This article makes a contribution to the general theory of citizenship. It argues that there is a need for a supplementary concept of ‘denizenship’ to illustrate changes to and erosion of postwar social citizenship as famously described by T H Marshall. The first aim is to construct a more theoretically developed idea of what the concept of a ‘denizen’ means in sociological terms. In its conventional meaning, this term describes a group of people permanently resident in a foreign country, but only enjoying limited partial rights of citizenship. I label this Denizenship Type 1. By contrast, Denizenship Type 2 refers to the erosion of social citizenship as citizens begin to resemble denizens or strangers in their own societies. The argument then is that there is a general convergence between citizenship and denizenship. As such, Denizenship Type 2 provides a possible supplement to the various terms that have recently been proposed, such as flexible citizenship, semi-citizenship, or precariat to desc...

We are all denizens now: on the erosion of citizenship

\n Rapid technological change – the digitalization and automation of work – is challenging contemporary welfare states. Most of the existing research, however, focuses on its effect on labor market outcomes, such as employment or wage levels. In contrast, this paper studies the implications of technological change for welfare state attitudes and preferences. Compared to previous work on this topic, this paper adopts a much broader perspective regarding different kinds of social policy. Using data from the European Social Survey, we find that individual automation risk is positively associated with support for redistribution, but negatively with support for social investment policies (partly depending on the specific measure of automation risk that is used), while there is no statistically significant association with support for basic income. We also find a moderating effect of the overall size of the welfare state on the micro-level association between risk and preferences.

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Social Investment, Redistribution or Basic Income? Exploring the Association Between Automation Risk and Welfare State Attitudes in Europe

This conceptual, interdisciplinary paper will start with an introduction to the new, networked, knowledge-driven, global economy. The objective of this paper, using a narrative review of the economic, business, and management literature of labor markets and human capital, will be to negate the notion that we have, at present, one labor market for human capital, and will conjecture that we currently have (or are about to have) three autonomous markets for labor that are driven by different market dynamics and mechanisms. The three markets are identified as follows: routine labor, skilled labor, and talent. Each one of the markets will then be discussed, including future trends, issues, and remedies. This trifurcation of the labor markets is mostly the combined result of phase transition resulting from three major impetuses. The first is the effect(s) that technological revolutions have on the supply and demand of/for multidimensional skills of human capital. Second is the “winner take all” market structure enabled by the “industrial” economy’s framed legislation and social norms. The third impetus is the context (for the technological revolutions and the nature of the markets) of a networked global economy that is driven by knowledge developing at an accelerated pace. The narrative multidisciplinary literature review used was a modified version of the integrative literature review. The review confirmed that the three labor markets’ dynamics are to a considerable degree dissimilar and that legislating, conducting monetary, and fiscal policies that treat them as one labor market could (and probably already does) cause more harm than good, resulting in destabilizing the labor markets (as indicated by the growing unemployment rate of the young generation worldwide) and by extension, the social fabric of the new economy (as indicated by the growing economic and educational inequality worldwide). The paper concludes with a framework of the three labor markets, followed by a summary, including the need for a new legal and social paradigm regarding labor and the need for a new formal model for value creation. Finally, the limitations of the study as well as potential research gaps are identified.

The Trifurcation of the Labor Markets in the Networked, Knowledge-Driven, Global Economy

How can we equalize opportunities while respecting people’s freedom? According to a view that I call libertarian resourcism, people’s fair shares of resources should normally take the form of uncon...

Equality of opportunity and the precarization of labour markets

https://www.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/emre.12368

Manufacturing Revolution Boosts People Issues: The Evolutionary Need for ‘Human-Automation Resource Management' in Smart Factories

Social Policy for a Digital Age
As advanced economies become more automated and digitized, almost all workers will be affected, but some more than others. Those who have what the economists Maarten Goos and Alan Manning call “lovely jobs” will do fine, creating and managing robots and various digital applications and adding lots of value in service sectors such as finance. Those who have what Goos and Manning call “lousy jobs,” however—in sectors such as manufacturing, retail, delivery, or routine office work—will fare less well, facing low pay, short contracts, precarious employment, and outright job loss. Economic inequality across society as a whole is likely to grow, along with demands for increased state expenditures on social services of various kinds—just as the resources to cover such expenditures are dropping because of lower tax contributions from a smaller work force

Nicolas Colin

Papers

The Next Safety Net