计量经济分析 = Econometric analysis

We investigate whether income inequality affects subsequent growth in a cross-country sample for 1965-90, using the models of Barro (1997), Bleaney and Nishiyama (2002) and Sachs and Warner (1997), with negative results. We then investigate the evolution of income inequality over the same period and its correlation with growth. The dominating feature is inequality convergence across countries. This convergence has been significantly faster amongst developed countries. Growth does not appear to influence the evolution of inequality over time. Outline

https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/81822/1/02-28.pdf

Economic growth and income inequality

Why Men Rebel was first published in 1970 on the heels of a decade of political violence and protest not only in remote corners of Africa and Southeast Asia, but also at home in the United States. Forty years later, the world is riveted on uprisings in the Middle East, and the United States has been overtaken by a focus on international terrorism and a fascination with citizen movements at home and abroad. Do the arguments of 1970 apply today? Why Men Rebel lends new insight into contemporary challenges of transnational recruitment and organization, multimedia mobilization, and terrorism.

Why Men Rebel

The course is focused on historical texts, most of them philosophical. Context for understanding the texts and the course of democratic development will be provided in lecture and discussions, and by some background readings (Dunn). We begin with the remarkable Athenian democracy, and its frequent enemy the Spartan oligarchy. In Athens legislation was passed directly by an assembly of all citizens, and executive officials were selected by lot rather than by competitive election. Athenian oligarchs such as Plato more admired Sparta, and their disdain for the democracy became the judgment of the ages, until well after the modern democratic revolutions. Marsilius of Padua in the early Middle Ages argued for popular sovereignty. The Italian citystates of the Middle Ages did without kings, and looked back to Rome and Greece for republican models. During the English Civil War republicans debated whether the few or the many should be full citizens of the regime. The English, French, and American revolutions struggled with justifying and establishing a representative democracy suitable for a large state, and relied on election rather than lot to select officials. The English established a constitutional monarchy, admired in Europe, and adapted by the Americans in their republican constitution. The American Revolution helped inspire the French, and the French inspired republican and democratic revolution throughout Europe during the 19 century.

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Democracy and Its Critics

Machines are increasingly doing “intelligent” things. Face recognition algorithms use a large dataset of photos labeled as having a face or not to estimate a function that predicts the pre...

https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/jep.31.2.87

Machine Learning: An Applied Econometric Approach

1. Introduction: the politics of advanced capitalism Pablo Beramendi, Silja Hausermann, Herbert Kitschelt and Hanspeter Kriesi Part I. Structural Transformations: 2. Prosperity and the evolving structure of advanced economies Carles Boix 3. The origins of dualism David Rueda, Erik Wibbels and Melina Altamirano 4. Occupational structure and labor market change in Western Europe since 1990 Daniel Oesch 5. Globalization, labor market risks, and class cleavage Rafaela Dancygier and Stefanie Walter 6. The return of the family Gosta Esping-Andersen Part II. Politics: 7. Party alignments: change and continuity Herbert Kitschelt and Philipp Rehm 8. What do voters want? Dimensions and configurations in individual-level preferences and party choice Silja Hausermann and Hanspeter Kriesi 9. Trade unions and the future of democratic capitalism Anke Hassel Part III. Policies: 10. Post-industrial social policy Evelyne Huber and John Stephens 11. The dynamics of social investment: human capital, activation, and care Jane Gingrich and Ben Ansell 12. Stability and change in CMEs: corporate governance and industrial relations in Germany and Denmark Gregory Jackson and Kathleen Thelen Part IV. Outcomes: 13. Constrained partisanship and economic outcomes Pablo Beramendi 14. Happiness and the welfare state: decommodification and the political economy of subjective wellbeing Christopher J. Anderson and Jason D. Hecht 15. Conclusion: advanced capitalism in crisis Pablo Beramendi, Silja Hausermann, Herbert Kitschelt and Hanspeter Kriesi.

