions and profit distribution of a competitive supply chain considering fairness concerns. The results show that there is a revenue-sharing contract parameter in both the peer-induced and distributional fairness concerns of manufacturers, which can effectively realize Pareto improvements in a supply chain. Meanwhile, the retail and wholesale prices both decreased with the increase in the revenue-sharing ratio between retailers and manufacturers, and the profits of retailers decreased accordingly, but the overall utility of manufacturers and supply chains improved markedly. Moreover, the coordination condition is closely related to the level of fairness concerns of the manufacturers and the competition intensity between two manufacturers. The sharing contract designed in this study can not only effectively improve the utility of retailers and manufacturers but also enhance the total utility of the channel to ensure that node enterprises have long-term, stable, and cooperative relationships and to strengthen the overall competitiveness of the supply chain.

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Coordination of Supply Chains with Competing Manufacturers considering Fairness Concerns

Coordinating contracts are sometimes difficult to be established because of information sharing constraints and additional administrative burdens. Considering the difficulties of coordinating contracts, it is reasonable that coordination between only some of chain members will be easier to achieve than coordination of the whole supply chain. For convenience, coordination between only some of chain members is referred to sub-coordination. This paper discusses three types of sub-coordination in a competing supply chain comprising two manufacturers, a retailer, and a 3PL provider. Using the fully decentralized supply chain as a benchmark, the effects of sub-coordination on the supply chain are investigated. We find out that sub-coordination is not always effective to improve the profit of the supply chain, in some cases sub-coordination even does harm to supply chain members or the whole supply chain. The performance of sub-coordination critically depends on the degree of product substitutability.

/pdf/sub-coordination-in-a-competing-supply-chain-with-a-3pl-2piutupmfz.pdf

Lin Jiang

Papers

A Multi-Objective Optimization Model for Green Supply Chain Considering Environmental Benefits

Coordination of Supply Chains with Competing Manufacturers considering Fairness Concerns

Sub-Coordination in a Competing Supply Chain With a 3PL Provider