Third-party cloud computing represents the promise of outsourcing as applied to computation. Services, such as Microsoft's Azure and Amazon's EC2, allow users to instantiate virtual machines (VMs) on demand and thus purchase precisely the capacity they require when they require it. In turn, the use of virtualization allows third-party cloud providers to maximize the utilization of their sunk capital costs by multiplexing many customer VMs across a shared physical infrastructure. However, in this paper, we show that this approach can also introduce new vulnerabilities. Using the Amazon EC2 service as a case study, we show that it is possible to map the internal cloud infrastructure, identify where a particular target VM is likely to reside, and then instantiate new VMs until one is placed co-resident with the target. We explore how such placement can then be used to mount cross-VM side-channel attacks to extract information from a target VM on the same machine.

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Hey, you, get off of my cloud: exploring information leakage in third-party compute clouds

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 17 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Boston College Law Review 50 B.C. L. Rev., No. 3, May, 2009. Boston University Public Interest Law Journal 18 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution 10 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Cardozo Public Law, Policy, & Ethics Journal 7 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J., No. 3, Summer, 2009. Chicago Journal of International Law 10 Chi. J. Int’l L., No. 1, Summer, 2009. Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 20 Colo. J. Int’l Envtl. L. & Pol’y, No. 2, Winter, 2009. Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 32 Colum. J.L. & Arts, No. 3, Spring, 2009. Connecticut Public Interest Law Journal 8 Conn. Pub. Int. L.J., No. 2, Spring-Summer, 2009. Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy 18 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y, No. 1, Fall, 2008. Cornell Law Review 94 Cornell L. Rev., No. 5, July, 2009. Creighton Law Review 42 Creighton L. Rev., No. 3, April, 2009. Criminal Law Forum 20 Crim. L. Forum, Nos. 2-3, Pp. 173-394, 2009. Delaware Journal of Corporate Law 34 Del. J. Corp. L., No. 2, Pp. 433-754, 2009. Environmental Law Reporter News & Analysis 39 Envtl. L. Rep. News & Analysis, No. 7, July, 2009. European Journal of International Law 20 Eur. J. Int’l L., No. 2, April, 2009. Family Law Quarterly 43 Fam. L.Q., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of International Law 40 Geo. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 22 Geo. J. Legal Ethics, No. 2, Spring, 2009. Golden Gate University Law Review 39 Golden Gate U. L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2009. Harvard Environmental Law Review 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 297-608, 2009. International Review of Law and Economics 29 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ., No. 1, March, 2009. Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 24 J. Envtl. L. & Litig., No. 1, Pp. 1-201, 2009. Journal of Legislation 34 J. Legis., No. 1, Pp. 1-98, 2008. Journal of Technology Law & Policy 14 J. Tech. L. & Pol’y, No. 1, June, 2009. Labor Lawyer 24 Lab. Law., No. 3, Winter/Spring, 2009. Michigan Journal of International Law 30 Mich. J. Int’l L., No. 3, Spring, 2009. New Criminal Law Review 12 New Crim. L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Northern Kentucky Law Review 36 N. Ky. L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 445-654, 2009. Ohio Northern University Law Review 35 Ohio N.U. L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 445-886, 2009. Pace Law Review 29 Pace L. Rev., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Quinnipiac Health Law Journal 12 Quinnipiac Health L.J., No. 2, Pp. 209-332, 2008-2009. Real Property, Trust and Estate Law Journal 44 Real Prop. Tr. & Est. L.J., No. 1, Spring, 2009. Rutgers Race and the Law Review 10 Rutgers Race & L. Rev., No. 2, Pp. 441-629, 2009. San Diego Law Review 46 San Diego L. Rev., No. 2, Spring, 2009. Seton Hall Law Review 39 Seton Hall L. Rev., No. 3, Pp. 725-1102, 2009. Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 18 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Stanford Environmental Law Journal 28 Stan. Envtl. L.J., No. 3, July, 2009. Tulsa Law Review 44 Tulsa L. Rev., No. 2, Winter, 2008. UMKC Law Review 77 UMKC L. Rev., No. 4, Summer, 2009. Washburn Law Journal 48 Washburn L.J., No. 3, Spring, 2009. Washington University Global Studies Law Review 8 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev., No. 3, Pp.451-617, 2009. Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 29 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y, Pp. 1-401, 2009. Washington University Law Review 86 Wash. U. L. Rev., No. 6, Pp. 1273-1521, 2009. William Mitchell Law Review 35 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev., No. 4, Pp. 1235-1609, 2009. Yale Journal of International Law 34 Yale J. Int’l L., No. 2, Summer, 2009. Yale Journal on Regulation 26 Yale J. on Reg., No. 2, Summer, 2009.

