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Felix Schuster

Researcher at Ruhr University Bochum

Publications -  21
Citations -  2304

Felix Schuster is an academic researcher from Ruhr University Bochum. The author has contributed to research in topics: Code (cryptography) & Attack surface. The author has an hindex of 14, co-authored 21 publications receiving 1964 citations. Previous affiliations of Felix Schuster include Microsoft & Bosch.

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Proceedings ArticleDOI

VC3: Trustworthy Data Analytics in the Cloud Using SGX

TL;DR: VC3 is the first system that allows users to run distributed MapReduce computations in the cloud while keeping their code and data secret, and ensuring the correctness and completeness of their results.
Proceedings Article

Oblivious multi-party machine learning on trusted processors

TL;DR: This work proposes data-oblivious machine learning algorithms for support vector machines, matrix factorization, neural networks, decision trees, and k-means clustering and shows that their efficient implementation based on Intel Skylake processors scales up to large, realistic datasets, with overheads several orders of magnitude lower than with previous approaches.
Proceedings ArticleDOI

Counterfeit Object-oriented Programming: On the Difficulty of Preventing Code Reuse Attacks in C++ Applications

TL;DR: It is demonstrated that many of these defenses that do not consider object-oriented C++ semantics precisely can be generically bypassed in practice, and that even recently proposed defenses that specifically target C++ are vulnerable to COOP.
Proceedings Article

Strong and efficient cache side-channel protection using hardware transactional memory

TL;DR: Cloak, a new technique that uses hardware transactional memory to prevent adversarial observation of cache misses on sensitive code and data, provides strong protection against all known cache-based side-channel attacks with low performance overhead.
Proceedings ArticleDOI

It's a TRaP: Table Randomization and Protection against Function-Reuse Attacks

TL;DR: This paper significantly improve and simplify the COOP attack, and presents a comprehensive code-reuse defense which is resilient against reuse of dynamically-bound functions and introduces two novel defense techniques: a practical technique to randomize the layout of tables containing code pointers resilient to memory disclosure and booby trap insertion to mitigate the threat of brute-force attacks iterating over the randomized tables.