The development of the concept of soft balancing is an attempt to stretch balance of power theory to encompass an international system in which traditional counterbalancing among the major powers is absent. There are two fundamental faws, however, in current treatments of soft balancing: the failure to consider alternative explanations for state actions that have the effect of constraining the United States, and the absence of empirical analysis of the phenomenon. A comparison of soft balancing and four alternative explanations in the main cases highlighted by proponents of the concept-Russia's strategic partnerships with China and India, Russian assistance to Iran's nuclear program, the European Union's efforts to enhance its defense capability, and opposition to the U.S.-led Iraq war in 2003—reveals no empirical support for the soft-balancing explanation. The lack of evidence for the relevance of balancing dynamics in contemporary great-power relations indicates that further investments in adapting bala...

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Hard Times for Soft Balancing

Introduction: what is an Islamic and non-Islamic party? 1. The socio-political context 2. Political origins of the AKP 3. Ideology, organization and parliamentary group of the AKP 4. The two queen bees: Erdogan and Gul 5. Modes of secularism 6. The AKP and the Kurdish question 7. Foreign policy - EU/Cyprus and USA/Iraq 8. The crisis and the 2007 elections.

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Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey

by Nikki R. Keddie, Yale University Press, New Haven & London, 2006, xviii + 408 pp., £10.99, pbk, ISBN‐13:978‐0‐300‐12105‐6 Keddie loves Iran. She dedicates her book ‘to the people of Iran’, with ...

Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution

Turkish foreign policy activism during the last decade has attracted widespread international attention. As a result, scholarly literature on the issue has expanded noticeably. If one makes a general categorization, the literature on the new Turkish foreign policy has mainly concentrated on “security-based” and “identity-based” explanations. The role of the changing economic dynamics in Turkey and the transformation of Turkish financial and industrial capital, however, are not adequately addressed in the existing literature. This study aims to contribute to the recent debates from a political economy perspective with reference to the functionalist and interdependence approaches. It is argued in this paper that the bifurcation within the financial capital in Turkey in the post-2001 period and the internationalization of the ‘Anatolian tigers’ have turned out to be the ‘practical hand’ of Turkish foreign policy. In addition, this study argues that there are certain limits and constraints of employing political economy factors as a driving force in the Turkish foreign policy activism.

Economy as the 'Practical Hand' of 'New Turkish Foreign Policy': A Political Economy Explanation

The current global political economy is characterised by the intensifying economic interaction of BRICS and ‘near BRICS’ economies, with emerging powers increasing their influence in neighbouring regions. The growing partnership between Turkey and Russia constitutes a useful case study for examining this transformation, in which Western supremacy and US hegemony are under increasing challenge. Turkish–Russian relations shed light on broader themes in global political economy. First, significant economic interdependence may be generated among states with different political outlooks, in the form of loose regional integration schemes driven by bilateral relations between key states and supporting private actors or interests. Second, growing economic interdependence may coexist with continued political conflict and geopolitical rivalry, as indicated by the Syrian and Ukrainian crises. An important strategy that emerges is the tendency to compartmentalise economic issues and geopolitical rivalries in ...

Turkey and Russia in a shifting global order: cooperation, conflict and asymmetric interdependence in a turbulent region