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Current index to legal periodicals

This paper presents Virgil, an automatic access point discovery and selection system. Unlike existing systems that select access points based entirely on received signal strength, Virgil scans for all available APs at a location, quickly associates to each, and runs a battery of tests to estimate the quality of each AP's connection to the Internet. Virgil also probes for blocked or redirected ports, to guide AP selection in favor of preserving application services that are currently in use. Results of our evaluation across five neighborhoods in three cities show Virgil finds a usable connection from 22% to 100% more often than selecting based on signal strength alone. By caching AP test results, Virgil both improves performance and success rate. Our overhead is acceptable and is shown to be faster than manually selecting an AP with Windows XP.

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Improved access point selection

Social networking websites are enormously popular, but they present a number of privacy risks to their users, one of the foremost of which being that social network service providers are able to observe and accumulate the information that users transmit through the network. We aim to mitigate this risk by presenting a new architecture for protecting information published through the social networking website, Facebook, through encryption. Our architecture makes a trade-off between security and usability in the interests of minimally affecting users' workflow and maintaining universal accessibility. While active attacks by Facebook could compromise users' privacy, our architecture dramatically raises the cost of such potential compromises and, importantly, places them within a framework for legal privacy protection because they would violate a user's reasonable expectation of privacy. We have built a prototype Facebook application implementing our architecture, addressing some of the limitations of the Facebook platform through proxy cryptography.

FlyByNight: mitigating the privacy risks of social networking

THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (ISBN: 0814798462) (NYU Press 2004) explores the social, political, and legal implications of the collection and use of personal information in computer databases. In the Information Age, our lives are documented in digital dossiers maintained by hundreds (perhaps thousands) of businesses and government agencies. These dossiers are composed of bits of our personal information, which when assembled together begin to paint a portrait of our personalities. The dossiers are increasingly used to make decisions about our lives - whether we get a loan, a mortgage, a license, or a job; whether we are investigated or arrested; and whether we are permitted to fly on an airplane. Digital dossiers impact many aspects of our lives. For example, they increase our vulnerability to identity theft, a serious crime that has been escalating at an alarming rate. Moreover, since September 11th, the government has been tapping into vast stores of information collected by businesses and using it to profile people for criminal or terrorist activity. Do these developments pose a problem? Is it possible to protect privacy in a society where information flows so freely and proliferates so rapidly? THE DIGITAL PERSON seeks to answer these questions. This book explores the problem from all angles - how businesses gather personal information in massive databases; how the government increasingly provides this data to businesses through public records; and how the government is gathering personal data from businesses for its own uses. THE DIGITAL PERSON not only explores these problems, but also provides a compelling account of how we can respond to them. Using a wide variety of sources, including history, philosophy, and literature, Solove sets forth a new understanding of privacy, one that is appropriate for the new challenges of the Information Age. Solove recommends how the law can be reformed to simultaneously protect our privacy and allow us to enjoy the benefits of our increasingly digital world. The table of contents and Chapter 1 are available for download.

