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Marina Minkin

Researcher at University of Michigan

Publications -  10
Citations -  1603

Marina Minkin is an academic researcher from University of Michigan. The author has contributed to research in topics: Virtual memory & Cache. The author has an hindex of 8, co-authored 10 publications receiving 1101 citations. Previous affiliations of Marina Minkin include Technion – Israel Institute of Technology.

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Proceedings Article

Foreshadow: extracting the keys to the intel SGX kingdom with transient out-of-order execution

TL;DR: This work presents Foreshadow, a practical software-only microarchitectural attack that decisively dismantles the security objectives of current SGX implementations and develops a novel exploitation methodology to reliably leak plaintext enclave secrets from the CPU cache.
Proceedings ArticleDOI

Fallout: Leaking Data on Meltdown-resistant CPUs

TL;DR: It is shown that Meltdown-like attacks are still possible, and software fixes with potentially significant performance overheads are still necessary to ensure proper isolation between the kernel and user space.
Proceedings ArticleDOI

Eleos: ExitLess OS Services for SGX Enclaves

TL;DR: Eleos introduces a novel Secure User-managed Virtual Memory (SUVM) abstraction that implements application-level paging inside the enclave, which eliminates the overheads of enclave exits due to paging, and enables new optimizations such as sub-page granularity of accesses.
Proceedings ArticleDOI

LVI: Hijacking Transient Execution through Microarchitectural Load Value Injection

TL;DR: This paper proposes Load Value Injection (LVI) as an innovative technique to reversely exploit Meltdown-type microarchitectural data leakage by directly injecting incorrect, attacker-controlled values into a victim’s transient execution.

Foreshadow-NG: Breaking the virtual memory abstraction with transient out-of-order execution

TL;DR: This report reviews mitigation strategies proposed by Intel, and explains how Foreshadow-NG necessitates additional OS and hypervisor-level defense mechanisms on top of existing Meltdown mitigations.