The Inflationary Universe

Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Truth and its Deformities

BERTRAND RUSSELL is the Picasso of modern philosophy. He has expressed himself very differently at different periods; and in each period he has exerted deservedly great influence and aroused extravagant hostility. That his works have always produced so strong a reaction is partly due to the sharpness and clarity with which they have been written. But this, unfortunately, does not hold good of his latest book, which differs not so much in its subject matter as in its style from anything that he has written before. It deals in a comprehensive, if unsystematic, way with the class of philosophical problems that are conventionally brought under the heading of the theory of knowledge. Many interesting questions are raised by it and ingenious answers suggested. But the argument as a whole suffers from a hesitancy and discursiveness which make it unexpectedly difficult to follow. An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth By Bertrand Russell. Pp. 352. (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1940). 12s. 6d. net

An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth

1. Conceptual Foundations of Emergence Theory I. THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES 2. The Physics of Downward Causation 3. The Emergence of Classicality from Quantum Theory 4. On the Nature of Emergent Reality II. THE BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES 5. Emergence: The Hole at the Wheel's Hub 6. The Role of Emergence in Biology 7. Emergence in Social Evolution: A Great Ape Example III. CONSCIOUSNESS AND EMERGENCE 8. Being Realistic about Emergence 9. In Defence of Ontological Emergence and Mental Causation 10. Emergence and Mental Causation 11. Varieties of Emergence IV. RELIGION AND EMERGENCE 12. Emergence, Mind, and Divine Action: The Hierarchy of the Sciences in Relation to the Human Mind-Brain-Body 13. Emergence: What is at Stake for Religious Reflection? 14. Emergence from Quantum Physics to Religion: A Critical Appraisal

The Re-Emergence of Emergence: The Emergentist Hypothes

Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science.

In the last decade, structural realism has been presented as the most promising strategy for developing a defensible realist view of science. Nevertheless, controversy still continues in relation to the exact meaning of the proposed structuralism. The stronger version of structural realism, the so-called ontic structural realism, has been argued for on the basis of some ideas related to quantum mechanics. In this paper, I will first outline these arguments, mainly developed by Steven French and James Ladyman, then challenge them, putting a particular emphasis on a metaphysical principle (the Principle of the Identity of the Indiscernibles) which, even though it is crucial for the whole argument, hasn't been, in my opinion, clearly stated and examined yet. My overall view will be that a weaker version of the form of realism we are considering is more plausible – namely, epistemic structural realism.

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On the preferability of epistemic structural realism

This paper offers a critical assessment of the current state of the debate about the identity and individuality of material objects. Its main aim, in particular, is to show that, in a sense to be carefully specified, the opposition between the Leibnizian ‘reductionist’ tradition, based on discernibility, and the sort of ‘primitivism’ that denies that facts of identity and individuality must be analysable has become outdated. In particular, it is argued that—contrary to a widespread consensus—‘naturalised’ metaphysics supports both the acceptability of non-qualitatively grounded (both ‘contextual’ and intrinsic) identity and a pluralistic approach to individuality and individuation. A case study is offered that focuses on non-relativistic quantum mechanics, in the context of which primitivism about identity and individuality, rather than being regarded as unscientific, is on the contrary suggested to be preferable to the complicated forms of reductionism that have recently been proposed. More generally, by assuming a plausible form of anti-reductionism about scientific theories and domains, it is claimed that science can be regarded as compatible with, or even as suggesting, the existence of a series of equally plausible grades of individuality. The kind of individuality that prevails in a certain context and at a given level can be ascertained only on the basis of the specific scientific theory at hand.

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Grades of individuality. A pluralistic view of identity in quantum mechanics and in the sciences

In recent work, the interrelated questions of whether there is a fundamental level to reality, whether ontological dependence must have an ultimate ground, and whether the monist thesis should be endorsed that the whole universe is ontologically prior to its parts have been explored with renewed interest. Jonathan Schaffer has provided arguments in favour of 'priority monism' in a series of articles (2003, 2004, 2007a, 2007b, forthcoming). In this paper, these arguments are analysed, and it is claimed that they are not compelling: in particular, the possibility that there is no ultimate level of basic entities that compose everything else is on a par with the possibility of infinite 'upward' complexity. The idea that we must, at any rate, postulate an ontologically fundamental level for methodological reasons (Cameron 2008) is also discussed and found unconvincing: all things considered, there may be good reasons for endorsing 'metaphysical infinitism'. In any event, a higher degree of caution in formulating metaphysical claims than found in the extant literature appears advisable.

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Ontological Priority, Fundamentality and Monism

The present paper discusses different approaches to metaphysics and defends a specific, non-deflationary approach that nevertheless qualifies as scientifically-grounded and, consequently, as acceptable from the naturalistic viewpoint. By critically assessing some recent work on science and metaphysics, we argue that such a sophisticated form of naturalism, which preserves the autonomy of metaphysics as an a priori enterprise yet pays due attention to the indications coming from our best science, is not only workable but recommended.

/pdf/moderately-naturalistic-metaphysics-480z6yi9hh.pdf

Moderately naturalistic metaphysics

This paper is about metaphysical ‘infinitism’, the view that there are, or could be, infinite chains of ontological dependence. Its main aim is to show that, contrary to widespread opinion, metaphysical infinitism is a coherent position. On the basis of this, it is then additionally argued that metaphysical infinitism need not fare worse than the more canonical ‘foundationalist’ alternatives when it comes to formulating metaphysical explanations. In the course of the discussion, a rather unexplored parallel with the debate concerning infinitism about justification is suggested.

Matteo Morganti

Papers

On the preferability of epistemic structural realism

Grades of individuality. A pluralistic view of identity in quantum mechanics and in the sciences

Ontological Priority, Fundamentality and Monism

Moderately naturalistic metaphysics

Dependence, Justification and Explanation: Must Reality be Well-Founded?