Using a Bayesian likelihood approach, we estimate a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model for the US economy using seven macro-economic time series. The model incorporates many types of real and nominal frictions and seven types of structural shocks. We show that this model is able to compete with Bayesian Vector Autoregression models in out-of-sample prediction. We investigate the relative empirical importance of the various frictions. Finally, using the estimated model we address a number of key issues in business cycle analysis: What are the sources of business cycle fluctuations? Can the model explain the cross-correlation between output and inflation? What are the effects of productivity on hours worked? What are the sources of the "Great Moderation"?

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Shocks and Frictions in US Business Cycles: A Bayesian DSGE Approach

We study economic growth and inflation at different levels of government and external debt. Our analysis is based on new data on forty-four countries spanning about two hundred years. The dataset incorporates over 3,700 annual observations covering a wide range of political systems, institutions, exchange rate arrangements, and historic circumstances. Our main findings are: First, the relationship between government debt and real GDP growth is weak for debt/GDP ratios below a threshold of 90 percent of GDP. Above 90 percent, median growth rates fall by one percent, and average growth falls considerably more. We find that the threshold for public debt is similar in advanced and emerging economies. Second, emerging markets face lower thresholds for external debt (public and private)--which is usually denominated in a foreign currency. When external debt reaches 60 percent of GDP, annual growth declines by about two percent; for higher levels, growth rates are roughly cut in half. Third, there is no apparent contemporaneous link between inflation and public debt levels for the advanced countries as a group (some countries, such as the United States, have experienced higher inflation when debt/GDP is high.) The story is entirely different for emerging markets, where inflation rises sharply as debt increases.

Growth in a Time of Debt

What are the welfare effects of enhanced dissemination of public information through the media and disclosures by market participants with high public visibility? For instance, is it always desirable to have frequent and timely publications of economic statistics by government agencies and the central bank? We examine the impact of public information in a setting where agents take actions appropriate to the underlying fundamentals, but they also have a coordination motive arising from a strategic complementarity in their actions. When the agents have no private information, greater provision of public information always increases welfare. However, when agents also have access to independent sources of information, the welfare effect of increased public disclosures is ambiguous.

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Social Value of Public Information

Are natural resources a “curse” or a “blessing”? The empirical evidence suggests either outcome is possible. The paper surveys a variety of hypotheses and supporting evidence for why some countries benefit and others lose from the presence of natural resources. These include that a resource bonanza induces appreciation of the real exchange rate, deindustrialization and bad growth prospects, and that these adverse effects are more severe in volatile countries with bad institutions and lack of rule of law, corruption, presidential democracies, and underdeveloped financial systems. Another hypothesis is that a resource boom reinforces rent grabbing and civil conflict especially if institutions are bad, induces corruption especially in non-democratic countries, and keeps in place bad policies. Finally, resource rich developing economies seem unable to successfully convert their depleting exhaustible resources into other productive assets. The survey also offers some welfare-based fiscal rules for harnessing resource windfalls in developed and developing economies.

Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?

There is a global financial cycle in capital flows, asset prices and in credit growth. This cycle co‐moves with the VIX, a measure of uncertainty and risk aversion of the markets. Asset markets in countries with more credit inflows are more sensitive to the global cycle. The global financial cycle is not aligned with countries’ specific macroeconomic conditions. Symp toms can go from benign to large asset price bubbles and excess credit creation, which are among the best predictors of financial crises. A VAR analysis suggests that one of the determinants of the global financial cycle is monetary policy in the centre country , which affects leverage of global banks, capital flows and credit growth in the international financial system. Whenever capital is freely mobile, the global financial cycle constrains national monetary policies regardless of the exchange rate regime. For the past few decades, international macroeconomics has postulated the “trilemma”: with free capital mobility, inde pendent monetary policies are feasible if and only if exchange rates are floating. The global financial cycle transforms the trilemma into a “dilemma” or an “irreconcilable duo”: independent monetary policies are possible if and only if the capital account is managed. So should policy restrict capital mobility? Gains to international capital flows have proved elusive whether in calibrated models or in the data.  Large gross flows disrupt asset markets and financial intermediation, so the costs may be very large. To deal with the global financial cycle and the “dilemma”, we have the following policy options: ( a) targeted capital controls; (b) acting on one of the sources of the financial cyc le itself, the monetary policy of the Fed and other main central banks; (c) acting on the transmission channel cyclically by limiting credit growth and leverage during the upturn of the cycle, using national macroprudential policies; (d) acting on the transmission channel structurally by imposing stricter limit s on leverage for all financial intermediaries. We argue for a convex combination of (a), (c) and (d).

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Dilemma not Trilemma: The Global Financial Cycle and Monetary Policy Independence

“Welfare for everyone”, according to former chancellor and economics minister Ludwig Erhard, has been the credo of Germany’s economic and social policy for the past 60 years. However, Germany is increasingly failing to achieve this objective.

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Deutschlands hohe Ungleichheit verursacht wirtschaftlichen Schaden

Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has transformed Europe and has created an integrated pan-European economy. Much research has focused on understanding this integration process and what benefits and costs it entails. This paper identifies a political economy channel of EMU as the monetary union implies that member states had to transfer or at least curtail their policy autonomy in several areas, such as monetary policy and fiscal policy. The paper shows that EMU has helped reduce the impact of political shocks on the domestic economy of member states but magnified the transmission of political shocks within the euro area. Equally importantly, economies with a weaker track record in terms of economic and institutional quality exhibited a significantly higher sensitivity to domestic political shocks before EMU, but not thereafter. While this may entail that EMU has brought benefits to countries with a weaker economic and institutional stability by insulating them from adverse political developments at home, a potential drawback is that it may provide weaker market discipline for domestic political stability. JEL Classification: F31, F33, G14

The political economy under monetary union: has the euro made a difference?

Despite substantial differences in monetary policy and communication strategies, many central banks share the practice of purdah, a self-imposed guideline of abstaining from communication around policy meetings or other important events. This practice is remarkable, as it seems to contradict the virtue of transparency by requiring central banks to withhold information precisely when it is sought after intensely. However, imposing such a limit to communication has often been justified on grounds that such communication may create excessive market volatility and unnecessary speculation. This short paper assesses the purdah for the Federal Reserve. The empirical results confirm the conjecture that financial markets are substantially more sensitive to central bank communication around policy meetings. Short-term interest rates react three to four times more strongly to statements in the purdah before FOMC meetings than during other times, and market volatility increases (compared to a volatility reduction induced by statements otherwise). The findings thus offer relevant insights about the limits to central bank transparency. JEL Classification: E58, E52, E43

Purdah: on the rationale for central bank silence around policy meetings

We analyze the transmission of the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 to 415 country-industry equity portfolios. We use a factor model to predict crisis returns, defining unexplained increases in factor loadings and residual correlations as indicative of contagion. While we find evidence of contagion from the U.S. and the global financial sector, the effects are small. By contrast, there has been substantial contagion from domestic markets to individual domestic portfolios, with its severity inversely related to the quality of countries' economic fundamentals. This confirms the "wake-up call" hypothesis, with markets focusing more on country-specific characteristics during the crisis.

Marcel Fratzscher

Papers

Deutschlands hohe Ungleichheit verursacht wirtschaftlichen Schaden

The political economy under monetary union: has the euro made a difference?

Purdah: on the rationale for central bank silence around policy meetings

The Global Crisis and Equity Market Contagion

Nachhaltiges Wachstum: Braucht Deutschland ein Investitionsprogramm?