Purpose



– This paper aims to conduct a systematic review of the literature on supply chain collaboration published over a 10-year period from 2005 to 2014. It explores the nature and extent of research undertaken to identify key themes emerging in the field and gaps that need to be addressed. 




Design/methodology/approach



– The authors review a sample of 207 articles from 69 journals, after using an iterative cycle of defining appropriate search keywords, searching the literature and conducting the analysis. 




Findings



– Key themes include the meaning of collaboration; considerations for supply chain collaboration theory; emerging areas in collaboration for sustainability, technology-enabled supply chains and humanitarian supply chains; and the need for a more holistic approach, multi-tier perspectives and research into B2C collaborations. 




Research limitations/implications



– The paper provides discussion and scope for future research into the area which would contribute to the field tremendously. 




Originality/value



– There have been very few reviews in the past on supply chain collaboration, and this is one of the first extensive reviews conducted to address how well the body of knowledge on supply chain collaboration corresponds with our contemporary society.

A decade of supply chain collaboration and directions for future research

We investigate the implications of collective and individual producer responsibility (CPR and IPR, respectively) models of product take-back laws for e-waste on manufacturers’ design for product recovery (DfR) choices and profits, and on consumer surplus in the presence of product competition. We show that IPR offers superior DfR incentives as compared to CPR, and provides a level competitive ground. CPR may distort competition and allow free-riding on DfR efforts to reduce product recovery costs. Thus, manufacturer preferences for IPR or CPR may differ because of the free-riding implications under CPR, with even high-end manufacturers having incentives to free-ride under certain competitive conditions. The policy choice between IPR and CPR is not clear cut from an economic welfare perspective. This choice involves a comparison between the effects of superior recovery cost reduction through improved DfR under IPR and the operational cost-efficiency under CPR.

Extended Producer Responsibility for E‐Waste: Individual or Collective Producer Responsibility?

https://hal-audencia.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01996486/document

Big data analytics and organizational culture as complements to swift trust and collaborative performance in the humanitarian supply chain

We have reviewed disaster management research papers published in major operations management, management science, operations research, supply chain management and transportation/logistics journals. In reviewing these studies, our objective is to assess and present the macro level "architectural blue print" of disaster management research with the hope that it will attract new researchers and motivate established researchers to contribute to this important field. The secondary objective is to bring this disaster research to the attention of disaster administrators so that disasters are managed more efficiently and more effectively. We have mapped the disaster management research on the following five attributes of a disaster: (1) Disaster Management Function (decision-making process, prevention and mitigation, evacuation, humanitarian logistics, casualty management, and recovery and restoration), (2) Time of Disaster (before, during and after), (3) Type of Disaster (accidents, earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, landslides, terrorism and wildfires etc.), (4) Data Type (Field and Archival data, Real data and Hypothetical data), and (5) Data Analysis Technique (bidding models, decision analysis, expert systems, fuzzy system analysis, game theory, heuristics, mathematical programming, network flow models, queueing theory, simulation and statistical analysis). We have done cross tabulations of data among these five parameters to gain greater insights into disaster research. Recommendations for future research are provided.

/pdf/disaster-management-from-a-pom-perspective-mapping-a-new-51u6b8xjcm.pdf

Disaster Management from a POM Perspective: Mapping a New Domain

Sustainability governance of chains and networks: a review and future outlook

Humanitarian supply chains involve many different entities, such as government, military, private, and non-governmental organizations and individuals. Well-coordinated interactions between entities can lead to synergies and improved humanitarian outcomes. Information technology (IT) tools can help facilitate collaboration, but cost and other barriers have limited their use. We document the use of an IT tool to improve last-mile supply distribution and data management in one of many camps for internally displaced persons after the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti, and we describe other current uses of technology in camp management. Motivated by these examples and the interest among humanitarian organizations in expanding the use of such tools to facilitate coordination, we introduce a cooperative game theory model and explore insights about the conditions under which multi-agency coordination is feasible and desirable. We also outline an agenda for future research in the area of technology-enabled collaboration in the humanitarian sector.

