Process tracing is a fundamental method of qualitative analysis. While it is often invoked by scholars as they examine qualitative data, too frequently this tool is neither adequately understood nor rigorously applied. This deficit motivates the present article, which offers a new framework for carrying out process tracing. This reformulation integrates discussions of process tracing and causal-process observations, gives greater attention to description as a key contribution, and emphasizes the causal sequence in which process-tracing observations can be situated. In the current period of major innovation in quantitative tools for causal inference, this reformulation is part of a wider, parallel effort to achieve greater systematization of qualitative methods. A key point here is that these methods can add inferential leverage too often lacking in quantitative analysis. The presentation is accompanied by teaching exercises, which focus on three examples from international relations, one from American politics, two from comparative politics, and one from public health/epidemiology.

Understanding Process Tracing

Process tracing is a fundamental tool of qualitative analysis. This method is often invoked by scholars who carry out within-case analysis based on qualitative data, yet frequently it is neither adequately understood nor rigorously applied. This deficit moti- vates this article, which offers a new framework for carrying out process tracing. The refor- mulation integrates discussions of process tracing and causal-process observations, gives greater attention to description as a key contribution, and emphasizes the causal sequence in which process-tracing observations can be situated. In the current period of major inno- vation in quantitative tools for causal inference, this reformulation is part of a wider, par- allel effort to achieve greater systematization of qualitative methods. A key point here is that these methods can add inferential leverage that is often lacking in quantitative anal- ysis. This article is accompanied by online teaching exercises, focused on four examples from American politics, two from comparative politics, three from international relations, and one from public health/epidemiology.

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International Security Studies (ISS) has changed and diversified in many ways since 1945. This book provides the first intellectual history of the development of the subject in that period. It explains how ISS evolved from an initial concern with the strategic consequences of superpower rivalry and nuclear weapons, to its current diversity in which environmental, economic, human and other securities sit alongside military security, and in which approaches ranging from traditional Realist analysis to Feminism and Post-colonialism are in play. It sets out the driving forces that shaped debates in ISS, shows what makes ISS a single conversation across its diversity, and gives an authoritative account of debates on all the main topics within ISS. This is an unparalleled survey of the literature and institutions of ISS that will be an invaluable guide for all students and scholars of ISS, whether traditionalist, ‘new agenda’ or critical. • The first book to tell the post-1945 story of International Security Studies and offer an integrated historical sociology of the whole field • Opens the door to a long-overdue conversation about what ISS is and where it should be going • Provides a detailed institutional account of ISS in terms of its journals, departments, think tanks and funding sources

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The Evolution of International Security Studies

Therefore, the seeker after the truth is not one who studies the writings of the ancients and, following his natural disposition, puts his trust in them, but rather the one who suspects his faith in them and questions what he gathers from them, the one who submits to argument and demonstration, and not to the sayings of a human being whose nature is fraught with all kinds of imperfection and de‹ciency. Thus the duty of the man who investigates the writings of scientists, if learning the truth is his goal, is to make himself the enemy of all that he reads, and, applying his mind to the core and margins of its content, attack it from every side. He should also suspect himself as he performs his critical examination of it, so that he may avoid falling into either prejudice or leniency. (Ibn al-Haytham)1

국제정치이론 = Theory of international politics

1. Introduction: why natural experiments? Part I. Discovering Natural Experiments: 2. Standard natural experiments 3. Regression-discontinuity designs 4. Instrumental-variables designs Part II. Analyzing Natural Experiments: 5. Simplicity and transparency: keys to quantitative analysis 6. Sampling processes and standard errors 7. The central role of qualitative evidence Part III. Evaluating Natural Experiments: 8. How plausible is as-if random? 9. How credible is the model? 10. How relevant is the intervention? Part IV. Conclusion: 11. Building strong research designs through multi-method research.

Natural Experiments in the Social Sciences: A Design-Based Approach

We have recently witnessed the e ftieth anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the only use of nuclear weapons in warfare. The non-use of nuclear weapons since then remains the single most important phenomenon of the nuclear age.Yet we still lack a full understanding of how this tradition arose and is maintained and of its prospects for the future. The widely cited explanation is deterrence, but this account is either wrong or incomplete.Although an element of sheer luck no doubt has played a part in this fortuitous outcome, this article argues that a normative element must be taken into account in explaining why nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. A normative prohibition on nuclear use has developed in the global system, which, although not (yet) a fully robust norm, has stigmatized nuclear weapons as unacceptable weapons of mass destruction. Without this normative stigma, there might have been more ‘‘use.’’ 1 This article examines this phenomenon in the context of the nuclear experience of the United States. This investigation is motivated by several empirical anomalies in the conventional account—deterrence—of the non-use of nuclear weapons since 1945. First is the non-use of nuclear weapons in cases where there was no fear of nuclear retaliation, that is, wherethe adversary could not retaliate inkind.Thisanomaly includes the e rst ten years or so of the nuclear era, when the United States possessed e rst an absolute nuclearmonopoly andthenan overwhelmingnuclear advantageover theSovietUnion. It also includes non-use by the United States in Vietnam (where the United States dropped tonnage equivalent to dozens of Hiroshima bombs) and in the 1991 Persian