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The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age (Introduction)

The new frontier of the Fourth Amendment is the search and seizure of computer data. Created to regulate entering homes and seizing physical evidence, the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures is now called on to regulate a very different process: retrieval of digital evidence from electronic storage devices. While obvious analogies exist between searching computers and searching physical spaces, important differences between them will force courts to rethink the basic meaning of the Fourth Amendment's key concepts. What does it mean to search computer data? When is computer data seized? When is a computer search or seizure reasonable? This article offers a normative framework for applying the Fourth Amendment to searches of computer data. It begins by exploring the basic differences between physical searches of physical property and electronic searches of digital evidence. It then proposes an exposure theory of Fourth Amendment searches: any exposure of data to an output device such as a monitor should be a search of that data, and only that data. The exposure approach is then matched with a rule for computer seizures: while copying data should not be deemed a seizure of that data, searches of copies should be treated the same as searches of the original. In the final section, the article proposes a rethinking of the plain view exception in computer searches to reflect the new dynamic of digital evidence investigations. The plain view exception should be narrowed or even eliminated in digital evidence cases to ensure that digital warrants that are narrow in theory do not devolve into general warrants in practice. Tailoring the doctrine in light of the new realities of computer investigations will protect the function of existing Fourth Amendment rules in the new world of digital evidence.

Searches and Seizures in a Digital World

This article argues that courts should approach the Fourth Amendment with caution when technology is in flux. When a technology is new or developing rapidly, courts should adopt modest formulations of Fourth Amendment protections that recognize the effectiveness and institutional advantages of statutory privacy protections.The cautious approach is justified on three grounds. First, caution is consistent with existing judicial practice. The reasonable expectation of privacy test generally has been used by the courts as a term of art that remains closely tied to property law concepts. When a technology implicates privacy but not property, current judicial practice tends to avoid broad interpretations of the Fourth Amendment. Second, legislative privacy protections are significantly stronger than most commentators appreciate. The case of wiretapping is instructive. While Fourth Amendment scholars often view wiretapping as a constitutional field under Katz v. United States and Berger v. New York, wiretapping has long been a primarily statutory field. Even today, wiretapping practice is governed by statutory commands, not constitutional ones. More broadly, Congress has created a wide range of statutory privacy laws that protect privacy in developing technologies where the courts have declined to offer protection.Third, legislatures have considerable institutional advantages that enable the legislative privacy rules regulating new technologies to be more balanced, comprehensive, and effective than judicially created rules. Rapid technological change makes it difficult for courts to clarify the law. Courts also lack the institutional capacity to readily appreciate existing technology and the impact of different legal rules. In contrast, courts are well equipped to respond to technological change in the context of criminal procedure rules.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID569441_code328150.pdf?abstractid=421560&rulid=52537&mirid=3

The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution

The federal government, all fifty states, and dozens of foreign countries have enacted computer crime statutes that prohibit "unauthorized access" to computers. No one knows what it means to "access" a computer, however, or when access becomes "unauthorized." The few courts that have construed these terms have offered widely varying interpretations. Several recent decisions suggest that any breach of contract renders an access unauthorized, broadly criminalizing contract law on the Internet. In this Article, Professor Orin Kerr explains the origins of unauthorized access statutes, and examines why the early beliefs that such statutes articulated a clear standard have proven remarkably naive. He then shows how and why the courts have construed these statutes in an overly broad manner that threatens to criminalize a surprising range of innocuous conduct involving computers. Finally, Professor Kerr offers a normative proposal for interpreting "access" and "authorization." Courts should reject a contract-based theory of authorization, and should limit the scope of unauthorized access statutes to circumvention of code-based restrictions on computer privileges. This proposed interpretation best mediates between securing privacy and protecting the liberty interests of Internet users. It also mirrors criminal law's traditional treatment of consent defenses, and avoids possible constitutional difficulties that may arise under the broader constructions that courts have recently favored.

