Knowledge and the Flow of Information.

The Creative Mind: Myths and Mechanisms.

This article offers a theoretical framework to explain circumstances under which perceptions of “unrealness” affect engagement in narratives and subsequent perceived realism judgments. A mental models approach to narrative processing forms the foundation of a model that integrates narrative comprehension and phenomenological experiences such as transportation and identification. Three types of unrealness are discussed: fictionality, external realism (match with external reality), and narrative realism (coherence within a story). We gather evidence that fictionality does not affect narrative processing. On the other hand, violations of external and narrative realism are conceived as inconsistencies among the viewer’s mental structures as they construct mental models of meaning to represent and comprehend the narrative. These inconsistencies may result in negative online evaluations of a narrative’s realism, may disrupt engagement, and may negatively influence postexposure (reflective) realism judgments as well as lessen a narrative’s persuasive power.

Resume

« Fictionnalite» et realisme percu des histoires : Un modele de comprehension et d'implication narratives



Cet article propose un cadre theorique visant a expliquer les circonstances dans lesquelles les perceptions d’« irrealite» affectent l’implication dans les narratifs et les jugements subsequents de perception de realisme. Une approche par modeles mentaux du traitement des narratifs forme la base d’un modele qui integre la comprehension narrative et les experiences phenomenologiques telles que le transport et l’identification. Trois types d’irrealite sont commentes : la « fictionnalite», le realisme externe (concordance avec une realite externe) et le realisme narratif (coherence d’une histoire). Nous reunissons ici des preuves a l’effet que la fictionnalite n’affecte pas le traitement narratif. D’autre part, les violations des realismes externe et narratif sont percues comme des incoherences dans les structures mentales des spectateurs, puisque ceux-ci construisent des modeles mentaux de significations afin de representer et comprendre le narratif. Ces incoherences peuvent avoir pour resultats des evaluations negatives du realisme d’un narratif sur le coup. Elles peuvent egalement interrompre l’implication, influencer negativement les jugements de realisme a posteriori (jugements reflexifs) et amoindrir la puissance persuasive d’un narratif.

Abstract

Fiktionalitat und wahrgenommener Realismus beim Erleben von Geschichten: Ein Modell zum narrativen Verstehen und Erleben



Dieser Artikel bietet einen theoretischen Rahmen, um Bedingungen zu erklaren unter denen die Wahrnehmung von Unwirklichkeit die Art und Weise des Erlebens von Geschichten und daraus resultierend Realismusurteile beeinflusst. Unter Ruckgriff auf einen Mentale-Modelle-Ansatz zur Verarbeitung von Narrationen werden narratives Verstehen und phanomenologische Erlebensweisen wie Transportation und Identifikation im Modell integriert. Drei Typen von Unwirklichkeit werden diskutiert: Fiktionalitat, externaler Realismus (Passung mit der externalen Realitat) und narrativer Realismus (Stimmigkeit mit der Geschichte). Unsere Daten zeigen, dass Fiktionalitat die narrative Verarbeitung nicht beeinflusst. Allerdings wird deutlich, dass Verletzungen des externalen und narrativen Realismus als Inkonsistenzen in den mentalen Strukturen der Zuschauer wahrgenommen werden, da Zuschauer mentale Bedeutungsmodelle konstruieren, um die Geschichte abzubilden und zu verstehen. Diese Inkonsistenzen konnten in negativen Ad-Hoc-Bewertungen von narrativem Realismus resultieren, konnten Erleben storen oder postrezeptive (reflektierende) Realismusurteile negativ beeinflussen - und letztendlich die persuasive Kraft der Narration verringern.

Resumen

La Ficcion y el Realismo Percibido en la Experiencia de las Historias: Un Modelo de la Comprension y el Compromiso Narrativo



Este articulo ofrece un marco teorico para explicar las circumstancias bajo las cuales las percepciones de “irrealismo” afectan el compromiso de las narrativas y los juicios de las percepciones de realismo subsequente. Un modelo mental de aproximacion de los procesamientos narrativos forma un modelo fundacional que integra la comprension narrativa y las experiencias fenomenologicas como por ejemplo la transportacion y la identificacion. Tres tipos de irrelismo son discutidos: ficcion, realismo externo (correspondencia con la realidad externa), y realismo narrativo (coherencia dentro de una historia). Juntamos evidencia que la ficcionalidad no afecta el procesamiento narrativo. Por otro lado, las violaciones al realismo externo y narrativo son concebidas como inconsistencias entre las estructuras mentales de la audiencia dado que ellos construyen modelos mentales de significacion para representar y comprender la narrativa. Estas inconsistencias pueden resultar en evaluaciones online negativas de una narrativa de realismo, pueden trastornar el compromiso, e influir negativamente sobre los juicios de realismo despues de la exposicion (reflectiva) asi como tambien disminuir el poder persuasivo de la narrativa.

