Marcelin Joanis

TL;DR: The authors empirically investigated the underlying causes of expenditure decentralization, based on the predictions of a new political economy model of partial fiscal decentralization and found that the degree of decentralization is endogenous and depends on the relative political conditions prevailing at each level of government.

TL;DR: In this article, a simple dynamic probabilistic voting model is proposed in which a government allocates a fixed budget across electoral districts that differ in their loyalties to the ruling party and the model predicts that the geographic pattern of spending depends on the way the government balances long-run "machine politics" considerations and the more immediate concern to win over swing voters.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide a theoretical treatment of the efficiency consequences of partial expenditure decentralization in developing countries, where two levels of government are involved in the provision of local public good, with voters imperfectly informed about each government's contribution to the public good.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated the relationship between public infrastructure spending and the productivity of the private sector using a recursive dynamic computable general equilibrium model of the Quebec economy to investigate various funding schemes to scale up infrastructure spending in the province.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors analyze the effect of partial decentralization on accountability using a two-period political agency model, in which two levels of government are involved in public good provision and voters are imperfectly informed about each government's contribution to the public good.