计量经济分析 = Econometric analysis

/pdf/convex-analysisnoer-san-nojin-zhan-nituite-5dl2rbmoyr.pdf

Convex Analysisの二,三の進展について

We investigate conditions sufficient for identification of average treatment effects using instrumental variables. First we show that the existence of valid instruments is not sufficient to identify any meaningful average treatment effect. We then establish that the combination of an instrument and a condition on the relation between the instrument and the participation status is sufficient for identification of a local average treatment effect for those who can be induced to change their participation status by changing the value of the instrument. Finally we derive the probability limit of the standard IV estimator under these conditions. It is seen to be a weighted average of local average treatment effects.

Evolution and Rationality Some Recent Game-Theoretic Results. Identification and Estimation of Local Average Treatment Effects

/pdf/the-theory-of-industrial-organization-19bejph0ej.pdf

The Theory of Industrial Organization

The Silent Language

RFID (Radio-Frequency Identification) technology has shown itself to be a promising technology to track movements of goods in a supply chain. As such, it can give unprecedented visibility to the supply chain. Such visibility can save labor cost, improve supply chain coordination, reduce inventory and increase product availability. Industry reports and white papers are now filled with estimates and proclamations of the benefits and quantified values of RFID. Early adopters are now rallying more and more followers. However, most such claims are educated guesses at best and are not substantiated, that is, they are not based on detailed, model-based analysis. This paper argues that there is a huge credibility gap of the value of RFID, and that a void exists in showing how the proclaimed values are arrived at, and how those values can be realized. The paper shows that this credibility gap must be filled with solid model analysis, and therefore presents a great opportunity for the Production and Operations Management (POM) research community. The paper reviews some of the ongoing research efforts that attempt to close the credibility gap, and suggests additional directions for further strengthening the POM's contribution to help industry realize the full potentials of RFID.

/pdf/unlocking-the-value-of-rfid-y7l2dfvsue.pdf

Unlocking the Value of RFID

We study the important problem of how to assure credible forecast information sharing between a supplier and a manufacturer. The supplier is responsible for acquiring the necessary capacity before receiving an order from the manufacturer who possesses private forecast information for her end product. We address how different contracts affect the supplier's capacity decision and, hence, the profitability of the supplier and the manufacturer. We fully develop two contracts (and provide explicit formulae) to enable credible forecast information sharing. The first is a nonlinear capacity reservation contract under which the manufacturer agrees to pay a fee to reserve capacity. The second is an advance purchase contract under which the manufacturer is induced to place a firm order before the supplier secures the component capacity used to build the end product. These contracts serve a strategic role in information sharing. The capacity reservation contract enables the supplier to detect the manufacturer's private forecast information, while the advance purchase contract enables the manufacturer to signal her forecast information. We show that channel coordination is possible even under asymmetric forecast information by combining the advance purchase contract with an appropriate payback agreement. Through our structural and numerical results we also show that the degree of forecast information asymmetry and the risk-adjusted profit margin are two important drivers that determine supply chain efficiency and which contract to adopt.

Strategic Commitments for an Optimal Capacity Decision Under Asymmetric Forecast Information

We study a manufacturer’s problem of managing his direct online sales channel together with an independently owned bricks-and-mortar retail channel, when the channels compete in service. We incorporate a detailed consumer channel choice model in which the demand faced in each channel depends on the service levels of both channels as well as the consumers’ valuation of the product and shopping experience. The direct channel’s service is measured by the delivery lead time for the product; the retail channel’s service is measured by product availability. We identify optimal dual channel strategies that depend on the channel environment described by factors such as the cost of managing a direct channel, retailer inconvenience, and some product characteristics. We also determine when the manufacturer should establish a direct channel or a retail channel if he is already selling through one of these channels. Finally, we conduct a sequence of controlled experiments with human subjects to investigate whether our model makes reasonable predictions of human behavior. We determine that the model accurately predicts the direction of changes in the subjects’ decisions, as well as their channel strategies in response to the changes in the channel environment. These observations suggest that the model can be used in designing channel strategies for an actual dual channel environment. 1