ZhaiYao



Yo yak

Fictionality and Perceived Realism in Experiencing Stories: A Model of Narrative Comprehension and Engagement

and general in order to be able to be performed on a wide variety of new inputs. The inputs may be an inventory of notes based upon key, style, et cetera. (Pressing’s cognitive model calls this the “referent.”) My taxonomy is a way of making those inputs clear. 184 Since improvisation (and composition) is fundamentally cognitive and motor selection, then this presupposes a set of things from which to select. One can only select if there are options, choices. Now, it seems that whether a person (agent) is aware (conscious or cognizant of the options (all or even some)), one may always post facto reconstruct the set of choices which were available or present to the agent at the time of selection. By this I mean the set of choices that were available to the agent from an objective point of view. This set has little to do with the actual, individual conscious states of the agent; however, it does involve many specific conditions of the agent and the agent’s environment. For example, a musician S may say that “it never occurred to me to play that B-flat after the A,” even though objectively that choice was available to S. Sometimes, however, we describe others, and even ourselves, as just doing something—no other options presented themselves to consciousness. So, “selection” may seem like an inappropriate term or concept for what is going on in improvisation. It may, however, seem more accurate in composition. When humans perform actions in quick succession, consciously it does not seem like a choice or decision is being made for each separate action. In fact, in some cases it may be difficult to individuate the rapid succession of actions into discrete units. It seems to be a unitary flow of movements. These are half-intentional actions. Beside the (SCI) case, examples of this kind of phenomenon are playing sports, talking, and just mundane actions like walking to the market. From a phenomenological perspective, in some moments the choice or decision aspect can be discerned, while other moments “feel” automatic. Consequently, it is in these seemingly automatic moments that selection may be an erroneous description. But there are several pieces of evidence that suggest that in both cases similar or the same processes are realized. First, it would be impossible to account for talent and skill if some sense of choice or selection or decision was not involved. Indeed, psychologists and others 185 indicate that some people are better than others (usually in some specific domain of behavior) in their speed of thinking, choosing, and moving in situations that require rapidity. In other words, if we cannot attribute responsibility to selection or choice, even in an attenuated sense, training and effort would be diminished or demolished. Why would one train if one could not control the automatic thinking or moving? What would be our understanding of talent and expertise? Second, there is reductio ad absurdam argument that can be given here, analogous to the one Thomas Nagel presents in the classic “Moral Luck” article. One could argue that artistic agents are never responsible for anything they do; they have no agency because all novel thoughts impinge. Humans do not cause their thoughts and selection. My only response is that creativity is still a mystery, and we are not yet epistemically entitled to run this argument to the point of absurdity. Furthermore, cognitive science has informed us that even in these moments sub-conscious motor and kinetic programs or mechanisms are running. Some of these were delineated for improvisation above. This is one reason why a phenomenology needs to be appended to cognitive models and the like. One should also be interested in what is present to the consciousness of the agent, and what is consciously occurring while playing (if anything), not only the underlying processes posited by a cognitive theory, nor what could be going on as argued for in a philosophical theory. David Sudnow is perhaps the best example of a phenomenological approach to improvising. By introspecting on his improvised piano playing and his learning how to play 62 For example, see Sian Beilock, Choke: What the Secrets of the Brain Reveal about Getting It Right When You Have To (New York: Free Press, 2010). 63 Thomas Nagel, “Moral Luck” in Mortal Questions, Canto Classics Series (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 24-38. 64 David Sudnow, Ways of the Hand: The Organization of Improvised Conduct (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978), and David Sudnow, Ways of the Hand: A Rewritten Account, foreword by Hubert L. Dreyfus (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001). 