In Distributed Algorithms, Nancy Lynch provides a blueprint for designing, implementing, and analyzing distributed algorithms. She directs her book at a wide audience, including students, programmers, system designers, and researchers.



Distributed Algorithms contains the most significant algorithms and impossibility results in the area, all in a simple automata-theoretic setting. The algorithms are proved correct, and their complexity is analyzed according to precisely defined complexity measures. The problems covered include resource allocation, communication, consensus among distributed processes, data consistency, deadlock detection, leader election, global snapshots, and many others.



The material is organized according to the system model-first by the timing model and then by the interprocess communication mechanism. The material on system models is isolated in separate chapters for easy reference.



The presentation is completely rigorous, yet is intuitive enough for immediate comprehension. This book familiarizes readers with important problems, algorithms, and impossibility results in the area: readers can then recognize the problems when they arise in practice, apply the algorithms to solve them, and use the impossibility results to determine whether problems are unsolvable. The book also provides readers with the basic mathematical tools for designing new algorithms and proving new impossibility results. In addition, it teaches readers how to reason carefully about distributed algorithms-to model them formally, devise precise specifications for their required behavior, prove their correctness, and evaluate their performance with realistic measures.


Table of Contents

1 Introduction 
2 Modelling I; Synchronous Network Model 
3 Leader Election in a Synchronous Ring 
4 Algorithms in General Synchronous Networks 
5 Distributed Consensus with Link Failures 
6 Distributed Consensus with Process Failures 
7 More Consensus Problems 
8 Modelling II: Asynchronous System Model 
9 Modelling III: Asynchronous Shared Memory Model 
10 Mutual Exclusion 
11 Resource Allocation 
12 Consensus 
13 Atomic Objects 
14 Modelling IV: Asynchronous Network Model 
15 Basic Asynchronous Network Algorithms 
16 Synchronizers 
17 Shared Memory versus Networks 
18 Logical Time 
19 Global Snapshots and Stable Properties 
20 Network Resource Allocation 
21 Asynchronous Networks with Process Failures 
22 Data Link Protocols 
23 Partially Synchronous System Models 
24 Mutual Exclusion with Partial Synchrony 
25 Consensus with Partial Synchrony

Distributed algorithms

We introduce the concept of unreliable failure detectors and study how they can be used to solve Consensus in asynchronous systems with crash failures. We characterise unreliable failure detectors in terms of two properties—completeness and accuracy. We show that Consensus can be solved even with unreliable failure detectors that make an infinite number of mistakes, and determine which ones can be used to solve Consensus despite any number of crashes, and which ones require a majority of correct processes. We prove that Consensus and Atomic Broadcast are reducible to each other in asynchronous systems with crash failures; thus, the above results also apply to Atomic Broadcast. A companion paper shows that one of the failure detectors introduced here is the weakest failure detector for solving Consensus [Chandra et al. 1992].

/pdf/unreliable-failure-detectors-for-reliable-distributed-4o7ni5mkch.pdf

Unreliable failure detectors for reliable distributed systems

The state machine approach is a general method for implementing fault-tolerant services in distributed systems. This paper reviews the approach and describes protocols for two different failure models—Byzantine and fail stop. Systems reconfiguration techniques for removing faulty components and integrating repaired components are also discussed.

/pdf/implementing-fault-tolerant-services-using-the-state-machine-16diye054a.pdf

Implementing fault-tolerant services using the state machine approach: a tutorial

The problem addressed here concerns a set of isolated processors, some unknown subset of which may be faulty, that communicate only by means of two-party messages. Each nonfaulty processor has a private value of information that must be communicated to each other nonfaulty processor. Nonfaulty processors always communicate honestly, whereas faulty processors may lie. The problem is to devise an algorithm in which processors communicate their own values and relay values received from others that allows each nonfaulty processor to infer a value for each other processor. The value inferred for a nonfaulty processor must be that processor's private value, and the value inferred for a faulty one must be consistent with the corresponding value inferred by each other nonfaulty processor.It is shown that the problem is solvable for, and only for, n ≥ 3m + 1, where m is the number of faulty processors and n is the total number. It is also shown that if faulty processors can refuse to pass on information but cannot falsely relay information, the problem is solvable for arbitrary n ≥ m ≥ 0. This weaker assumption can be approximated in practice using cryptographic methods.

