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The concept of mind

problems in addition to the signs of the Wernicke-Korsakoff syndrome. Many of the patients were closely examined over long periods and the authors make the point that repeated examinations for as long as ten years in some instances allowed them to describe the natural history of the syndrome. and this they do in their third chapter. Again the description of the pathological findings is precise and comprehensive and the authors stress the periventricular distribution of the lesions and their bilateral symmetry. The authors consider specifically the neuropathological substrate on which are based the defective memory, ocular motor signs, the ataxia, the global confusional state and the occasional disturbance of olfactory and gustatory function. They argue a unity between Wernicke's disease and Korsakoff's psychosis and discuss the relationship between these two and alcoholic cerebellar degeneration, central pontine myelinolysis and other myelinolytic syndromes and interestingly discuss the problem of \"alcoholic dementia\" concluding that the nosological status ofalcoholic dementia is by

https://jnnp.bmj.com/content/jnnp/52/10/1218.2.full.pdf

Neuropsychology Mental Structure

The psychological self may be construed as a reflexive arrangement of the subjective "I" and the constructed "Me," evolving and expanding over the human life course. The psychological self begins life as a social actor, construed in terms of performance traits and social roles. By the end of childhood, the self has become a motivated agent, too, as personal goals, motives, values, and envisioned projects for the future become central features of how the I conceives of the Me. A third layer of selfhood begins to form in the adolescent and emerging adulthood years, when the self as autobiographical author aims to construct a story of the Me, to provide adult life with broad purpose and a dynamic sense of temporal continuity. An integrative theory that envisions the psychological self as a developing I-Me configuration of actor, agent, and author helps to synthesize a wide range of conceptions and findings on the self from social, personality, cognitive, cultural, and developmental psychology and from sociology and other social sciences. The actor-agent-author framework also sheds new light on studies of self-regulation, self-esteem, self-continuity, and the relationship between self and culture.

The Psychological Self as Actor, Agent, and Author.

Despite a strong intuitive and theoretical tradition linking autobiographical memory and sense of self, there are few coherent, testable models that exemplify how these constructs relate. Without any clear theoretical starting point, research efforts have been fragmented, with many different fields of psychology operating in relative isolation, using different methodological approaches and a confusing array of self-related terminology. We attempt to bridge the widening gap between theory and research by proposing a novel framework for sense of self and memory. This simple model delineates sense of self along 2 dimensions: the subjective versus objective and the present versus temporally extended aspects of sense of self. The 4 resulting components of sense of self are argued to relate to autobiographical memory in important, but very different, ways. Subjective sense of self provides a crucial precondition for episodic memory, which in turn is a prerequisite for phenomenological continuity. Autobiographical memory, and particularly its semanticized forms, are important for the formation and maintenance of a mental representation of the objective self in the present moment and across time. This model does not represent a new theoretical direction for the study of sense of self and memory; to the contrary, it is deeply grounded in the theoretical work of the past few decades. Its novelty is that it translates this theoretical groundwork into a form that is readily accessible for researchers. We review evidence for our model and suggest ways that it may provide a roadmap for future research efforts.

https://psycnet.apa.org/journals/bul/139/4/815.pdf

Autobiographical memory and sense of self.

I argue that our current practice of ascribing the term 'memory' to mental states and processes lacks epistemic warrant. Memory, according to the 'received view', is any state or process that results from the sequential stages of encoding, storage, and retrieval. By these criteria, memory, or its footprint, can be seen in virtually every mental state we are capable of having. This, I argue, stretches the term to the breaking point. I draw on phenomenological, historical, and conceptual considerations to make the case that an act of memory entails a direct, non-inferential feeling of reacquaintance with one's past. It does so by linking content retrieved from storage with autonoetic awareness during retrieval. On this view, memory is not the content of experience, but the manner in which that content is experienced. I discuss some theoretical and practical implications and advantages of adopting this more circumscribed view of memory.

What memory is.

This paper explores the question of what the self is by reviewing research conducted with both normal and neuropsychological participants. Findings converge on the idea that the self may be more complex and differentiated than some previous treatments of the topic have suggested. Although some aspects of self-knowledge such as episodic recollection may be compromised in individuals, other aspects—for instance, semantic trait summaries—appear largely intact. Taken together, these findings support the idea that the self is not a single, unified entity. Rather, it is a set of interrelated, functionally independent systems. In the process of reviewing neuropsychological findings, an unexpected result emerges: trait self-knowledge appears unusually robust with respect to neural and cognitive damage that render other aspects of self-knowledge dysfunctional in varying degrees.

The unanticipated resilience of trait self-knowledge in the face of neural damage

In this article, we demonstrate that planning tasks enhance recall when the context of planning (a) is self-referential and (b) draws on familiar scenarios represented in episodic memory. Specifically, we show that when planning tasks are sorted according to the degree to which they evoke memories of personally familiar scenarios (e.g., planning a picnic), recall is reliably superior to tasks that fail to do so (e.g., planning an Arctic trek). We discuss the implications of these findings for planning tasks and their relation to episodic memory.

/pdf/familiarity-and-personal-experience-as-mediators-of-recall-3ak7pcqp0x.pdf

Familiarity and Personal Experience as Mediators of Recall when Planning for Future Contingencies.

Memory for items encoded self-referentially was examined in college students with Attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). In Study 1, memory was assessed using the standard self-reference effect (SRE) paradigm—which requires participants to access semantic trait self-knowledge to perform self-referential encoding (e.g., Klein, 2004). ADHD and control groups produced virtually identical SRE profiles: (a) better recall following self-referential encoding than following either semantic or structural encoding; and (b) greater-than-chance clustering in recall of words encoded self-referentially. In Study 2 the self-referential task was altered—its performance required access to personal events in episodic memory (e.g., Klein, Loftus, & Burton, 1989). The ADHD group differed from controls in two ways: (a) they recalled significantly fewer words in the self-referential condition; and (b) their clustering of words encoded self-referentially failed to exceed chance levels. These results suggest the ADHD p...

Memory and Self-knowledge in Young Adults with ADHD

As part of a general trend toward interdisciplinary approaches, the social cognitive neurosciences was founded on the premise that research into social issues that take the brain seriously have much to contribute to our understanding of social thought and behavior. However, despite this goal, reliance on a specific set of techniques—neuroimaging—has come to dominate the emerging field. In this paper we argue that (a) an inclusive social cognitive neuroscience, one that takes seriously all three constituents of the field's name, is likely to provide greater insight into the nature of human social behavior, and (b) within the domain of neuroscience, no one method—be it brain scanning, patient populations, or case studies of patients suffering neurological impairment—holds the key to understanding the neural underpinnings of social behavior.

a Call fOr aN iNCluSivE aPPrOaCh TO ThE SOCial COgNiTivE NEurOSCiENCES

/pdf/research-report-familiarity-and-personal-experience-as-3a6d3f5p7i.pdf

Moshe L. Lax

Papers

The unanticipated resilience of trait self-knowledge in the face of neural damage

Familiarity and Personal Experience as Mediators of Recall when Planning for Future Contingencies.

Memory and Self-knowledge in Young Adults with ADHD

a Call fOr aN iNCluSivE aPPrOaCh TO ThE SOCial COgNiTivE NEurOSCiENCES

RESEARCH REPORT Familiarity and Personal Experience as Mediators of Recall When Planning for Future Contingencies