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The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use

Why have nuclear weapons not been used since Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945? Nina Tannenwald disputes the conventional answer of 'deterrence' in favour of what she calls a nuclear taboo - a widespread inhibition on using nuclear weapons - which has arisen in global politics. Drawing on newly released archival sources, Tannenwald traces the rise of the nuclear taboo, the forces that produced it, and its influence, particularly on US leaders. She analyzes four critical instances where US leaders considered using nuclear weapons (Japan 1945, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War 1991) and examines how the nuclear taboo has repeatedly dissuaded US and other world leaders from resorting to these 'ultimate weapons'. Through a systematic analysis, Tannenwald challenges conventional conceptions of deterrence and offers a compelling argument on the moral bases of nuclear restraint as well as an important insight into how nuclear war can be avoided in the future.

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The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945

Gavin, a principal promoter in the U.S. military of the development of tactical nuclear weapons, wrote, “Nuclear weapons will become conventional for several reasons, among them cost, effectiveness against enemy weapons, and ease of handling.”1 Indeed, during the 1950s numerous U.S. leaders fully expected that a nuclear weapon would become “just another weapon.” Secretary of State John Foster Dulles accepted “the ultimate inevitability” that tactical nuclear weapons would gain “conventional” status.2 Adm. Arthur Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under President Dwight Eisenhower, predicted in 1956 that the use of nuclear weapons “would become accepted throughout the world just as soon as people could lay their hands upon them.”3 These leaders were articulating a view with a long tradition in the history of weapons and warfare: a weapon once introduced inevitably comes to be widely accepted as legitimate. In reality, however, nuclear weapons have come to be deaned as abhorrent and unacceptable weapons of mass destruction, with a taboo on their use. This taboo is associated with a widespread revulsion toward nuclear weapons and broadly held inhibitions on their use. The opprobrium has come to apply to all nuclear weapons, not just to large bombs or to certain types or uses of nuclear weapons. It has developed to the point that uses of nuclear weapons that were once considered plausible by at least some U.S. decisionmakers—for example, tactical battleaeld uses in limited wars and direct threats to deter enemies from conventional attack—have been severely delegitimized and are practically unthinkable policy options. Thomas Stigmatizing the Bomb

Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo

This article responds to key methodological and theoretical challenges posed by the literature on the role of ideas in international relations, especially the literature on ideas and the end of the Cold War. The article develops a theoretical framework that guides the analysis of the empirical articles that follow. It identifies explanatory strategies for the role of ideas and seeks to clarify key methodological issues in the study of ideas. The article defines terms, identifies several different relationships between ideational and material factors, and lays out a series of “tests” for evaluating the causal effect of various kinds of ideas and ideational mechanisms. It then seeks to clarify two primary issues: whether it is possible to draw a clearer line between the material and the ideational; and what is meant by “constitutive effects” and “constitutive explanation.” The article defends the notion of constitutive explanation and shows how both causal analysis and constitutive analysis are valid explan...

Ideas and Explanation: Advancing the Theoretical Agenda

This chapter evaluates the status and role of the nuclear taboo in contemporary world politics, particularly its role in stemming the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons, and its relationship to both deterrence and disarmament. What are its future prospects? What policies will strengthen it? What will lead to its demise? The chapter argues that while nuclear weapons are less and less likely to be used by a major nuclear power, the commitment to the taboo among some of the 'new' nuclear powers may be tenuous and needs to be strengthened. The taboo has had three main effects: first, the taboo has made it impossible to view nuclear weapons as 'just another weapon'. Second, the taboo has reinforced mutual deterrence among nuclear powers, that is, it has helped to undergird and reinforce stable nuclear deterrence. Third, at the same time, the taboo has undermined deterrence between nuclear and non-nuclear states.

Nina Tannenwald

Papers

The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis of Nuclear Non-Use

The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945

Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo

Ideas and Explanation: Advancing the Theoretical Agenda

The nuclear taboo