This paper studies the cross-sectional properties of return forecasts derived from Fama-MacBeth regressions. These forecasts mimic how an investor could, in real time, combine many firm characteristics to obtain a composite estimate of a stockâs expected return. Empirically, the forecasts vary substantially across stocks and have strong predictive power for actual returns. For example, using ten-year rolling estimates of Fama- MacBeth slopes and a cross-sectional model with 15 firm characteristics (all based on low-frequency data), the expected-return estimates have a cross-sectional standard deviation of 0.87% monthly and a predictive slope for future monthly returns of 0.74, with a standard error of 0.07.

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The Cross-section of Expected Stock Returns

Offering a unifying theoretical perspective not readily available in any other text, this innovative guide to econometrics uses simple geometrical arguments to develop students' intuitive understanding of basic and advanced topics, emphasizing throughout the practical applications of modern theory and nonlinear techniques of estimation. One theme of the text is the use of artificial regressions for estimation, reference, and specification testing of nonlinear models, including diagnostic tests for parameter constancy, serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, and other types of mis-specification. Explaining how estimates can be obtained and tests can be carried out, the authors go beyond a mere algebraic description to one that can be easily translated into the commands of a standard econometric software package. Covering an unprecedented range of problems with a consistent emphasis on those that arise in applied work, this accessible and coherent guide to the most vital topics in econometrics today is indispensable for advanced students of econometrics and students of statistics interested in regression and related topics. It will also suit practising econometricians who want to update their skills. Flexibly designed to accommodate a variety of course levels, it offers both complete coverage of the basic material and separate chapters on areas of specialized interest.

Estimation and Inference in Econometrics

. This study investigates firms subject to accounting enforcement actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission for alleged violations of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles. We investigate: (i) the extent to which the alleged earnings manipulations can be explained by extant earnings management hypotheses; (ii) the relation between earnings manipulations and weaknesses in firms' internal governance structures; and (iii) the capital market consequences experienced by firms when the alleged earnings manipulations are made public. We find that an important motivation for earnings manipulation is the desire to attract external financing at low cost. We show that this motivation remains significant after controlling for contracting motives proposed in the academic literature. We also find that firms manipulating earnings are: (i) more likely to have boards of directors dominated by management; (ii) more likely to have a Chief Executive Officer who simultaneously serves as Chairman of the Board; (iii) more likely to have a Chief Executive Officer who is also the firm's founder, (iv) less likely to have an audit committee; and (v) less likely to have an outside blockholder. Finally, we document that firms manipulating earnings experience significant increases in their costs of capital when the manipulations are made public.

Resume. Les auteurs analysent les entreprises assujetties aux mesures d'execution prises par la Securities and Exchange Commission dans les cas de presomption de transgression des principes comptables generalement reconnus. Ils s'interessent aux aspects suivants de la question: i) la mesure dans laquelle les presomptions de manipulations des benefices peuvent etre expliquees par les hypotheses existantes de gestion des benefices; ii) la relation entre les manipulations de benefices et les faiblesses des structures de regie interne des entreprises; et iii) la reaction du marche financier a l'endroit des entreprises au sujet desquelles les presomptions de manipulation des benefices sont rendues publiques. Les auteurs constatent qu'un incitatif majeur a la manipulation des benefices est le desir d'obtenir du financement externe a moindre cout. Ils demontrent que cet incitatif demeure important meme apres le controle des motifs contractuels que mettent de l'avant les travaux theoriques. Ils constatent egalement que les entreprises qui manipulent les benefices sont: i) davantage susceptibles d'avoir des conseils d'administration domines par la direction; ii) davantage susceptibles d'avoir un chef de la direction qui joue simultanement le role de president du conseil; iii) davantage susceptibles d'avoir un chef de la direction qui est egalement le fondateur de l'entreprise; iv) moins susceptibles d'avoir un comite de verification; et v) moins susceptibles d'avoir un bloc de titres detenus par un actionnaire exterieur. Enfin, les auteurs etablissent le fait que le cout du capital, pour les entreprises qui manipulent les benefices, enregistre des hausses appreciables lorsque ces manipulations sont rendues publiques.

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Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC*

https://isiarticles.com/bundles/Article/pre/pdf/14778.pdf

The market pricing of accruals quality

The basic paradigm of asset pricing is in vibrant f lux. The purely rational approach is being subsumed by a broader approach based upon the psychology of investors. In this approach, security expected returns are determined by both risk and misvaluation. This survey sketches a framework for understanding decision biases, evaluates the a priori arguments and the capital market evidence bearing on the importance of investor psychology for security prices, and reviews recent models.