186 paino and improvise, Sudnow gives excellent descriptions of the process and actions. One of the most important insights he gives is that selection in jazz piano improvisation is in large part about fingering and the way one’s hands and fingers move across the keys. I can attest that the same is true for stringed instruments, like guitar. Often, when I improvise, my attention is on finger patterns that I know work (with embellishments) over certain “changes.” How strongly the phenomenology of playing an instrument comes to play in thinking about creativity and improvisation in particular comes to the fore in this extraordinary account of a conversation with the famous, brilliant pianist Bill Evans. ... I [Gene Lees] kidded him [Bill Evans] about his rocking a finger on a key on a long note at the end of a phrase. After all, the hammer has already left the string: one has no further physical contact with the sound. ‘Don’t you know the piano has no vibrato?’ I said. ‘Yes,’ Bill responded, ‘but trying for it affects what comes before it in the phrase.’ Evans reveals that there are motor selections that do not enter into the perceivable product (in this case sounds) but yet affect properties of that product. Not all selections will be perceivable in the final product (e.g., performance, recording). One should also be aware that selection may be coerced in both a literal and metaphorical sense. External factors such as authorities may constrain what artists do, thereby eliminating or reducing choices. I may only have the resources to learn one instrument. If I only know how to play saxophone, I am not going to pick up a trumpet. At any given time t, the agent (improviser, player, performer) has twelve pitches available in the range physically determined by the instrument. This range is vague because 65 Gene Lees, “The Poet Bill Evans,” in Reading Jazz: A Gathering of Autobiography, Reportage, and Criticism from 1919 to Now, ed. Robert, Gottlieb (New York: Pantheon, 1996), 424. 187 given certain techniques, which some musicians are able to do and others not, and physical enhancements to instruments, the range can be extended, both to the top and bottom of the frequency or pitch range. But it would wrong to suppose that this complete selection options set is fully available every time, in every context to an improviser. What decreases the possibilities of the selection options group are the constraints that are given and/or accepted by the player, the genre, context, et cetera. Now, the agent may at any point deviate from these constraints (intentionally or otherwise), but she may not deviate from the complete selection options group, unless she changes instrument or technique. The idealized selection options group is coextensive with the set of all physically realizable pitches and all possible durations. This set may be expressed in many ways. For instance, one could simply give the Hertz (Hz) cycles (frequency) of the pitch indexed to a timed duration, such as eight seconds or two seconds. Obviously, this is an infinite set, because the duration of a produced pitch could be infinitely long, and the sound waves, although severely limited by human audibility capacity (even non-human animal audibility) could be infinitely low or high, although there are frequencies which we cease to call sounds. Practically, in Western music theory, the accepted range of pitches is the human audition range (called audio or sonic), 66 I am assuming the agent is using the Western Equal Temperament (ET) tempered system. On the drawbacks of the exclusive use of the ET system that was more or less codified in the eighteenth century, see Ross W. Duffin, How Equal Temperament Ruined Harmony (and Why You Should Care) (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007). Scholars have identified at least 150 different temperament tuning systems in Western art music. Of course, ET does not apply to many non-Western music systems. The locus classicus is J. Murray Barbour, Tuning and Temperament: A Historical Survey, Dover Books on Music Series (n.d., n.p., 1951; reprint ed., New York: Dover, 2004). 188 which is approximately from 20 50 Hz (the lowest pipe organ sounds) to 20,000 30,000 Hz; while the accepted range of durations caps out at 128 notes. Selection is the process of choosing an output. The output may be physically realized or produced sound, or a notation for a realizable sound, or both. A single selection is actually an array of various factors as explicated in Pressing’s cognitive model. In using the term “choosing,” or “choice,” again I make no commitment to a theory of free will. This theory and taxonomy may remain neutral. If free will is false, then the selection process will be a product of some set of causal laws. Those causal laws will still have to operate within the taxonomy. Moreover, ideally a selection may be viewed as a choice of each discrete unit with relevant arrays, even though phenomenologically one may not be aware of all of the arrays. A musical phrase or lick may be played wherein the agent chose to play the lick as a whole. The entire phrase, then, which may consist of several pitches of different durations, dynamics, rhythms, and attacks, is the unit of selection—not each discrete pitch et cetera. Following are the selection options sets for musical sound generation (

