This paper discusses prescriptive theories of policy making in complex organizations with particular reference to foreign policy making in the Executive Branch. Instead of utilizing centralized management practices to discourage or neutralize internal disagreements over policy, an executive can use a multiple advocacy model to harness diversity of views and interests in the interest of rational policy making. Diversity is also given scope in “bureaucratic politics” and “partisan mutual adjustment,” but in contrast to these unregulated pluralistic systems, multiple advocacy requires management to create the basis for structured, balanced debate among policy advocates drawn from different parts of the organization (or, as necessary, from outside the organization). Multiple advocacy, therefore, is a “mixed system” that combines elements of a centralized management model with certain features of pluralistic and participatory systems.

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0003055400145253

The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy

: The business environment is always changing and change creates risk. Managing the risk of the uncertain future is a challenge that requires resilience the ability to survive, adapt and grow in the face of turbulent change. Academics and industry leaders have seen the need to supplement traditional risk management techniques with the concept of resilience that is better designed to cope with extreme complexities, unpredictable events and adaptive threats. However, without standardized definitions, accepted variables or measurement tools, supply chain resilience is merely a theoretical concept. This dissertation will explore the current thought on supply chain resilience and develop the construct into a managerial process for implementation. In Phase I, the Supply Chain Resilience Framework was developed to provide a conceptual framework based on extant literature and refined through a focus group methodology. Findings suggest that supply chain resilience can be assessed in terms of two dimensions: vulnerabilities and capabilities. Research identified seven vulnerability factors composed of 40 specific attributes and 14 capability factors from 71 attributes that facilitate the measurement of resilience. Phase II created an assessment tool based on this framework the Supply Chain Resilience Assessment and Management (SCRAMTM). Data gathered from seven global manufacturing supply chains was used to assess their current state of supply chain resilience. The tool was validated using a qualitative methodology comparing assessment scores to 1,369 items recorded from discussions of 14 recent disruptions. Phase III concluded the research project by identifying critical linkages between the inherent vulnerability factors and controllable capability factors.

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Supply Chain Resilience: Development of a Conceptual Framework, an Assessment Tool and an Implementation Process

Author’s Note: For their comments and criticisms of an earlier draft of this article, I would like to thank Heinz Eulau, Alexander George, Ole Holsti, Jack Kangas, Stephen Krasner, John Oneal, and participants in the Stanford International Relations Group. In 1954, Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin sought to develop a generalized framework applicable to the analysis of any state’s foreign policymaking process. Including variables relating to the internal and external settings, social structure and behavior, as well as to the decisionmaking process itself, Snyder and his colleagues (1954: 36-37) adopted the state as their fundamental unit of analysis and assumed that &dquo;state action is the action taken by those acting in the name of the state. Hence, the state is its decision-makers.&dquo; Although widely read and acclaimed, the Snyder-Bruck-Sapin framework was not without its critics. McClosky (1962) argued that the approach was a taxonomy, not a theory, and that because all of the factors related to the decision-making process were treated as variables, analysts could neither draw linkages between factors nor could they infer the conditions under which specific variables would be most important. Rosenau (1968) also criticized the approach, noting that it

Bureaucratic Foreign Policy-Making

This multi-disciplinary project examines the style, structure, and performance of presidential management of international crises in order to determine both the impact of earlier crisis management experiences on subsequent crisis management behavior, and the role of a structured presidential approach to crisis management in either encouraging or discouraging such institutional learning. The aim of such an approach is twofold. First, it is to discover the level of learning and adaptation, from both positive and negative experiences, that takes place among presidents and their advisors during and after the handling of an international crisis, including how that learning may be maximized and directed toward more effective management efforts in the future. Second, it is to determine the role of a structured crisis management approach in shaping decision-making behavior, including how such an approach may affect the ability of presidents and their advisors to learn from prior experiences. The study integrates research from the international crisis, presidential management, and organizational learning literatures, utilizing George’s (1979) comparative case study method to examine several crises during the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower. The paper concludes with a presentation of findings and discusses the relevance of such findings on issues such as; recent and looming international crisis situations in North Korea, the Middle East, and elsewhere; the impact of a changing global landscape that includes such dangers as nuclear proliferation; and the prospects for successful crisis management efforts by the current and future American presidents in the 21 century. st For my parents... Columbia, my grandmother, my greatest teacher, 1909-2003 Sandra, my mom, my inspiration to cherish life, 1942-2003 You dedicated your lives to lifting me up beyond the clouds and from there you reached down and guided me to my destination ...and my family Whether bonded through blood, or through soul, spirit, and loyalty my true family will always be a state of mind and a gift of love Your undying faith and hope have always overcome my doubts and fears and together we finally pushed my rock – this rock – over the mountain

Presidential Management of International Crises: Structured Management Approaches and Crisis Learning

This article extends the role theory literature on domestic role contestation process by specifically examining bureaucracies as potential advocates of competing national role conceptions. While recent scholarship on domestic role contestation affirms the influence of party politics and cabinet dynamics on role enactment, bureaucracies remain underexplored as key actors despite the presence of a robust literature that supports their relevance in the foreign policymaking process. This article draws on expectations from both the role theory and bureaucratic politics literatures to explain how bureaucracies contest national roles and how such contestation may be resolved. The article tests these propositions through the study of China’s inter-bureaucratic contestation over its appropriate role in the South China Sea territorial disputes between 1979 and 1992. The article concurrently advances role studies on China by integrating them with more recent arguments about domestic role contestation. Traditionally, role theorists interested in China have either black-boxed the state or only focused on elite-mass role contestation, while this article explores intra-elite role contestation.

“Sellout” Ministries and Jingoes: China’s Bureaucratic Institutions and the Evolution of Contested National Role Conceptions in the South China Sea

ALL Presidents are dependent on the permanent bureau /-\ cracies of government inherited from their predecessors. A President must have the information and analysis of options which the bureaucracies provide in order to anticipate problems and make educated choices. He must, in most cases, also have the cooperation of the bureaucracies to turn his deci sions into governmental action. A bureaucracy can effectively defuse a presidential decision by refusing to support it with in fluential members of Congress or to implement it faithfully. The President's dependence on the bureaucracy and his lim ited freedom to man uvre are acute in all areas. The military, however, poses a unique set of problems for him. These arise in part from the limitations upon the President when he is seeking military advice. When the National Security Council or other presidential sessions are convened to discuss high-level foreign and national security matters, the President has a great deal of influence on the selection of all those who will attend, except the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who must be chosen from a small group of senior career military officers. Compare also the President's ability to appoint noncareer people to subcabinet and ambassadorial posts with the limitations on his range of selection for appointments to senior military positions or over seas military commands. One dilemma for the President is finding alternative sources of military advice. The military, for example, has a virtual mo nopoly on providing information to the President about the readiness and capabilities of U.S. or even allied forces. Other groups and individuals can provide advice on many "military" questions, but their access to information is limited. The Presi dent may call for judgments from his Secretary of Defense, but the Secretary's analysis must rely on the basic factual material and field evaluations provided by the military. Judgments about the likely effectiveness of American combat operations are also the exclusive province of the military. In assessing the potential effects of a diplomatic move, the President can turn not only to career Foreign Service Officers, but also to businessmen, academics and intelligence specialists in other

Morion H. Halperin

Papers

The President and the Military