Cybercrime's Scope: Interpreting 'Access' and 'Authorization' in Computer Misuse Statutes

In the Supreme Court’s recent decision on GPS surveillance, United States v. Jones, five justices authored or joined concurring opinions that applied a new approach to interpreting Fourth Amendment protection. Before Jones, Fourth Amendment decisions had always evaluated each step of an investigation individually. Jones introduced what we might call a “mosaic theory” of the Fourth Amendment, by which courts evaluate a collective sequence of government activity as an aggregated whole to consider whether the sequence amounts to a search.This Article considers the implications of a mosaic theory of the Fourth Amendment. It explores the choices and puzzles that a mosaic theory would raise, and it analyzes the merits of the proposed new method of Fourth Amendment analysis. The Article makes three major points. First, the mosaic theory represents a dramatic departure from the basic building block of existing Fourth Amendment doctrine. Second, adopting the mosaic theory would require courts to answer a long list of novel and challenging questions. Third, courts should reject the theory and retain the traditional sequential approach to Fourth Amendment analysis. The mosaic approach reflects legitimate concerns, but implementing it would be exceedingly difficult in light of rapid technological change. Courts can better respond to the concerns animating the mosaic theory within the traditional parameters of the sequential approach to Fourth Amendment analysis.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2086149_code328150.pdf?abstractid=2032821&mirid=4

The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment

How does the Fourth Amendment apply to the search and seizure of computer data? The Fourth Amendment was created to regulate entering homes and seizing physical evidence, but its prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures is now being called on to regulate a very different process: retrieval of digital evidence from electronic storage devices. Although obvious analogies exist between searching physical spaces and searching computers, important differences between them will force courts to rethink the key concepts of the Fourth Amendment. What does it mean to "search" computer data? When is computer data "seized"? When is a computer search or seizure "reasonable"? This Article offers a normative framework for applying the Fourth Amendment to searches of computer hard drives and other storage devices. It begins by exploring the basic differences between physical searches of tangible property and electronic searches of digital evidence. It then considers how the Fourth Amendment should apply when a government investigator retrieves evidence from a person's computer, and concludes that exposing data to an output device such as a monitor should be a Fourth Amendment "search" ordinarily requiring a warrant. Although copying data should not be deemed a "seizure" of that data, imaging a computer should be regulated by the Fourth Amendment and searches of copies should be treated the same as searches of the original. In the final section, the Article considers ways to limit the scope of computer searches. The plain view exception may need to be narrowed or even eliminated in digital evidence cases to ensure that digital warrants that are narrow in theory do not devolve into general warrants in practice. Tailoring the doctrine to the realities of computer investigations will protect the function of existing Fourth Amendment rules in the new environment of digital evidence. INTRODUCTION In the last decade, personal computers have become an increasingly important source of evidence in criminal cases. Computers record and store a remarkable amount of information about what users write, see, hear, and do. In a growing number of cases, searching the suspect's personal computer is an essential step in the investigation. The thorny issue for the courts--and the fascinating issue for scholars--is how the Fourth Amendment should regulate the process. How does the Fourth Amendment govern the steps that an investigator takes when retrieving evidence from a personal computer? At present, the answer is surprisingly unclear. (1) Lower courts have just begun to grapple with the question, resulting in a series of tentative and often contradictory opinions that leaves many answers unresolved. (2) The problem is difficult because important differences exist between the mechanisms of physical and digital evidence collection. The Fourth Amendment was drafted to regulate searches of homes and physical property, and the courts have developed clear rules to regulate the enter-and-retrieve mechanism of traditional physical searches. (3) Computer searches offer a very different dynamic: electric heads pass over billions of magnetized spots on metal disks, transforming those spots into data that is processed and directed to users via monitors. How can the old rules fit the new facts? For example, what does it mean to "search" computer data? When is computer data "seized"? When is a search or seizure of computer data "reasonable"? These questions are particularly difficult because computers challenge several of the basic assumptions underlying Fourth Amendment doctrine. Computers are like containers in a physical sense, homes in a virtual sense, and vast warehouses in an informational sense. Which insights should govern? This Article develops a normative framework for applying the Fourth Amendment to searches of computer hard drives and other electronic storage devices. (4) It explores the various ways that the Fourth Amendment could apply to the retrieval of evidence from computers and charts out a recommended path. …

Orin S. Kerr

Papers

Searches and Seizures in a Digital World

The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution

Cybercrime's Scope: Interpreting 'Access' and 'Authorization' in Computer Misuse Statutes

The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment

Searches and Seizures in a Digital World