The metaphysics of improvisation

Research seeking a scientific foundation for the theory of art appreciation has raised controversies at the intersection of the social and cognitive sciences. Though equally relevant to a scientific inquiry into art appreciation, psychological and historical approaches to art developed independently and lack a common core of theoretical principles. Historicists argue that psychological and brain sciences ignore the fact that artworks are artifacts produced and appreciated in the context of unique historical situations and artistic intentions. After revealing flaws in the psychological approach, we introduce a psycho-historical framework for the science of art appreciation. This framework demonstrates that a science of art appreciation must investigate how appreciators process causal and historical information to classify and explain their psychological responses to art. Expanding on research about the cognition of artifacts, we identify three modes of appreciation: basic exposure to an artwork, the artistic design stance, and artistic understanding. The artistic design stance, a requisite for artistic understanding, is an attitude whereby appreciators develop their sensitivity to art-historical contexts by means of inquiries into the making, authorship, and functions of artworks. We defend and illustrate the psycho-historical framework with an analysis of existing studies on art appreciation in empirical aesthetics. Finally, we argue that the fluency theory of aesthetic pleasure can be amended to meet the requirements of the framework. We conclude that scientists can tackle fundamental questions about the nature and appreciation of art within the psycho-historical framework.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0140525X12000489

The artful mind meets art history: toward a psycho-historical framework for the science of art appreciation.

Apparently snobbery undermines justification for and legitimacy of aesthetic claims. It is also pervasive in the aesthetic realm, much more so than we tend to presume. If these two claims are combined, a fundamental problem arises: we do not know whether or not we are justified in believing or making aesthetic claims. Addressing this new challenge requires an epistemological story which underpins when, where and why snobbish judgement is problematic, and how appreciative claims can survive. This leads towards a virtue-theoretic account of art appreciation and aesthetic justification, as contrasted with a purely reliabilist one – a new direction for contemporary aesthetics.

The vice of snobbery: aesthetic knowledge, justification and virtue in art appreciation

Gregory Currie, Matthew Kieran, Aaron Meskin and Jon Robson: Introduction Part I: Method 1: Dominic McIver Lopes: Feckless Reason 2: Sherri Irvin: Is Aesthetic Experience Possible? 3: David Davies: 'This is Your Brain on Art': What Can Philosophy of Art Learn from Neuroscience? 4: Fabian Dorsch: The Limits of Aesthetic Empiricism 5: Bence Nanay: Philosophy of Perception as a Guide to Aesthetics 6: Christy Mag Uidhir and Cameron Buckner: Portrait of the Artist as an Aesthetic Expert Part II: First Order Issues 7: Jesse Prinz: Seeing with Feeling 8: Noel Carroll: The Arts, Emotion, and Evolution 9: Jonathan Weinberg: All Your Desires in One Box 10: Kathleen Stock: Physiological Evidence and the Paradox of Fiction 11: Stacie Friend: Believing in Stories Index

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Aesthetics and the Sciences of Mind

Acknowledgments.Notes on Contributors.Introduction: A Conceptual Map of Issues in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art (Matthew Kieran).HOW ARE ARTISTIC EXPERIENCE AND VALUE INTER-RELATED?.1. Aesthetic Empiricism and the Challenge of Fakes and Ready-mades (Gordon Graham).2. Against Enlightened Empiricism (David Davies).References and Suggested Reading.IN WHAT DOES TRUE BEAUTY CONSIST?.3. Beauty and Ugliness in and out of Context (Marcia Muelder Eaton).4. Terrible Beauties (Carolyn Korsmeyer).References and Suggested Reading.WHAT IS THE NATURE OF AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE?.5. Aesthetic Experience: A Question of Content (Noel Carroll).6. The Aesthetic State of Mind (Gary Iseminger).References and Suggested Reading.SHOULD WE VALUE WORKS AS ART FOR WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM THEM?.7. Art and Cognition (Berys Gaut).8. Cognitive Values in the Arts: Marking the Boundaries (Peter Lamarque).References.HOW DO PICTURES REPRESENT?.9. The Speaking Image: Visual Communication and the Nature of Depiction (Robert Hopkins).10. The Domain of Depiction (Dominic McIver Lopes).References and Suggested Reading.WHAT CONSTITUTES ARTISTIC EXPRESSION?.11. Artistic Expression and the Hard Case of Pure Music (Stephen Davies).12. Musical Expressiveness as Hearability-as-Expression (Jerrold Levinson).References and Suggested Reading.IN WHAT WAYS IS THE IMAGINATION INVOLVED IN ENGAGING WITH ARTWORKS?.13. Anne Bronte and the Uses of Imagination (Gregory Currie).14. Imagine That! (Jonathan M. Weinberg and Aaron Meskin).References and Suggested Reading.CAN EMOTIONAL RESPONSES TO FICTION BE GENUINE AND RATIONAL?.15. Genuine Rational Fictional Emotions (Tamar Szabo Gendler and Karson Kovakovich).16. The Challenge of Irrationalism and How Not To Meet It (Derek Matravers).References and Suggested Reading.IS ARTISTIC INTENTION RELEVANT TO THE INTERPRETATION OF ART WORKS?.17. Interpretation and the Problem of the Relevant Intention (Robert Stecker).18. Art, Meaning, and Artist's Meaning (Daniel O. Nathan).References and Suggested Reading.ARE THERE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EVALUATION?.19. There are no Aesthetic Principles (Alan H. Goldman).20. Iron, Leather and Critical Principles (George Dickie).References and Suggested Reading.WHAT ARE THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MORAL AND AESTHETIC VALUES OF ART?.21. Artistic Value and Opportunistic Moralism (Eileen John).22. Ethical Criticism and The Vice of Moderation (Daniel Jacobson).References and Suggested Reading.Index.

