There is, I think, something ethereal about i —the square root of minus one. I remember first hearing about it at school. It seemed an odd beast at that time—an intruder hovering on the edge of reality.

Usually familiarity dulls this sense of the bizarre, but in the case of i it was the reverse: over the years the sense of its surreal nature intensified. It seemed that it was impossible to write mathematics that described the real world in …

I and i

다중혈관 관상동맥 환자에서 y-문합을 이용하여 양쪽 내흉동맥만을 사용한 우회술의 조기 성적

Starts with a brief review of the history and the application areas considered in the literature. The author then proceeds with introductory modeling examples, behavioral and structural properties, three methods of analysis, subclasses of Petri nets and their analysis. In particular, one section is devoted to marked graphs, the concurrent system model most amenable to analysis. Introductory discussions on stochastic nets with their application to performance modeling, and on high-level nets with their application to logic programming, are provided. Also included are recent results on reachability criteria. Suggestions are provided for further reading on many subject areas of Petri nets. >

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Petri nets: Properties, analysis and applications

What will 5G be? What it will not be is an incremental advance on 4G. The previous four generations of cellular technology have each been a major paradigm shift that has broken backward compatibility. Indeed, 5G will need to be a paradigm shift that includes very high carrier frequencies with massive bandwidths, extreme base station and device densities, and unprecedented numbers of antennas. However, unlike the previous four generations, it will also be highly integrative: tying any new 5G air interface and spectrum together with LTE and WiFi to provide universal high-rate coverage and a seamless user experience. To support this, the core network will also have to reach unprecedented levels of flexibility and intelligence, spectrum regulation will need to be rethought and improved, and energy and cost efficiencies will become even more critical considerations. This paper discusses all of these topics, identifying key challenges for future research and preliminary 5G standardization activities, while providing a comprehensive overview of the current literature, and in particular of the papers appearing in this special issue.

What Will 5G Be

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

Generalized stochastic Petri nets (GSPNs) are presented and are applied to the performance evaluation of multiprocessor systems. GSPNs are derived from standard Petri nets by partitioning the set of transitions into two subsets comprising timed and immediate transitions. An exponentially distributed random firing time is associated with each timed transition, whereas immediate transitions fire in zero time. It is shown that GSPN are equivalent to continuous-time stochastic processes, and solution methods for the derivation of the steady state probability distribution are presented. Examples of application of gspn models to the performance evaluation of multiprocessor systems show the usefulness and the effectiveness of this modeling tool. 15 references.

A class of generalized stochastic Petri nets for the performance evaluation of multiprocessor systems

In this paper we study with simple analytical models the energy-aware management of cellular access networks, trying to characterize the amount of energy that can be saved by reducing the number of active cells during the periods when they are not necessary because traffic is low. When some cells are switched off, radio coverage and service provisioning are taken care of by the cells that remain active, so as to guarantee that service is available over the whole area. We show how to optimize the energy saving, first assuming that any fraction of cells can be turned off, and then accounting for the constraints resulting from the cell layout.

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Optimal Energy Savings in Cellular Access Networks

A class of Petri nets (DSPN) in which transitions can fire after either a deterministic or a random, exponentially distributed, firing delay is defined, and a solution technique is presented to obtain the steady-state probability distribution over markings, introducing restrictions on the use of deterministic firing delays. An example of application of this modeling technique is presented to demonstrate the impact that the use of a mix of deterministic and exponentially distributed firing delays (instead of all exponentially distributed firing delays) can have on performance and reliability estimates.

On Petri nets with deterministic and exponentially distributed firing times

Petri nets in which random firing delays are associated with transitions whose firing is an atomic operation are known under the name “stochastic Petri nets” These models are discussed, with the purpose of explaining why they were proposed in the performance evaluation field, why random delays with negative exponential probability density functions are mainly used, and what are their strong and weak points An effort is made to summarize the lines of research that are currently being pursued, and to explain what new results would be regarded as breakthroughs and have the most impact on the use of this modeling technique in the application field

Stochastic Petri nets: an elementary introduction

The class of Petri nets obtained by eliminating timing from generalized stochastic Petri net (GSPN) models while preserving the qualitative behavior is identified. Structural results for those nets are derived, obtaining the first structural analysis of Petri nets with priority and inhibitor arcs. A revision of the GSPN definition based on the structural properties of the models is presented. It is shown that for a (wide) class of nets, the definition of firing probabilities of conflicting immediate transitions does not require the information on reachable markings. Identification of the class of models for which the net-level specification is possible is also based on the structural analysis results. The procedure for the model specification is illustrated by means of an example. It is also shown that a net-level specification of the model associated with efficient structural analysis techniques can have a substantial impact on model analysis. >

Marco Ajmone Marsan

Papers

A class of generalized stochastic Petri nets for the performance evaluation of multiprocessor systems

Optimal Energy Savings in Cellular Access Networks

On Petri nets with deterministic and exponentially distributed firing times

Stochastic Petri nets: an elementary introduction

Generalized stochastic Petri nets: a definition at the net level and its implications