The Pattern of the Chinese Past

eignty assumes a world of autonomous, internationally recognized, and wellgoverned states. Although frequently violated in practice, the fundamental rules of conventional sovereignty—recognition of juridically independent territorial entities and nonintervention in the internal affairs of other states—have rarely been challenged in principle. But these rules no longer work, and their inadequacies have had deleterious consequences for the strong as well as the weak. The policy tools that powerful and well-governed states have available to “ax” badly governed or collapsed states—principally governance assistance and transitional administration (whether formally authorized by the United Nations or engaged in by a coalition of the willing led by the United States)— are inadequate. In the future, better domestic governance in badly governed, failed, and occupied polities will require the transcendence of accepted rules, including the creation of shared sovereignty in speciac areas. In some cases, decent governance may require some new form of trusteeship, almost certainly de facto rather than de jure.1 Many countries suffer under failed, weak, incompetent, or abusive national authority structures. The best that people living in such countries can hope for is marginal improvement in their material well-being; limited access to social services, including health care and education; and a moderate degree of individual physical security. At worst they will confront endemic violence, exploitative political leaders, falling life expectancy, declining per capita income, and even state-sponsored genocide. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), for example, civil wars that have persisted for more than two decades have resulted in millions of deaths. In Zimbabwe the policies of President RobSharing Sovereignty

Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States

Can economic ties positively influence social relations and actions? If so, how does this influence operate? Microfinance programs, which provide credit through a group-based lending strategy, provide the ideal setting for exploring these questions. This article examines whether structuring socially isolated women into peer-groups for an explicitly economic purpose, such as access to credit, has any effect on the women s collective social behavior. Based on interviews with 400 women from 59 microfinance groups in West Bengal, India, I find that one third of these groups undertook various collective actions. Improvements in women s social capital and normative influence fostered this capacity for collective action. Several factors contributed to these transformations, including economic ties among members, the structure of the group network, and women's participation in group meetings. Based on these findings, I argue that microfinance groups have the potential to promote women s social capital and normative influence, thereby facilitating women s collective empowerment. I conclude by discussing the need for refining our understanding of social capital and social ties that promote normative influence.

From Credit to Collective Action: The Role of Microfinance in Promoting Women's Social Capital and Normative Influence

China’s long-term economic dynamics pose a formidable challenge to economic historians. The Qing Empire (1644 –1911), the world’ s largest national economy before 1800, experienced a tripling of population during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with no signs of diminishing per capita income. While the timing remains in dispute, a vast gap emerged between newly rich industrial nations and China’s lagging economy in the wake of the Industrial Revolution. Only with an unprecedented growth spurt beginning in the late 1970s did this great divergence separating China from the global leaders substantially diminish, allowing China to regain its former standing among the world’s largest economies. This essay develops an integrated framework for understanding that entire history, including both the divergence and the recent convergent trend. We explain how deeply embedded political and economic institutions that contributed to a long process of extensive growth before 1800 subsequently prevented China from capturing the benefits associated with the Industrial Revolution. During the twentieth century, the gradual erosion of these historic constraints and of new obstacles erected by socialist planning eventually opened the door to China’s current boom. Our analysis links China’s recent development to important elements of its past, while using recent success to provide fresh perspectives on the critical obstacles undermining earlier modernization efforts, and their eventual removal. (JEL N15, N45, O11, O47, P21, P24, P26)

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From Divergence to Convergence: Reevaluating the History behind China's Economic Boom

Introduction: What the Olympic Games Mean to China Chapter 1: Europe and the People without Sport History, or What Hosting the Olympic Games Means to China Chapter 2: The Clash of Cultures: Martial Arts and Olympic Sports Chapter 3: Symbols of State Power: Stadiums and National Identity in Beijing Chapter 4: What Women's Sports Mean to China Chapter 5: Mixing Sport and Politics: China and the International Olympic Committee Chapter 6: "China Bashing" at the Olympic Games: Why the Cold War Continues in Sport Journalism Chapter 7: Will the Olympics Change China, or Will China Change the Olympics?

Beijing's Games: What the Olympics Mean to China

Prologues Part I. Preludes Part II. The Emergence of a Bourgeois Class Part III. The Bourgeoisie and the Quest for Power and Modernity Notes Bibliography Index Series List.

The golden age of the Chinese bourgeoisie, 1911-1937

Note to reader Maps Introduction Part I. The Adventurer of the Southern Seas, 1866-1905: 1. The formative years, 1866-1894 2. The symbolic creation of a revolutionary leader, 1894-1897 3. The symbolic creation of a revolutionary movement, 1897-1900 4. The awakening of Chinese nationalism and the founding of the revolutionary alliance, 1805 Part II. The Founding Father? 1905-1920: 5. Sun and the revolutionary alliance 6. The conspirator 7. The (adoptive) father of the Chinese republic 8. Crossing the desert, 1913-1920 Part III. Sun's Last Years: National Revolution and Revolutionary Nationalism, 1920-1925: 9. Sun Yat-sen, soviet advisers, and the Canton revolutionary base, 1920-1924 10. Sun Yat-sen's three principles of the people 11. Sun Yat-sen's death and transformation Biographical sketches Notes Bibliography Index.

Sun Yat Sen

@fmct:Contents @toc4:Acknowledgments iii Preface: Veni iii @toc1:The Reason of the Strongest (Are there Rogue States?) @toc2:1 The Free Wheel 000 2 License and Freedom: the roue 000 3 The other of democracy, the "by turns": alternative and alternation 000 4 Mastery and Measure 000 5 Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, or How Not to Speak in Mottos 000 6 The Rogue that I Am 000 7 God, What More Do I Have To Say? In What Language To Come? 000 8 The Last of the Rogue States: The "Democracy to Come," Opening in Two Turns 000 9 (No) More Rogue States 000 10 Sending 000 @toc1:The "World" of the Enlightenment to Come (Exception, Calculation, Sovereignty) @toc2:1 Teleology and Architectonic: The Neutralization of the Event 000 2 To Arrive--at the Ends of the State (and of War, and of World War) 000 @toc4:Notes 000

Shanghai: China's Gateway to Modernity

China from the opium wars to the 1911 revolution

From the 1950s to the 1970s, historians′ approach to Republican China was informed by a predominant concern for Revolution. Scholarly priorities were focused on the early history of the Chinese Communist Party and on the socio-economic analysis of the countryside where the Chinese revolution had achieved its first success. Few publications were devoted to urban China. The Maoist regime until its end was seen to maintain a strong anti-urban stance. Great ex-treaty port cities were condemned for their past co-operation with foreign imperialism. In the West, the Republican era was often perceived as a confused interregnum between the Qing dynasty and the Communist Empire. And more than a few historians shared the views of their Chinese colleagues and featured big cities of the 1920s and 1930s as outposts of foreign economic exploitation and political oppression, as citadels of cultural arrogance.

Marie-Claire Bergère

Papers

The golden age of the Chinese bourgeoisie, 1911-1937

Sun Yat Sen

Shanghai: China's Gateway to Modernity

China from the opium wars to the 1911 revolution

Civil Society and Urban Change in Republican China