Previous empirical evidence which evaluated the accuracy of management earnings or sales forecasts consistently revealed these forecasts to be on average signi cantly overoptimistic. However, all studies analyzed forecasts from public disclosures, which are an important signal to investors and analysts and thus possibly biased by strategic considerations. To disentagle whether and to which extent strategic deception or cognitive biases are resposible for this overoptimism, the present study analyzes the accuracy of 6,234 undisclosed, company-internal sales forecasts, which German firms provided anonymously to the IAB Establishment Panel. Quite surprisingly, the study reveals the average forecast to be signi cantly overpessimistic. I propose that the non-existence of a general bias towards overoptimism is due to the lack of incentives to consciously overgloss future prospects in undisclosed forecasts and that overpessimism may be a consequence of loss aversion.

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Forecast Errors in Undisclosed Management Sales Forecasts: The Disappearance of the Overoptimism Bias

Purpose




The purpose of this study is to examine the type of internal control weaknesses and its impact that leads to fraud activities in an oil and gas company, which is rarely found in empirical research.




Design/methodology/approach




A case study approach was taken to investigate and analyse the fraud incidents to the deepest understanding. A mixed method of data collection, specifically document analysis and interviews, was used.




Findings




The study found that internal control weaknesses can be major contributing factors for fraud to be committed. Poor supervision and improper documentation process provide opportunity to misappropriate the assets, worst off if it includes several people that cooperate to conduct those illegal malpractices.




Research limitations/implications




The results provide further confirmation of the fraud triangle theory on the causes of the fraud, i.e. opportunity because of weak internal control. It also validates with many prior studies conducted by global professional firms such as KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers and Association of Certified Fraud Examiners on fraud and its related causes and implications. This study, however, was conducted on only one company with limited number of interviews.




Practical implications




This study provides some recommendations to improve weak internal control, which in turn will reduce opportunities of fraud committed in the company.




Originality/value




This study is original, as it focuses on a company that operates in the highly specialized industry, i.e. oil and gas, which is rare in fraud literature, particularly in developing markets such as Malaysia. It has examined various documents and reports of employee fraud that are generally difficult to be accessed by researchers to be finally published in an academic journal. The findings of this study are inferred from direct access of company documents that are private and confidential.

Internal controls and fraud – empirical evidence from oil and gas company

Internal control in accounting research: A review

Growth is important for the long-term success of a business. Regrettably, the impact of family influence on firm growth is largely neglected. We examine whether family firms have a higher growth ra...

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Family Business Growth Around the World

This paper examines the value relevance of accounting information in per and post-periods of International Financial Reporting Standards implementation using the regression and portfolio approaches for sample of the UAE companies. The results obtained from a combination of regression and portfolio approaches, show accounting information is value relevant in UAE stock market. A comparison of the results for the periods before and after adoption, based on both regression and portfolio approaches, shows a decline in value relevance of accounting information after the reform in accounting standards. It could be interpreted to mean that following to IFRS in UAE didn’t improve value relevancy of accounting information.  However, results based on and portfolio approach shows that cash flows’ incremental information content increased for the post-IFRS period. Keywords: Value Relevance; IFRS; Accounting Information; UAE

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Value Relevance of Accounting Information in the United Arab Emirates

We investigate whether auditors take into account accruals quality, a proxy for the cash flow risk associated with earnings, by adjusting audit hours and audit fees. Accruals quality tells investors about the mapping of accounting earnings into cash flows. Poor accruals quality weakens this mapping and thus increases this cash flow risk. We find a negative relationship between accruals quality and audit hours/fees, indicating that auditors increase their audit efforts by modifying audit procedures and substantive tests and charge higher fees for the increased cash flow risk. In addition, we find that both innate accruals quality and discretionary accruals quality are negatively related to audit hours and fees but that innate accruals quality is more likely to influence audit hours and fees than discretionary accruals quality. The results indicate that auditors incorporate the cash flow risk associated with accruals quality but that their response varies according to the source of accruals quality.

The Effects of Accruals Quality on Audit Hours and Audit Fees

Research Question/Issue. In this study, we explore the relationship between the use of nonfinancial performance measures in Chief Executive Officer (CEO) bonus plans and CEO power, moderated by compensation committee monitoring. Furthermore, we investigate whether the inclusion of nonfinancial performance measures is associated with higher CEO bonus pay sensitivity to shareholder returns. Research Findings/Insights. Using a sample of FTSE 350 firms during the period 2007–2013, we find that CEO power is significantly negatively related to the propensity of using nonfinancial performance measures. This negative relationship, however, is moderated by higher levels of compensation committee monitoring. We also find that firms combining nonfinancial and financial performance measures in CEO bonus plans tend to have stronger CEO bonus pay sensitivity to shareholder returns than firms using financial measures alone. Thus, our results suggest that boards of directors adopting nonfinancial performance measures are able to better align CEO incentives with shareholder interests. We find similar results when using the weight of nonfinancial performance measures in the bonus plan in our analyses. Theoretical/Academic Implications. This study empirically supports the managerial power theory whereby powerful CEOs influence the choice of performance measures in their bonus plans. However, effective compensation committees are found to attenuate the influence of powerful CEOs and to better align their interests with those of shareholders. Our result of stronger bonus pay sensitivity to shareholder returns for firms combining nonfinancial with financial performance measures implies that the informativeness of these measures enhances the firm's ability to tie CEO bonus compensation to shareholder wealth. Practitioner/Policy Implications. This study offers insights to members of boards of directors, especially compensation committee members, who are interested in improving the design of executive incentive contracts to better align managerial incentives to shareholder interests. Furthermore, the findings inform regulators about the importance of alternative performance measures in pay‐performance sensitivity and may warrant increased firm disclosure of the details of the pay structure.

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Myojung Cho

Papers

The Effects of Accruals Quality on Audit Hours and Audit Fees

The use of nonfinancial performance measures in CEO bonus compensation

The effect of commercial banks' internal control weaknesses on loan loss reserves and provisions

Optimistic bias in management forecasts by Japanese firms to avoid forecasting losses

Audit fee lowballing: Determinants, recovery, and future audit quality