Norms have never been absent from the study of international politics, but the sweeping “ideational turn” in the 1980s and 1990s brought them back as a central theoretical concern in the field. Much theorizing about norms has focused on how they create social structure, standards of appropriateness, and stability in international politics. Recent empirical research on norms, in contrast, has examined their role in creating political change, but change processes have been less well-theorized. We induce from this research a variety of theoretical arguments and testable hypotheses about the role of norms in political change. We argue that norms evolve in a three-stage “life cycle” of emergence, “norm cascades,” and internalization, and that each stage is governed by different motives, mechanisms, and behavioral logics. We also highlight the rational and strategic nature of many social construction processes and argue that theoretical progress will only be made by placing attention on the connections between norms and rationality rather than by opposing the two.

/pdf/international-norm-dynamics-and-political-change-37ig9r9dlq.pdf

International Norm Dynamics and Political Change

Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Edited by I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave. Pp. viii, 282. £3·50, paperback £1. 1970. (Cambridge University Press.)

What makes organizations so similar? We contend that the engine of rationalization and bureaucratization has moved from the competitive marketplace to the state and the professions. Once a set of organizations emerges as a field, a paradox arises: rational actors make their organizations increasingly similar as they try to change them. We describe three isomorphic processes-coercive, mimetic, and normative—leading to this outcome. We then specify hypotheses about the impact of resource centralization and dependency, goal ambiguity and technical uncertainty, and professionalization and structuration on isomorphic change. Finally, we suggest implications for theories of organizations and social change.

The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields (Chinese Translation)

Since the Cold War ended, Western policymakers have sought to create security arrangements in Europe, as well as in other regions of the globe, that are based on international institutions In doing so, they explicitly reject balance-of-power politics as an organizing concept for the post-Cold War world During the 1992 presidential campaign, for example, President Clinton declared that, “in a world where freedom, not tyranny, is on the march, the cynical calculus of pure power politics simply does not compute It is ill-suited to a new era” Before taking office, Anthony Lake, the president’s national security adviser, criticized the Bush administration for viewing the world through a “classic balance of power prism,” whereas he and Mr Clinton took a “more ‘neo-Wilsonian’ view”
 1

/pdf/the-false-promise-of-international-institutions-3kwpnelvmt.pdf

The False Promise of International Institutions

The Tragedy of Great Power Politics

The end of the Cold War brought widespread optimism about the future of civil-military relations. With a declining need for military preparedness, it seemed, civilian authorities would be better able to exert control over military policies and decision making. But, argues Michael Desch in this volume, the truth is precisely the opposite. In war-time, he explains, civil authorities cannot help paying close attention to military matters. In times of peace, however, the civilian sector is less interested in military affairs - and therefore leaves them to the military. Focusing on a range of times and places, Desch begins with a look at changes in US civil-military relations since the end of the Cold War. He then turns to the former Soviet Union, explaining why it was easier for civilians to control the Soviet military than its present-day Russian successor. He examines the Hindenburg-Ludendorff dictatorship in World War I Germany, Japan during the interwar era, and the French role in the Algerian crisis. Finally, he explores the changing domestic security environment and civil-military relations in southern Latin America.

Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment

I Cultural theories have long enjoyed a prominent place in the field of international security. Indeed, two waves have come and gone since the start of World War 11, and we are now at the high watermark of a third.' Today's culturalists in national security studies are a heterogeneous lot, who bring a variety of theories to the table. However, virtually all new culturalists in security studies are united in their belief that realism, the dominant research program in international relations that emphasizes factors such as the material balance of power, is an overrated, if not bankrupt, body of theory, and that cultural theories, which look to ideational factors, do a much better job of explaining how the world works. This article assesses this latest wave of cultural theories in security studies by focusing on some of its most prominent examples. There is no question that virtually all cultural theories tell us something about how states behave. The crucial question, however, is whether these new theories merely supplement realist theories or actually threaten to supplant them. I argue that when cultural theories are assessed using evidence from the real world, there is no reason to think that they will relegate realist theories to the dustbin of social

/pdf/culture-clash-assessing-the-importance-of-ideas-in-security-51d467dk1b.pdf

Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies

For most of the twentieth century, international politics were dominated by World Wars I and II and by the cold war. This period of intense international security competition clearly strengthened states, increasing their scope and cohesion. However, the end of the cold war may represent a “threat trough”—a period of significantly reduced international security competition. If so, the scope and cohesion of many states may likewise change. Although this change will not be so great as to end the state or the states system, the state as we know it surely will change. Some states will disintegrate, many will cease growing in scope and may even shrink a little, and few will remain unaffected.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2704078.pdf

War and strong states, peace and weak states?

are more or less likely to win wars has long been a contentious issue. The Greek general Thucydides’ chronicle of the defeat of democratic Athens in its twenty-four-year struggle with authoritarian Sparta in The Peloponnesian War, particularly his account of the Sicilian debacle, remains the classic indictment of the inability of democracies to prepare for and ght wars.1 Indeed, for most of Western history, pessimism dominated thinking about democracy and war. “Democratic defeatists,” from the French aristocrat Alexis de Tocqueville to mid-twentieth-century realists such as E.H. Carr, George Kennan, and Walter Lippmann, believed that democracy was a decided liability in preparing for and ghting wars. Particularly during the Cold War, the pessimistic perspective on the ghting power of democracies was dominant.2 Even leaders of the free world, such as John F. Kennedy, believed that when democracy “competes with a system of government . . . built primarily for war, it is at a disadvantage.” Despite the end of the Cold War, a few Cassandras remain concerned that democracies are unprepared to meet the next major military threat from authoritarian states such as China or international terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda.4 Democracy and Victory

/pdf/democracy-and-victory-why-regime-type-hardly-matters-3xfafg7e0p.pdf

Democracy and Victory: Why Regime Type Hardly Matters

Why has the United States, with its long-standing Liberal tradition, come to embrace the illiberal policies it has in recent years? The conventional wisdom is that al-Qaida's attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, and the subsequent war on terrorism have made America less Liberal. The logic of this argument is straightforward: interstate war has historically undermined domestic liberties, and the war on terrorism is causing the United States to follow this well-worn path. This explanation confronts a puzzle, however: illiberal U.S. policies—including the pursuit of global hegemony, launching of a preventive war, imposition of restrictions on civil liberties in the name of national security, and support for torture under certain circumstances—manifested themselves even before the September 11 terrorist attacks and were embraced across the political spectrum. Indeed, it is precisely American Liberalism that makes the United States so illiberal today. Under certain circumstances, Liberalism itse...

Michael C. Desch

Papers

Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment

Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies

War and strong states, peace and weak states?

Democracy and Victory: Why Regime Type Hardly Matters

America's Liberal Illiberalism: The Ideological Origins of Overreaction in U.S. Foreign Policy