Michael F. Thies

TL;DR: The conditions under which coalition partners should make efforts to keep tabs on each other's ministers, and the ways in which they might do so, were discussed in this paper, where it was shown that parties in Italian, Dutch, and multiparty Japanese coalitions used their allotments of junior ministerial positions to shadow each others' ministers, while parties in German coalitions relied instead on institutional devices to tie ministers' hands.

TL;DR: In this article, the conditions under which coalition partners should make efforts to keep tabs on each other's ministers and the ways in which they might do so are discussed, and the results show that parties in Italian, Dutch, and multiparty Japanese coalitions used their allotments of junior ministerial positions to shadow other coalition partners' ministers.

TL;DR: In this article, a model of how unorganized interest groups and organized groups get represented in an electoral system is proposed to address cross-national differences in electoral systems and individual legislators allocate their efforts to serving unorganized constituents versus organized groups.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide an informal model of what the old factional exchange between leaders and followers was like and investigate the extent to which the terms of this exchange, and hence the characteristics of Japanese factionalism, have begun to change under the new rules.

TL;DR: Many scholars have argued that money politics in Japan has been driven in part by the imperatives of intraparty competition under the single, nontransferable vote (SNTV) system used for lower house elections as discussed by the authors.