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Marcus Peinado
Researcher at Microsoft
Publications - 142
Citations - 10777
Marcus Peinado is an academic researcher from Microsoft. The author has contributed to research in topics: Encryption & Digital content. The author has an hindex of 49, co-authored 139 publications receiving 10080 citations. Previous affiliations of Marcus Peinado include Center for Information Technology.
Papers
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Proceedings ArticleDOI
Controlled-Channel Attacks: Deterministic Side Channels for Untrusted Operating Systems
TL;DR: In this article, the authors introduce controlled channel attacks, a new type of sidechannel attack that allows an untrusted operating system to extract large amounts of sensitive information from protected applications on systems like Overshadow, Ink Tag or Haven.
Journal ArticleDOI
Shielding Applications from an Untrusted Cloud with Haven
TL;DR: The notion of shielded execution is introduced, which protects the confidentiality and integrity of a program and its data from the platform on which it runs (i.e., the cloud operator’s OS, VM, and firmware).
Proceedings ArticleDOI
VC3: Trustworthy Data Analytics in the Cloud Using SGX
Felix Schuster,Manuel Costa,Cédric Fournet,Christos Gkantsidis,Marcus Peinado,Gloria Mainar-Ruiz,Mark Russinovich +6 more
TL;DR: VC3 is the first system that allows users to run distributed MapReduce computations in the cloud while keeping their code and data secret, and ensuring the correctness and completeness of their results.
Patent
Binding a digital license to a portable device or the like in a digital rights management (DRM) system and checking out/checking in the digital license to/from the portable device or the like
TL;DR: In this paper, a digital license corresponding to the content is obtained, where the digital license includes the content key (KD) therein in an encrypted form, and a sub-license corresponding to and based on the obtained license is composed.
Proceedings Article
Inferring fine-grained control flow inside SGX enclaves with branch shadowing
TL;DR: A new, yet critical, side-channel attack, branch shadowing, that reveals fine-grained control flows (branch granularity) in an enclave and develops two novel exploitation techniques, a last branch record (LBR)-based history-inferring technique and an advanced programmable interrupt controller (APIC)-based technique to control the execution of an enclave in a finegrained manner.