Iran's nuclear program has become a highly controversial issue in international politics since the August 2002 unveiling of the secretly built uranium enrichment facility in Natanz and the heavy-water production plant in Arak. American officials nnd experts assert that Iran has secret plans to use its nuclear capabilities to develop nuclear weapons. Iranian officials, however, deny such allegations and claim that they will use their capabilities exclusively for peaceful purposes. Notwithstanding the official rhetoric, some Iranian scholars, intellectuals, and even bureaucrats argue that Iran should seriously consider developing nuclear weapons given that they have the necessary skills and capabilities as well as the reasons to do so. The clerical leaders have supposedly not yet decided about weaponizing Iran's nuclear capability. However, the ever-increasing size of Iran's existing nuclear infrastructure, and the achievements of Iranian scientists, who claim to have developed indigenous capabilities, may very well elevate Iran to the status of a nuclear power, even a de facto nuclear-weapons state. The prevailing view among Iranian bureaucrats and scientists who have been for many years involved in nuclear projects and others who are well entrenched in the state structure is that Iran should definitely have nuclear technology and even weapons. Those who are seemingly against nuclear weapons development maintain that the the international situation is not suitable, and they suggest waiting. Statements made by Americans and Israelis about a military strike on Iran's nuclear facilities strengthen the views of those who endorse nuclear weapons development; however, weaponization of Iran's capabilities will depend on the political calculus of the leadership.1 Against this background, the aim of this article is to discuss in detail the implications of Iran's nuclear capabilities for regional and international peace and stability. Let us begin with a reminder of the crisis that erupted in 2002 between Iran and the United States (US) over Iran's nuclear capabilities and intentions. An overview of the crisis, which also involved the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Union (EU) will highlight the positions of these actors. Iran's desire to develop a full-fledged nuclear fuel cycle is not new. Since the mid-1970s, under the leadership of both the Shah and the mullahs, Iran has been developing considerable technological infrastructure and accumulating valuable scientific expertise in the nuclear field. Therefore, Iran's strategic relations with the US and the leading European nations such as France and (West) Germany in the 1960s and 1970s will be discussed with special emphasis on their nuclear cooperation. The achievements of Iran in the nuclear field under the Shah came to a temporary halt with the dramatic changes of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Despite the deterioration of its relations with the West after the Islamic Revolution, Iran soon resumed its efforts to finish its nuclear projects, but there were serious difficulties because of the US policy of denying the transfer of nuclear technology and material. Russia and China entered the picture and helped Iran develop significant nuclear capabilities.2 This article will examine closely the ups and downs in Iran's efforts to advance in the field both technologically and scientifically. Building on this, a discussion will follow about whether Iran intends to develop nuclear weapons with the capabilities that it has now or will acquire in the future. To have a better idea about Iran's motivations and how long it may take it to build nuclear weapons, this article will present the views of Iranian scholars, scientists, bureaucrats, and intellectuals who are involved in the nuclear projects. Given Iran's probable desire to acquire nuclear weapons, this article will discuss the possible consequences of the policy options that are available to the US in its effort to prevent Iran from realizing its ambitions. …

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Good for the Shah, Banned for the Mullahs: The West and Iran's Quest for Nuclear Power

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Implications of A Nuclear Iran for Turkey

The logic of interest, which has gained considerable ground in foreign policy formulation in Turkey, is not rooted in Western identity, nor is it contingent upon the degree of interaction exclusively with the Western world. The entire world has equal prominence in Turkey’s foreign policy orientation. Whether the prevalence of the logic of interest in the formulation of Turkish foreign policy under the “post‐Islamist” AKP government signifies a deviation from the Westernization process or whether it is simply a reaction to the conjunctural developments in the international arena in order to preserve Turkey’s national interests is seriously debated. This paper aims to contribute to this debate by shedding light on the background of developments both inside and outside Turkey.

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Is the Westernization Process Losing Pace in Turkey: Who’s to Blame?

Iran's desire to develop a full-fledged nuclear fuel cycle is not new. Its strategic relations with the United States, and the leading European nations such as France and (West) Germany in the 1960...

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Iran's nuclear ambitions from a historical perspective and the attitude of the West

(1997). Turkey's quest for peaceful nuclear power. The Nonproliferation Review: Vol. 4, No. 3, pp. 33-44.

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Mustafa Kibaroğlu

Papers

Good for the Shah, Banned for the Mullahs: The West and Iran's Quest for Nuclear Power

Implications of A Nuclear Iran for Turkey

Is the Westernization Process Losing Pace in Turkey: Who’s to Blame?

Iran's nuclear ambitions from a historical perspective and the attitude of the West

Turkey's quest for peaceful nuclear power