/pdf/reaching-agreement-in-the-presence-of-faults-2optz6t1lz.pdf

Reaching Agreement in the Presence of Faults

Our growing reliance on online services accessible on the Internet demands highly available systems that provide correct service without interruptions. Software bugs, operator mistakes, and malicious attacks are a major cause of service interruptions and they can cause arbitrary behavior, that is, Byzantine faults. This article describes a new replication algorithm, BFT, that can be used to build highly available systems that tolerate Byzantine faults. BFT can be used in practice to implement real services: it performs well, it is safe in asynchronous environments such as the Internet, it incorporates mechanisms to defend against Byzantine-faulty clients, and it recovers replicas proactively. The recovery mechanism allows the algorithm to tolerate any number of faults over the lifetime of the system provided fewer than 1/3 of the replicas become faulty within a small window of vulnerability. BFT has been implemented as a generic program library with a simple interface. We used the library to implement the first Byzantine-fault-tolerant NFS file system, BFS. The BFT library and BFS perform well because the library incorporates several important optimizations, the most important of which is the use of symmetric cryptography to authenticate messages. The performance results show that BFS performs 2p faster to 24p slower than production implementations of the NFS protocol that are not replicated. This supports our claim that the BFT library can be used to build practical systems that tolerate Byzantine faults.

/pdf/practical-byzantine-fault-tolerance-and-proactive-recovery-41bx19pxe1.pdf

Practical byzantine fault tolerance and proactive recovery

SIFT - Design and analysis of a fault-tolerant computer for aircraft control. [Software Implemented Fault Tolerant systems]

SIFT (Software Implemented Fault Tolerance) is an ultrareliable computer for critical aircraft control applications that achieves fault tolerance by the replication of tasks among processing units. The main processing units are off-the-shelf minicomputers, with standard microcomputers serving as the interface to the I/O system. Fault isolation is achieved by using a specially designed redundant bus system to interconnect the proeessing units. Error detection and analysis and system reconfiguration are performed by software. Iterative tasks are redundantly executed, and the results of each iteration are voted upon before being used. Thus, any single failure in a processing unit or bus can be tolerated with triplication of tasks, and subsequent failures can be tolerated after reconfiguration. Independent execution by separate processors means that the processors need only be loosely synchronized, and a novel fault-tolerant synchronization method is described. The SIFT software is highly structured and is formally specified using the SRI-developed SPECIAL language. The correctness of SIFT is to be proved using a hierarchy of formal models. A Markov model is used both to analyze the reliability of the system and to serve as the formal requirement for the SIFT design. Axioms are given to characterize the high-level behavior of the system, from which a correctness statement has been proved. An engineering test version of SIFT is currently being built.

/pdf/sift-design-and-analysis-of-a-fault-tolerant-computer-for-2tealmd58f.pdf

SIFT: Design and analysis of a fault-tolerant computer for aircraft control

SIFT (Software Implemented Fault Tolerance) is an experimental, fault-tolerant computer system designed to meet the extreme reliability requirements for safety-critical functions in advanced aircraft. Errors are masked by performing a majority voting operation over the results of identical computations, and faulty processors are removed from service by reassigning computations to the nonfaulty processors. This scheme has been implemented in a special architecture using a set of standard Bendix BDX930 processors, augmented by a special asynchronous-broadcast communication interface that provides direct, processor to processor communication among all processors. Fault isolation is accomplished in hardware; all other fault-tolerance functions, together with scheduling and synchronization are implemented exclusively by executive system software. The system reliability is predicted by a Markov model. Mathematical consistency of the system software with respect to the reliability model has been partially verified, using recently developed tools for machine-aided proof of program correctness.

/pdf/development-and-analysis-of-the-software-implemented-fault-2k90qzofk6.pdf

Development and analysis of the Software Implemented Fault-Tolerance (SIFT) computer

Software-implemented fault tolerant (SIFT) computer design for commercial aviation is reported. A SIFT design concept is addressed. Alternate strategies for physical implementation are considered. Hardware and software design correctness is addressed. System modeling and effectiveness evaluation are considered from a fault-tolerant point of view.

/pdf/design-study-of-software-implemented-fault-tolerance-sift-4214eeab22.pdf

M. W. Green

Papers

SIFT - Design and analysis of a fault-tolerant computer for aircraft control. [Software Implemented Fault Tolerant systems]

SIFT: Design and analysis of a fault-tolerant computer for aircraft control

SIFT: Design and analysis of a fault-tolerant computer for aircraft control

Development and analysis of the Software Implemented Fault-Tolerance (SIFT) computer

Design study of Software-Implemented Fault-Tolerance (SIFT) computer