http://www.utdallas.edu/~oozer/pdf/DualChannel.pdf

Dual Sales Channel Management with Service Competition

This paper investigates the capacity investment decision of a supplier who solicits private forecast information from a manufacturer. To ensure abundant supply, the manufacturer has an incentive to inflate her forecast in a costless, non-binding, and non-verifiable type of communication known as "cheap talk.'' According to standard game theory, parties do not cooperate and the only equilibrium is uninformative -- the manufacturer's report is independent of her forecast and the supplier does not use the report to determine capacity. However, we observe in controlled laboratory experiments that parties cooperate even in the absence of reputation-building mechanisms and complex contracts. We argue that the underlying reason for cooperation is trust. The extant literature on forecast sharing and supply chain coordination implicitly assumes that supply chain members either absolutely trust each other and cooperate when sharing forecast information, or do not trust each other at all. Contrary to this all-or-nothing view, we determine that a continuum exists between these two extremes. In addition, we determine (i) when trust is important in forecast information sharing, (ii) how trust is affected by changes in the supply chain environment, and (iii) how trust affects related operational decisions. To explain and better understand the observed behavioral regularities, we also develop an analytical model of trust to incorporate both pecuniary and non-pecuniary incentives in the game-theoretic analysis of cheap-talk forecast communication. The model identifies and quantifies how trust and trustworthiness induce effective cheap-talk forecast sharing under the wholesale price contract. We also determine the impact of repeated interactions and information feedback on trust and cooperation in forecast sharing. We conclude with a discussion on the implications of our results for developing effective forecast management policies.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1692460_code999133.pdf?abstractid=1477563&mirid=5

Trust in Forecast Information Sharing

In this chapter, we discuss when, how, and why trust and trustworthiness arise to support cooperation within and across organizations. To do so, we first define trust and trustworthiness, discuss how they can be quantified and determine key components of trusting and trustworthy behavior. In addition, we identify building blocks of trust and trustworthiness and offer tangible insights about how to establish trusting and cooperative business/inter-organizational relationships, based on both academic research and case studies from across industries. We all know that trust and trustworthiness matter in almost all aspects of our relationships, business or otherwise. Our friends, foes, family, colleagues, sociologists, management scientists, and even economists recognize this fact (even though some may not acknowledge it). We innately believe being trustworthy is a virtue (or, at least, are taught to think so) and have learned whether and when to trust (to the best of our abilities). And when we trust, we put ourselves in a vulnerable situation (i.e., we take a risk) based upon the expectation that the person we trusted (trustee) behaves in a positive way that is rewarding to us (as trustors). So, we make a risky “investment” of some sort and face uncertainty in the outcome (and may even regret later) when we trust. We also perhaps adjust our trusting and trustworthy behavior depending on the target of our trust, given the relevant context. For example, we may trust our significant other that he or she will return the $250 (or the car) we lend him or her (perhaps with an implicit or explicit expectation of a positive return beyond the actual loan). We probably would not ask him or her to write a contract before lending our car. However, most of us would perhaps require a marriage certificate (a binding contract that can only be annulled after a legal hearing) accepting all requirements governing a marriage before we commit “to have and to hold from this day forward, for better, for worse, for richer, for poorer, in sickness and health, until death do us part...” and ensure that we provide and receive the care and commitment in the presence of conflicting objectives that we will all face during our marriage. Similarly, most successful business and economic relationships are built upon a considerable degree of mutual trust and trustworthiness. As Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow wrote, “Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust” (Arrow 1972). Trust has been the glue for most transactions within and across cultures as long as humans have socialized and transacted. Business owners and practitioners are not oblivious to this fact. They do not begin talking with a potential partner by first writing a complete set of contracts stipulating all 1 Note that you neither need a marriage certificate nor need to rely on trust if (the big if) your spouse’s and your objectives are and will be perfectly aligned with absolutely no uncertainty 100% of the time during the span of your life. Similarly, in such a case, there is no need for a preor post-nuptial agreement.

/pdf/trust-and-trustworthiness-26ifx6xpvn.pdf

Özalp Özer

Papers

Unlocking the Value of RFID

Strategic Commitments for an Optimal Capacity Decision Under Asymmetric Forecast Information

Dual Sales Channel Management with Service Competition

Trust in Forecast Information Sharing

Trust and Trustworthiness