Contemporary debates in aesthetics and the philosophy of art

In aesthetics and the philosophy of art, two pictures of art's relation to morality predominate. On one picture, let us call it ethicism, there is the notion that art proper, however indirectly, prescribes and guides us toward a sound moral understanding of the world. The historical precedent for this kind of picture is strong: the classical Greeks looked to the Homeric poems to render their moral cosmos intelligible, and the Victorians fueled a dramatic expansion of art galleries in order to enlighten and ennoble the masses. However, at least within the dominant strand of philosophical aesthetics, this picture has traditionally been given short shrift. On the alternative picture, let us call it aestheticism, the spheres of morality and art are thought of as autonomous rather than complementary. The aestheticist's historical precedent is similarly strong: Plato's disparagement of art rests upon the presumption that art bears no necessary relation to morality, and Oscar Wilde's "art for art's sake" concerns the perfections of beauty severed from the burden of moral intimation. Typically, it is presumed that the arguments in favor of aestheticism are far stronger than the crude, wishful thinking constitutive of ethicism. The aestheticist need not even deny that an artwork may contingently cultivate ethical insight. Rather, she need only point out that we value, as art, works like the Marquis de Sade's Juliette which promote apparently immoral understandings of the world and others. That is, we may properly enjoy the pleasures an artwork affords whilst recognizing that, morally speaking, the view represented in the work is itself flawed. For example, a work which gets us to imagine torturing another with pleasure may be, as art, equally as valuable as, or more valuable than, one which gets us to imagine the same event with disgust. Contrastingly, what is taken to constitute morally or politically correct art may possess little of artistic value; hence, the aestheticist can explain the evaluative fallacy committed by those who would evaluate art on moral grounds. The fact that artistic and moral value may come apart like this, the aestheticist claims, proves that artistic value must be morally neutral. The truth is that the pleasures afforded by art are of value in and of themselves independently of any relation to the appropriate moral understanding of the events portrayed. I Yet, I will argue, the arguments against the role of moral evaluation in art, which strengthen the presumption in favor of aestheticism, can only undermine a crudely instrumentalist conception of art's relation to morality; that is, where an artwork is conceived of as morally significant to the extent it evokes morally sound responses and understandings. Contrastingly, contra aestheticism, an account of art which recognizes an inherent link between what is represented artistically and moral understanding may yet prove more adequate to our judgment and evaluation of art. Any account of art which recognizes the pleasures inherent in the peculiar and vivid imaginings prescribed by artworks must allow for a distinctive relation to moral understanding. It is through what we imagine and the promotion of imaginative understanding in engaging with artworks that art may justifiably lay claim to the cultivation of our moral sensibilities.

Matthew Kieran

Papers

The vice of snobbery: aesthetic knowledge, justification and virtue in art appreciation

Aesthetics and the Sciences of Mind

Contemporary debates in aesthetics and the philosophy of art

Art, imagination, and the cultivation of morals

Mere Exposure to Bad Art