Introduction 1. Woman's Place in Man's Life Cycle 2. Images of Relationship 3. Concepts of Self and Morality 4. Crisis and Transition 5. Women's Rights and Women's Judgment 6. Visions of Maturity References Index of Study Participants General Index

In a Different Voice. Psychological Theory and Women’s Development. Cambridge, MA (Harvard University Press) 1982.

Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The outside world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the governing laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Several lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual \"filling in,\" visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception.

A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness-Authors' Response-Acting out our sensory experience

In this paper I briefly sketch a theory that answers the question "what is the self?," where this question is understood in a scientific sense that includes both natural science and systematic fundamental metaphysics. As selves, we are essentially rational human minded animals or real persons in a fully natural and desperately non-ideal world-animals with meaningful lives, for better or worse.

What is the self

ADHD and the Nature of Self-Control

Supervenience and Mind

Series Editors' Preface Acknowledgements Introduction The Essential Embodiment Thesis Essentially Embodied, Desire-Based Emotions Sense of Self, Embodiment, and Desire-Based Emotions The Role of Emotion in Decision and Moral Evaluation Essentially Embodied, Emotive, Enactive Social Cognition Breakdowns in Embodied Emotive Cognition Conclusion Notes References Index

Embodiment, Emotion, and Cognition

Preface and Acknowledgments Introduction 1. Consciousnesslo and Essential Embodiment I: The Basics 2. Consciousnesslo and Essential Embodiment II: Types and Structures 3. Essentially Embodied Agency I: Actions, Causes, Reasons 4. Essentially Embodied Agency II: Guidance and Trying 5. Essentially Embodied Agency III: Emotive Causation 6. The Metaphysics of Agency I: The Problem of Mental Causation 7. The Metaphysics of Agency II: And How to Solve It 8. The Metaphysics of Agency III: Where the Action Is Bibliography

Embodied Minds in Action

Embodied Selves and Divided Minds

The long-standing debate between cognitive and feeling theories of emotion stems, in part, from the assumption that cognition and thought are abstract, intellectual, disembodied processes, and that bodily feelings are non-intentional and have no representational content. Working with this assumption has led many emotions theorists to neglect the way in which emotions are simultaneously bodily and cognitive-evaluative. Even hybrid theories, such as those set forth by Prinz (2004) and Barlassina and Newen (2013), fail to account fully for how the cognitive and bodily elements of emotion are integrated. As a result, such accounts are unable to provide an adequate characterization of the intentionality or phenomenology of emotions. I will argue that an enactive account of emotions, one which characterizes them as a way of engaging with and making sense of one’s surroundings, can help us to overcome this false dichotomy between cognitive and body elements. What I call ‘affective framing’ is at the core of emotional experience. It is the way in which we engage with and appraise our surroundings in and through bodily feelings of caring, so that the bodily and cognitive elements of emotion necessarily are fused. The notion of affective framing not only helps to clarify the relationship between bodily and cognitive elements of emotion, but also offers a useful way to make sense of both the intentional directedness and phenomenal character of emotional experience.

How can emotions be both cognitive and bodily

Some theorists have argued that cognitive agents engineer their environment to sustain and amply their cognitive abilities, and also that elements of the surrounding world sometimes play a crucial role in evoking and sustaining emotion. Such insights raise an interesting question about the relationship between cognitive and affective scaffolding: in addition to enabling the realization of specific affective states, can an affective niche also enable the realization of certain cognitive capacities? In order to gain a better understanding of this relationship between affective scaffolding and cognition, I will examine the use of expressive arts in the context of psychotherapy and peacebuilding. In these settings, environmental resources and interpersonal scaffolds not only evoke emotion and encourage the adoption of particular bodily-affective styles, but also support the development of capacities for self-awareness and interpersonal understanding. These affective scaffolds play a crucial role in therapy and peacebuilding, in fact, insofar as they facilitate the development of self-knowledge, enhance capacities associated with social cognition, and build positive rapport and trust among participants. I will argue that this is because affectivity is linked to the way that subjects frame and attend to their surroundings. Insofar as the regulation and modulation of emotion goes hand in hand with opening up new interpretive frames and establishing new habits of mind, affective scaffolds can contribute significantly to various modes of cognition.

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Michelle Maiese

Papers

Embodiment, Emotion, and Cognition

Embodied Minds in Action

Embodied Selves and Divided Minds

How can emotions be both cognitive and bodily

Affective Scaffolds, Expressive Arts, and Cognition.