Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

National Institute of Standards and Technology における超伝導研究及び生活

Usually, a proof of a theorem contains more knowledge than the mere fact that the theorem is true. For instance, to prove that a graph is Hamiltonian it suffices to exhibit a Hamiltonian tour in it; however, this seems to contain more knowledge than the single bit Hamiltonian/non-Hamiltonian.In this paper a computational complexity theory of the “knowledge” contained in a proof is developed. Zero-knowledge proofs are defined as those proofs that convey no additional knowledge other than the correctness of the proposition in question. Examples of zero-knowledge proof systems are given for the languages of quadratic residuosity and 'quadratic nonresiduosity. These are the first examples of zero-knowledge proofs for languages not known to be efficiently recognizable.

/pdf/the-knowledge-complexity-of-interactive-proof-systems-31apre0ecf.pdf

The knowledge complexity of interactive proof-systems

This survey covers rollback-recovery techniques that do not require special language constructs. In the first part of the survey we classify rollback-recovery protocols into checkpoint-based and log-based.Checkpoint-based protocols rely solely on checkpointing for system state restoration. Checkpointing can be coordinated, uncoordinated, or communication-induced. Log-based protocols combine checkpointing with logging of nondeterministic events, encoded in tuples called determinants. Depending on how determinants are logged, log-based protocols can be pessimistic, optimistic, or causal. Throughout the survey, we highlight the research issues that are at the core of rollback-recovery and present the solutions that currently address them. We also compare the performance of different rollback-recovery protocols with respect to a series of desirable properties and discuss the issues that arise in the practical implementations of these protocols.

/pdf/a-survey-of-rollback-recovery-protocols-in-message-passing-bnrpate93a.pdf

A survey of rollback-recovery protocols in message-passing systems

The Transmission Control Protocol.

In the future, a largely invisible and ubiquitous computing infrastructure will assist people with a variety of activities in the home and at work. The applications that will be deployed in such systems will create and manipulate private information and will provide access to a variety of other resources. Securing such applications is challenging for a number of reasons. Unlike traditional systems where access control has been explored, access decisions may depend on the context in which requests are made. We show how the well-developed notion of roles can be used to capture security-relevant context of the environment in which access requests are made. By introducing environment roles, we create a uniform access control framework that can be used to secure context-aware applications. We also present a security architecture that supports security policies that make use of environment roles to control access to resources.

/pdf/securing-context-aware-applications-using-environment-roles-292gpsi09m.pdf

Securing context-aware applications using environment roles

The abstraction of a shared memory is of growing importance in distributed computing systems. Traditional memory consistency ensures that all processes agree on a common order of all operations on memory. Unfortunately, providing these guarantees entails access latencies that prevent scaling to large systems. This paper weakens such guarantees by definingcausal memory, an abstraction that ensures that processes in a system agree on the relative ordering of operations that arecausally related. Because causal memory isweakly consistent, it admits more executions, and hence more concurrency, than either atomic or sequentially consistent memories. This paper provides a formal definition of causal memory and gives an implementation for message-passing systems. In addition, it describes a practical class of programs that, if developed for a strongly consistent memory, run correctly with causal memory.

Causal memory: definitions, implementation, and programming

A new protocol for maintaining replicated data that can provide both high data availability and low response time is presented. In the protocol, the nodes are organized in a logical grid. Existing protocols are designed primarily to achieve high availability by updating a large fraction of the copies, which provides some (although not significant) load sharing. In the new protocol, transaction processing is shared effectively among nodes storing copies of the data, and both the response time experienced by transactions and the system throughput are improved significantly. The authors analyze the availability of the new protocol and use simulation to study the effect of load sharing on the response time of transactions. They also compare the new protocol with a voting-based scheme. >

The grid protocol: a high performance scheme for maintaining replicated data

We investigate the incentive mechanism of BitTorrent, which is a peer-to-peer file distribution system. As downloaders in BitTorrent are faced with the conflict between the eagerness to download and the unwillingness to upload, we relate this problem to the iterated prisoner's dilemma, which suggests guidelines to design a good incentive mechanism. Based on these guidelines, we propose a new, simple incentive mechanism. Our analysis and the experimental results using PlanetLab show that the original incentive mechanism of BitTorrent can induce free riding because it is not effective in rewarding and punishing downloaders properly. In contrast, a new mechanism proposed by us is shown to be more robust against free riders.

/pdf/incentives-in-bittorrent-induce-free-riding-3abwj9akrr.pdf

Incentives in BitTorrent induce free riding

We describe an approach to building security services for context-aware environments Specifically, we focus on the design of security services that incorporate the use of security-relevant "context" to provide flexible access control and policy enforcement We previously presented a generalized access control model that makes significant use of contextual information in policy definition This document provides a concrete realization of such a model by presenting a system-level service architecture, as well as early implementation experience with the framework Through our context-aware security services, our system architecture offers enhanced authentication services, more flexible access control and a security subsystem that can adapt itself based on current conditions in the environment We discuss our architecture and implementation and show how it can be used to secure several sample applications

/pdf/a-context-aware-security-architecture-for-emerging-2sd6bdfcbi.pdf

Mustaque Ahamad

Papers

Securing context-aware applications using environment roles

Causal memory: definitions, implementation, and programming

The grid protocol: a high performance scheme for maintaining replicated data

Incentives in BitTorrent induce free riding

A context-aware security architecture for emerging applications