Improving Humanitarian Operations through Technology-Enabled Collaboration

Extended producer responsibility (EPR) is a policy tool that holds producers financially responsible for the post-use collection, recycling, and disposal of their products. Many EPR implementations are collective—a large collection and recycling network (CRN) handles multiple producers’ products in order to benefit from scale and scope economies. The total cost is then allocated to producers based on metrics such as their return shares by weight. Such weight-based proportional allocation mechanisms are criticized in practice for not taking into account the heterogeneity in the costs imposed by different producers’ products. The consequence is cost allocations that impose higher costs on certain producer groups than they can achieve independently. This may lead some producers to break away from collective systems, resulting in fragmented systems with higher total cost. Yet cost efficiency is a key legislative and producer concern. To address this concern, this paper develops cost allocation mechanisms that...

Efficient Implementation of Collective Extended Producer Responsibility Legislation

Summary
The goal of this article is to contribute to the understanding of how the multiple, and sometimes conflicting, stakeholder perspectives and prevailing conditions (economic, geographic, etc.) in the implementation locality shape extended producer responsibility (EPR) “on the ground.” We provide an in-depth examination of the implementation dimension of EPR in a specific case study by examining concrete activities at the operational front of the collection and recycling system, and probing the varying stakeholder preferences that have driven a specific system to its status quo. To this end, we conduct a detailed case study of the Washington State EPR implementation for electronic waste. We provide an overview of various stakeholder perspectives and their implications for the attainment of EPR policy objectives in practice. These findings shed light on the intrinsic complexity of EPR implementation. We conclude with recommendations on how to achieve effective and efficient EPR implementation, including improving design incentives, incorporating reuse and refurbishing, expanding product scope, managing downstream material flows, and promoting operational efficiency via fair cost allocation design.

/pdf/implementing-extended-producer-responsibility-legislation-1chmibqx1z.pdf

Implementing Extended Producer Responsibility Legislation

A key goal of Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) legislation is to provide incentives for producers to design their products for recyclability. EPR is typically implemented in a collective system, where a network of recycling resources are coordinated to fulfill the EPR obligations of a set of producers, and the resulting system cost is allocated among these producers. Collective EPR is prevalent because of its cost efficiency advantages. However, it is considered to provide inferior design incentives compared to an individual implementation (where producers fulfill their EPR obligations individually). In this paper, we revisit this assertion and investigate its fundamental underpinnings in a network setting. To this end, we develop a new biform game framework that captures producers’ independent design choices (noncooperative stage) and recognizes the need to maintain the voluntary participation of producers for the collective system to be stable (cooperative stage). This biform game subsumes the net...

https://rady.ucsd.edu/docs/seminars/Design%20Incentives%20under%20Collective%20Extended%20Producer%20Responsibility%20A%20Network%20Perspective_nonblinded.pdf

Design Incentives Under Collective Extended Producer Responsibility: A Network Perspective

Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) legislation aims to create incentives for producers to design products that are easier to recycle. In this paper, we study whether a collective EPR implementation, which is common in practice due to its cost efficiency advantage, can achieve this goal. In particular, we look for cost allocation mechanisms in a collective system that provide at least as effective design incentives as those induced by an individual system benchmark, while ensuring voluntary participation of producers (i.e. satisfying group incentive compatibility). Based on a biform network game model, we show that a cost allocation mechanism that satisfies the above criteria exists only if the recycling infrastructure satisfies certain properties in terms of (i) how recycling costs change as a function of design choices and (ii) the processing capacity mix relative to the return volume. Otherwise, a cost allocation mechanism that leads to effective design incentives can only guarantee individual rationality but not group incentive compatibility. This indicates a critical tradeoff between producers' design incentives and their voluntary participation in a collective system. That is, participation by enforcement may be required for a policy maker to induce superior designs and maintain a stable collective implementation (and therefore realize its cost efficiency advantage). If this is not feasible, then one needs to accept collective implementations as enablers of cost-efficiency at the expense of inferior design incentives, and find other means (i.e., other forms of regulatory intervention) besides cost allocation to provide design incentives.

Luyi Gui

Papers

Improving Humanitarian Operations through Technology-Enabled Collaboration

Efficient Implementation of Collective Extended Producer Responsibility Legislation

Implementing Extended Producer Responsibility Legislation

Design Incentives Under Collective Extended Producer Responsibility: A Network Perspective

Design Incentives Under Collective Extended Producer Responsibility: A Network Perspective