This paper reviews the literature on gender differences in economic experiments. In the three main sections, we identify robust differences in risk preferences, social (other-regarding) preferences, and competitive preferences. We also speculate on the source of these differences, as well as on their implications. Our hope is that this article will serve as a resource for those seeking to understand gender differences and to use as a starting point to illuminate the debate on gender-specific outcomes in the labor and goods markets.

/pdf/gender-differences-in-preferences-1wffy691ko.pdf

Gender Differences in Preferences

We develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. Rewards or punishments (whether material or imagerelated) create doubt about the true motive for which good deeds are performed and this “overjustification effect” can induce a partial or even net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. We also identify the settings that are conducive to multiple social norms and more generally those that make individual actions complements or substitutes, which we show depends on whether stigma or honor is (endogenously) the dominant reputational concern. Finally, we analyze the socially optimal level of incentives and how monopolistic or competitive sponsors depart from it. Sponsor competition is shown to potentially reduce social welfare.

/pdf/incentives-and-prosocial-behavior-tzz3wh6cov.pdf

Incentives and Prosocial Behavior

Poverty in the United Kingdom

Enclosed is a copy of the Board of Governors’ Semiannual Agenda of Regulations for the period August 1, 1980 through February 1, 1981. The Semiannual Agenda provides you with information on those regulatory matters that the Board now has under consideration or anticipates considering over the next six months, and is divided into three parts: (1) regulatory matters that the Board had considered during the previous six months on which final action has been taken; (2) regulatory matters that have been proposed for public comment and that require further Board consideration; and (3) regulatory matters that the Board may consider over the next six months.

Federal Reserve Bank of New Yorkの制定せる財務諸表様式について

Four main messages emerge from the study of subjective survey data. First, a large experimental literature by and large supports economists' skepticism of subjective questions. Second, put in an econometric framework, these findings cast serious doubts on attempts to use subjective data as dependent variables, because the measurement error appears to correlate with a large set of characteristics in behaviors. Third, these data may be useful as explanatory variables. Finally, the empirical work suggests that subjective variables are useful in practice for explaining differences in behavior across individuals. Changes in answers to these questions, however, do not appear useful in explaining changes in behavior.

/pdf/do-people-mean-what-they-say-implications-for-subjective-3bd7j8ne4z.pdf

Do People Mean What They Say? Implications for Subjective Survey Data

The Evolution of Labour Market Inequalities –– Introduction

We model the correlations of brothers’ life-cycle earnings separating for the first time the effect of paternal earnings from additional residual sibling effects. We identify the two effects by analysing sibling correlations and intergenerational correlations jointly within a unified framework. Our multi-person model of earnings dynamics distinguishes permanent earnings from transitory –serially correlated—shocks, allows for life-cycle effects and nests the models of previous research that have focussed either on intergenerational or siblings correlations. Using data on the Danish population we find that sibling effects explain between one fourth and one half of inequality in life-cycle earnings, and largely account for individual differences in earnings growth. Intergenerational associations account for a considerable share of overall sibling correlations, between 30 and 60 per cent from youth to maturity. We also find that transitory shocks are correlated across family members, in particular between brothers. Extensions of the model reveal a distinctive effect of mothers’ human capital on top of fathers’ earnings, as well as differential intergenerational transmission in favour of younger brothers conditional on brothers’ age spacing.

Alike in Many Ways: Intergenerational and Sibling Correlations of Brothers' Life- Cycle Earnings

The Long-Run Earnings Effects of Winning a Mayoral Election

We model the dynamics of social assistance benefit receipt in Britain using data from the British Household Panel Survey, waves 1–15. First, we discuss definitions of social assistance benefit receipt, and present information about the trends between 1991 and 2005 in the receipt of social assistance benefits, and in annual rates of transition into and out of receipt. Second, we review potential multivariate modelling approaches especially the dynamic random effects probit models that are used in our empirical analysis and, third, discuss sample selection criteria and explanatory variables. Fourth, we present our regression estimation estimates and interpret them. The final section contains a summary of the substantive results, and highlights some lessons concerning application of the analysis for other countries and some methodological issues.

Lorenzo Cappellari

Papers

The Evolution of Labour Market Inequalities –– Introduction

Alike in Many Ways: Intergenerational and Sibling Correlations of Brothers' Life- Cycle Earnings

The Long-Run Earnings Effects of Winning a Mayoral Election

The dynamics of social assistance receipt: measurement and modelling issues, with an