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Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing

This paper evaluates alternative methods for classifying individual trades as market buy or market sell orders using intraday trade and quote data. We document two potential problems with quote-based methods of trade classification: quotes may be recorded ahead of trades that triggered them, and trades inside the spread are not readily classifiable. These problems are analyzed in the context of the interaction between exchange floor agents. We then propose and test relatively simple procedures for improving trade classifications. THE INCREASING AVAILABILITY OF intraday trade and quote data is opening new frontiers for financial market research. The improved ability to discern whether a trade was a buy order or a sell order is of particular importance. In Hasbrouck (1988), the classification of trades as buys or sells is used to test asymmetric-information and inventory-control theories of specialist behavior. In Blume, MacKinlay, and Terker (1989), a buy-sell classification is used to measure order imbalance in tests of breakdowns in the linkage between S&P stocks and non-S&P stocks during the crash of October, 1987. In Harris (1989), an increase in the ratio of buys to sells is used to explain the anomalous behavior of closing prices. In Lee (1990), the imbalance in buy-sell orders is used to measure the market response to an information event. In Holthausen, Leftwich, and Mayers (1987), a buy-sell classification is used to examine the differential effect of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated block trades. Most past studies have classified trades as buys or sells by comparing the trade price to the quote prices in effect at the time of the trade. In this paper, we identify two serious potential problems with this method, namely, that quotes are often recorded ahead of the trade that triggered them, and that

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb02683.x

Inferring Trade Direction from Intraday Data

For a sample of NYSE firms, we show that wide spreads are accompanied by low depths, and that spreads widen and depths fall in response to higher volume. Spreads widen and depths fall in anticipation of earnings announcements; these effects are more pronounced for announcements with larger subsequent price changes. Spreads are also wider following earnings announcements, but this effect dissipates quickly after controlling for volume. Collectively, our results suggest liquidity providers are sensitive to changes in information asymmetry risk and use both spreads and depths to actively manage this risk.

https://cdn.preterhuman.net/texts/unsorted2/Stock%20books%20032/Lee,%20Mucklow%20And%20Ready-Spreads,%20Depths,%20And%20The%20Impact%20Of%20Earnings%20Information%20-%20An%20Intraday%20Analysis.pdf

Spreads, Depths, and the Impact of Earnings Information: An Intraday Analysis

We use a robust regression estimator to analyze the risk premia on size and bookto-market. We find that the risk premium on size that was estimated by Fama and French (1992) completely disappears when the 1 percent most extreme observations are trimmed each month. We also show that the negative average of the monthly size coefficients reported by Fama and French can be entirely explained by the 16 months with the most extreme coefficients. We argue that further investigation of these results could lead to an understanding of the economic forces underlying the size effect, and may also yield important insights into how firms grow. IN RELATED ARTICLES, FAMA and French (1992 and 1993) argue that size and book-to-market play a dominant role in explaining cross-sectional differences in expected returns.' In the first article, Fama and French show that there appear to be risk premia associated with these factors, and in the second they show that long-short portfolios constructed to maximize the "loading" on these factors are useful in explaining the common variation in returns. In this article, we investigate the robustness of the estimated risk premia for size and book-to-market. If the estimates are driven by a small subset of firms or months, then our robust techniques will allow us to isolate these influential observations. We believe that identifying and investigating these observations could deepen our understanding of the economic reasons for the risk premia associated with size and book-to-market, which is particularly important since neither of these factors is identified with any well articulated equilibrium asset pricing model.2

On The Robustness of Size and Book‐to‐Market in Cross‐Sectional Regressions

Trading halts increase, rather than reduce, both volume and volatility. Volume (volatility) in the first full trading day after a trading halt is 230 percent (50 to 115 percent) higher than following "pseudohalts": nonhalt control periods matched on time of day, duration, and absolute net-of-market returns. These results are robust over different halt types and news categories. Higher posthalt volume is observed into the third day while higher posthalt volatility decays within hours. The extent of media coverage is a partial determinant of volume and volatility following both halts and pseudohalts, but a separate halt effect remains after controlling for the media effect. IN THE WAKE OF the 1987 market break, a number of commentators, including the Presidential Task Force on Market Mechanisms, recommended the establishment of "circuit breaker" mechanisms. The primary argument supporting circuit breakers (both price limits and trading halts) is that nontrading periods provide an opportunity for normal information transmission in times of market duress. Proponents of circuit breakers claim that, during major price changes there can be a breakdown in the transmission of information between the trading floor and market participants. Therefore, "the primary function of a circuit breaker should be to reinform participants" (Greenwald and Stein (1988), p. 17). By lowering informational asymmetries between traders, halts could permit the orderly emergence of a new consensus price. But would "informative" trading halts succeed? Many academics are openly suspicious of any kind of market interference and assume that trading halts are guilty until proven innocent. Grossman (1990, p. 3), for example, argues that the closing of markets "merely prevents consenting adults from carrying out their desires on the floor of the stock exchange." Not only do halts impose a liquidity cost on traders, but studies suggest that information will not be as

https://www.jstor.org/stable/info/2329140

Volume, Volatility, and New York Stock Exchange Trading Halts

Price improvement is the difference between the execution price of an order and the quoted bid or ask when the order was submitted. We show that expected price improvement falls off dramatically as the size of the order approaches the quoted depth, and becomes negative for larger orders. This is particularly important for small firms because the quoted depths are low. Using quoted spreads and depths and our estimate of expected price improvement, we show that trading strategies that attempt to exploit the weekly predictability of small-firm returns would be swamped by transaction costs. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.

Mark J. Ready

Papers

Inferring Trade Direction from Intraday Data

Spreads, Depths, and the Impact of Earnings Information: An Intraday Analysis

On The Robustness of Size and Book‐to‐Market in Cross‐Sectional Regressions

Volume, Volatility, and New York Stock Exchange Trading Halts

Estimating the profits from trading strategies