计量经济分析 = Econometric analysis

We will review some of the major results in random graphs and some of the more challenging open problems. We will cover algorithmic and structural questions. We will touch on newer models, including those related to the WWW.

Random graphs

Offering a unifying theoretical perspective not readily available in any other text, this innovative guide to econometrics uses simple geometrical arguments to develop students' intuitive understanding of basic and advanced topics, emphasizing throughout the practical applications of modern theory and nonlinear techniques of estimation. One theme of the text is the use of artificial regressions for estimation, reference, and specification testing of nonlinear models, including diagnostic tests for parameter constancy, serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, and other types of mis-specification. Explaining how estimates can be obtained and tests can be carried out, the authors go beyond a mere algebraic description to one that can be easily translated into the commands of a standard econometric software package. Covering an unprecedented range of problems with a consistent emphasis on those that arise in applied work, this accessible and coherent guide to the most vital topics in econometrics today is indispensable for advanced students of econometrics and students of statistics interested in regression and related topics. It will also suit practising econometricians who want to update their skills. Flexibly designed to accommodate a variety of course levels, it offers both complete coverage of the basic material and separate chapters on areas of specialized interest.

Estimation and Inference in Econometrics

On robust estimation of the location parameter

Boards of directors serve two important functions for organizations: monitoring management on behalf of shareholders and providing resources. Agency theorists assert that effective monitoring is a function of a board's incentives, whereas resource dependence theorists contend that the provision of resources is a function of board capital. We combine the two perspectives and argue that board capital affects both board monitoring and the provision of resources and that board incentives moderate these relationships.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/30040728.pdf

Boards of Directors and Firm Performance: Integrating Agency and Resource Dependence Perspectives

Assesses the relationship between boards of directors, compensation committees and top management pay, focusing on the role and impact of corporate governance mechanisms and the structure of boards of directors to explain variations in top management pay in the UK. Uses data from the 'Financial Times' top 100 companies to examine the relationship between: top management compensation, non-executive directors and corporate performance; top management compensation, existence of compensation committees and proportion of non-executives on these committees; and the relationship between top management compensation and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality. Finds that, in general, boardroom control and vigilance has a limited effect in shaping top management compensation, neither the proportion of outside directors, nor CEO duality being related to management compensation; and companies adopting compensation committees have higher levels of top management pay. Demonstrates that the direct effect of boardroom control variables on the level of management compensation is minimal.

Board Control, Remuneration Committees, and Top Management Compensation

We document differences in CEO pay and incentives in the United States and the United Kingdom for 1997. After controlling for size, sector and other firm and executive characteristics, CEOs in the US earn 45% higher cash compensation and 190% higher total compensation. The calculated effective ownership percentage in the US implies that the median CEO receives 1.48% of any increase in shareholder wealth compared to 0.25% in the UK The differences, can be largely attributed to greater share option awards in the US arising from institutional and cultural differences between the two countries. Corporate governance practices in the United Kingdom received increased attention in the 1990s, culminating in influential reports issued by the Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1995) and Hampel (1998) committees. Among other recommendations, the reports outlined a best-practice framework for setting executive pay, and significantly expanded disclosure rules for UK executive compensation. The Greenbury and Hampel reports were, in part, a response to a growing controversy over chief executive officer (CEO) pay levels triggered when executives in several recently privatised electric utilities exercised share options worth millions of pounds. However, in spite of these reports, CEO pay levels rose more than 18% in 1997 alone, even as publicsector workers were being asked to accept raises of less than 3% (Buckingham and Cowe, 1998 a,b). The continuing controversy, coupled with enhanced data availability through the new disclosure requirements, has sparked considerable academic interest in UK executive pay practices. Although CEO pay levels in the United Kingdom have grown in recent years, they remain far behind pay levels enjoyed by CEOs in the United States. The international pay gap is especially pronounced after including gains realised from exercising share options. Chief executives in the 500 largest UK companies in aggregate made ?330 million (or ?660,000 each) in 1997, including ?74 million from exercising options. In contrast, the top 500 US CEOs made in aggregate ?3.2 billion (or ?6.3 million each), including ?2.0 billion from option exercises.' Indeed, Disney's Michael Eisner, dubbed by pay-critic Graef Crystal

The prince and the pauper? ceo pay in the

We document differences in CEO pay and incentives in the United States and the United Kingdom for 1997. After controlling for size, sector and other firm and executive characteristics, CEOs in the US earn 45% higher cash compensation and 190% higher total compensation. The calculated effective ownership percentage in the US implies that the median CEO receives 1.48% of any increase in shareholder wealth compared to 0.25% in the UK. The differences, can be largely attributed to greater share option awards in the US arising from institutional and cultural differences between the two countries.

The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the United States and United Kingdom

This paper addresses three weaknesses in the literature on new organizational forms: the limited mapping of the extent of contemporary organizational change; confusion about how contemporary changes link together; and the lack of systematic testing of the performance consequences of this kind of change. Drawing on a large-scale survey of organizational innovation in European firms, the paper finds widespread but not revolutionary change in terms of organization structure, processes, and boundaries. Using the economics notion of complementarities, the paper develops contingency and configurational approaches to suggest that organizational innovations will tend to cluster in particular ways and that the performance benefits of these innovations depend on their clustering. Complementarities in performance are explored from both inductive and deductive perspectives. Consistent with the expectations of complementarity theory, high-performing firms appeared to be innovating more and differently than low-performing firms. Again consistent with complementarities, piecemeal changes-with the exception of IT-were found to deliver little performance benefit, while exploitation of the full set of innovations was associated with high performance. Though few European firms were found to exploit the complementarities of new organizational practices, those that did enjoyed high-performance premia.

Martin J. Conyon

Papers

Board Control, Remuneration Committees, and Top Management Compensation

The prince and the pauper? ceo pay in the

The Prince and the Pauper? CEO Pay in the United States and United Kingdom

Change and Complementarities in the New Competitive Landscape: A European Panel Study

Change and Complementarities in the New Competitive Landscape: a European Panel Study, 1992-1996