Showing papers by "Oliver E. Williamson published in 1983"

Organization Form, Residual Claimants, and Corporate Control

Abstract: EUGENE FAMA and Michael Jensen's treatment of the "Separation of Ownership and Control" is both insightful and informative. It deepens our understanding of corporate control, and the analysis of residual claimants usefully extends the economics of internal organization to include partnerships, mutuals, nonprofits, and the like. The basic argument is this: specialized governance structures arise in response to the efficiency needs of each type of organization. This is an important argument and one with which I broadly concur. They couple this, however, with a strong suggestion that these structures have reached a high degree of refinement-on which account there is not now, if indeed there ever has been, an organization control problem with which scholars and others are legitimately concerned. On this point I have grave doubts. My discussion of the paper addresses three issues: What is the relation, if any, of the hierarchical organization of the firm to economic performance? What relation, if any, does residual claimant status have to the composition and character of the board of directors? And is there now or has there ever been a corporate control problem? I deal with each of these issues in order.

Antitrust Enforcement: Where it has been; Where it is Going

Abstract: Antitrust, which once enjoyed widespread support, has come under withering attack from a variety of quarters recently. Many of the critics regard antitrust as an anachronism, and openly counsel that it be abolished. But some hold the opposite view. They urge that antitrust enforcement be strengthened, and recall the Warren Court years with nostalgia.

Vertical Merger Guidelines: Interpreting the 1982 Reforms

Abstract: Fourteen years separate the original Justice Department Merger Guidelines of May 30, 1968, the last day of Donald Turner's term as head of the Antitrust Division, and the Merger Guidelines of June 14, 1982, which were issued in the second year of William Baxter's tenure. Because merger policy plays an essential role in antitrust enforcement, the promulgation of new Merger Guidelines provides an important means of assessing changes in that area. Inasmuch as a decade appears to be a useful interval for evaluating antitrust developments,' a comparison of the recent with the earlier Guidelines should help to disclose what kinds of progress in antitrust enforcement (if any) have occurred within the interval.