The Politics of Advanced Capitalism

The determinants of the welfare state have received a great deal of attention in the comparative political economy literature. An analysis of the role that indirect taxation plays in the politics of advanced industrial societies is, however, missing. This article demonstrates that a full understanding of the links between redistribution, social democracy and corporatism is impossible without a closer look at indirect taxation. Conventional wisdom is questioned and it is shown that social democratic governments in corporatist environments find themselves in a paradoxical situation. They need to support the welfare state by relying upon a fundamentally regressive policy instrument: indirect taxation. It is also shown that social democratic governments can minimize the use of consumption taxes as part of their redistributive strategy only in non-corporatist settings. In exploring these issues, this article illuminates alternative routes for the pursuit of equality in a context of declining corporatist arrangements. The demand for redistribution is fairly inelastic across industrialized democracies. Even when social expenditures become very expensive, the demand for them decreases with great difficulty. 1 A cursory examination of fiscal policy across OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation Development) governments reveals a striking fact: the countries more often ruled by social democratic parties are also characterized by the highest tax burden on consumption income and the highest levels of welfare state effort throughout the 1965–95 period. If taxes on consumption are seen as a regressive fiscal device applied to general consumption goods (rather than luxury goods), this pattern poses a puzzle for partisanship theory. Social democratic parties are assumed to protect the interests of citizens in the bottom half of the income distribution, 2 and yet they seem to make ample use of a tool that clearly undermines this goal. How can we explain the coexistence of large redistributive efforts on the expenditure side with the use of regressive tools on the revenue side?

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Social Democracy Constrained: Indirect Taxation in Industrialized Democracies

1. Regions and redistribution: introduction and overview 2. A theory of fiscal structures in political unions 3. The road ahead: the empirical strategy 4. The European Union: economic geography and fiscal structures under centrifugal representation 5. North America's divide: distributive tensions, risk sharing, and the centralization of public insurance in federations 6. Germany's reunification: distributive tensions and fiscal structures under centripetal representation 7. Endogenous decentralization and welfare resilience: Spain, 1978-2007 8. The political geography of inequality: summary and implications.

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The political geography of inequality : regions and redistribution

A long tradition of research has shown decentralized political structures as an important cause behind lower levels of redistribution and higher levels of inequality. This article offers an alternative interpretation of the association between fragmented fiscal structures and higher levels of inequality. I argue that the distributive effects of decentralization depend on the preexisting territorial patterns of inequality. Therefore, the political choice between alternative fiscal structures is largely driven by their expected distributive consequences. As a result, the territorial structure of inequality becomes an important factor to explain why some fiscal structures are more integrated than others. Two mechanisms link regional income distributions and preferences about the decentralization of redistributive policy: differences in the demand for redistribution associated with interregional income differences, and differences in the demand for social insurance associated with the incidence of labor market risks. I test the argument using a data set of fourteen countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) over the period 1980–2000. In addition, I illustrate the potential of the approach by analyzing why social solidarity remains territorially fragmented in the European Union despite the fact that it has a common currency and a common market.Previous versions of this article were presented in seminars at Cornell University, Syracuse University, Duke University, and the 2005 APSA meetings. I benefited from comments in all these events. In addition, I thank Christopher Anderson, Tony Atkinson, Neal Beck, Carles Boix, Matt Cleary, Thomas R. Cusack, Alberto Diaz-Cayeros, Gosta Esping-Andersen, Kai Konrad, Mitchell Orenstein, Jonas Pontusson, Adam Przeworski, Jonathan Rodden, David Rueda, David Soskice, Ernesto Stein, Duane Swank, Daniel Treisman, Brian Taylor, Michael Wallerstein, and Erik Wibbels for their very helpful comments on earlier versions. Krishna Ayyangar provided excellent research assistance. Finally, I want to thank Lisa Martin and two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful suggestions. Financial support from the Juan March Institute, Nuffield College (Oxford), the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin and the Center for Policy Research (Syracuse University) is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.

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Inequality and the Territorial Fragmentation of Solidarity

Although income inequality is an important normative issue for students of democratic politics, little is known about its effects on citizens’ electoral participation. The authors develop a formal ...

/pdf/left-parties-poor-voters-and-electoral-participation-in-32377agv4v.pdf

Pablo Beramendi

Papers

The Politics of Advanced Capitalism

Social Democracy Constrained: Indirect Taxation in Industrialized Democracies

The political geography of inequality : regions and redistribution

Inequality and the Territorial Fragmentation of Solidarity

Left Parties, Poor Voters, and Electoral Participation in Advanced Industrial Societies