Showing papers by "Michal Plaček published in 2016"

Shortfall of Strategic Governance and Strategic Management in the Czech Republic

Abstract: The article analyses the problems of strategic governance and strategic management of the Czechoslovak Government, as well as the Government of the Czech Republic in the years 1989-2016. It seeks the causes and factors that have caused the low levels of strategic governance and strategic management at the level of the ministries of the Czech Republic. It examines the problem from genetic and historical perspective, and from the organizational and human capacity to exercise strategic governance. The study is based on two pieces of empirical research within the ministries of the Czech Republic. It identifies the main cause of failure of strategic governance and strategic management at the level of the central government of the Czech Republic. These include, in particular, the persistent distrust of the ideas of strategic governance and strategic management held by the right-wing governments and the generally low capacity of governments of the Czech Republic to engage in strategic governance. The organizational structure of the central state administration lacks the strategic units that generate ideas for supporting strategic governance. The empirical research of the ministries of the Czech Republic also revealed that policy workers in Czech ministries dedicate a large proportion of their work time to operational and administrative activities at the expense of analytical and strategic activities. The changes require implementation of reforms within the public administration, which (among other things) will eliminate the existing causes and inhibiting factors regarding the lack of strategic governance in the Czech Republic.

The Evaluation of the Role of the Office for Protection of Competition of the Czech Republic in Regulating Public Procurement

Abstract: Our study offers additional insight into the Office for Protection of Competition. It examines the Office for Protection of Competition in terms of an input-process-output model, defines the inputs needed for its activities and examines the outputs of its control activities. It also identifies external factors (in the environment) that affect the performance and behavior of the Office for Protection of Competition and have an impact on inspection activities. The theoretical background as well as assumptions are then subjected to empirical scrutiny. Theoretical conclusions and recommendations for more effective control of public contracts are drawn from the conclusions which are established.

Political Business Cycle in the Czech Republic: Case of Municipalities

Abstract: The study analyses expenditures of all municipalities of the Czech Republic over the period 2003-2013. It aims to examine whether changes in municipal spending get affected by the electoral cycle. The analysis has proven that expenditures of municipalities of the Czech Republic are influenced by the political cycle. However, the political business cycle has at the level of municipalities (compared to the macroeconomic level) its peculiarities. These arise mainly from limited options of municipal politicians to use economic instruments to win electoral votes in elections. To receive electoral votes, municipal politicians use mainly public investments and projects that are at the level of municipalities so apparent that they may influence voters in their electoral decision-making. Prior to elections, expenditures on investments significantly increase for all municipal size groups. For municipal size groups of over 50,000 residents, however, they are (per capita) higher compared to smaller municipal size groups. This may be explained by the fact that these municipalities have higher disposable resources (higher per capita own budgetary revenues, higher potential to acquire resources to co-finance municipal projects and broader portfolio of debt financing). Expenditures on transfers do not significantly change prior to municipal elections. We interpret this finding in a way that politicians prefer such investment projects that are ""visible"". Transfers are used to pay for certain current expenses for which municipalities may (in accordance with the established rules) apply through grants.

Do the data on municipal expenditures in the Czech Republic imply incorrectness in their management

Abstract: DO THE DATA ON MUNICIPAL EXPENDITURES IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC IMPLY INCORRECTNESS IN THEIR MANAGEMENT? Milan Půček, Michal Plaček, František Ochrana Limited public resources confront public administration bodies with the question of how to handle them in an economically rational manner. Audit of public expenditures necessitates an ongoing creation and modifi cation of an effective control system. Such a system is made up by subsystems of a formal (accounting and documentation) and economic control, responsible for monitoring the effi ciency, effectiveness and economy of managing public expenditures. Signifi cance of such interconnection rests in the fact that the formal control may signal possible improper management of public expenditures. This may become a stimulus for the economic control subsystem to verify the effectiveness, effi ciency and economy of outlaid expenditures. For identifi cation purposes related to potential accounting and record-keeping incorrectnesses in the management of public expenditures is proposed adoption of Benford’s Law (Benford’s test). Benford’s test is applied on municipal expenditure data for the year 2012. Data represent sums of public expenditures in the structure of the statement of budgetary execution and control specifi ed by the Regulation of the Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic No. 323/2002 Coll. For the data analysis there were used statistical methods, hypothesis testing, linear regressions and comparisons. Although the empirical analysis points at a limited use of Benford’s test in the conditions of municipal expenditures in the Czech Republic (mainly due to the instability of results and unavailability of suitable data), the analysis showed that Benford’s test can be adopted as a supporting tool, suitable for building into the control system of public expenditures. It is one of the ways to increase the effectiveness of a complex control of public expenditures.

Local Government in the Czech Republic

Abstract: The goal of this chapter is to characterise the local self-government system in the Czech Republic in general and with specific focus on two selected areas – waste management services and municipal benchmarking.

An Empirical Analysis of Post-Contractual Behaviour in Public Works Contracts: The Czech Case as a Secondary Comparison with the Slovak Republic

Abstract: The article analyzes post-contractual behavior on a sample of 200 randomly selected public works contracts, awarded in 2013, where it was possible to trace information about the final price. The study looks for factors, which have a statistically significant effect on the ratio between the actually paid price and tendered price. The findings are compared with similar studies in Slovakia. The model identifies a number of bids for a statistically significant indicator having a positive effect on the relationship between the actually paid price and the tendered price. Conversely, the ratio between the estimated and actual tendered amounts, as well as the use of subcontractors are seen as factors with a negative impact.

Political Business Cycle in Czech Republic. Case of Municipalities.

Abstract: he study analyses expenditures of all municipalities of the Czech Republic over the period 2003–2013. It aims to examine whether changes in municipal spending get affected by the electoral cycle. The analysis has proven that expenditures of municipalities of the Czech Republic are influenced by the political cycle. However, the political business cycle has at the level of municipalities (compared to the macroeconomic level) its peculiarities. These arise mainly from limited options of municipal politicians to use economic instruments to win electoral votes in elections. To receive electoral votes, municipal politicians use mainly public investments and projects that are at the level of municipalities so apparent that they may influence voters in their electoral decision-making. Prior to elections, expenditures on investments significantly increase for all municipal size groups. For municipal size groups of over 50,000 residents, however, they are (per capita) higher compared to smaller municipal size groups. This may be explained by the fact that these municipalities have higher disposable resources (higher per capita own budgetary revenues, higher potential to acquire resources to co-finance municipal projects and broader portfolio of debt financing). Expenditures on transfers do not significantly change prior to municipal elections. We interpret this finding in a way that politicians prefer such investment projects that are "visible". Transfers are used to pay for certain current expenses for which municipalities may (in accordance with the established rules) apply through grants.