The global marine fish catch is approaching its upper limit. The number of overfished populations, as well as the indirect effects of fisheries on marine ecosystems, indicate that management has failed to achieve a principal goal, sustainability. This failure is primarily due to continually increasing harvest rates in response to incessant sociopolitical pressure for greater harvests and the intrinsic uncertainty in predicting the harvest that will cause population collapse. A more holistic approach incorporating interspecific interactions and physical environmental influences would contribute to greater sustainability by reducing the uncertainty in predictions. However, transforming the management process to reduce the influence of pressure for greater harvest holds more immediate promise.

https://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/277/5325/509.full.pdf

The Management of Fisheries and Marine Ecosystems

Overexploitation of marine fisheries remains a serious problem worldwide, even for many fisheries that have been intensively managed by coastal nations Many factors have contributed to these system failures Here we discuss the implications of persistent, irreducible scientific uncertainty pertaining to marine ecosystems When combined with typical levels of uncontrollability of catches and incidental mortality, this uncertainty probably implies that traditional approaches to fisheries management will be persistently unsuccessful We propose the use of large-scale protected areas (marine reserves) as major components of future management programs Protected areas can serve as a hedge against inevitable management limitations, thus greatly enhancing the long-term sustainable exploitation of fishery resources Marine reserves would also provide an escape from the need of ever more detailed and expensive stock assessments and would be invaluable in the rehabilitation of depleted stocks

https://esajournals.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1890/1051-0761%281998%298%5BS72%3AITPPIF%5D2.0.CO%3B2

Implementing the precautionary principle in fisheries management through marine reserves

https://www.who-owns-the-world.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/oceans.pdf

Neoliberalism in the oceans: “rationalization,” property rights, and the commons question

▪ Abstract The total world catch from marine and freshwater wild stocks has peaked and may be slightly declining. There appear to be few significant resources to be developed, and the majority of the world's fish stocks are intensively exploited. Many marine ecosystems have been profoundly changed by fishing and other human activities. Although most of the world's major fisheries continue to produce substantial sustainable yield, a number have been severely overfished, and many more stocks appear to be heading toward depletion. The world's fisheries continue to be heavily subsidized, which encourages overfishing and provides society with a small fraction of the potential economic benefits. In most of the world's fisheries there is a “race for fish” in which boats compete to catch the fish before a quota is achieved or the fish are caught by someone else. The race for fish leads to economic inefficiency, poor quality product, and pressure to extract every fish for short-term gain. A number of countries hav...

State of the World’s Fisheries

Defining success in fisheries and conflicts in objectives

Economic inefficiency and other problems associated with managing fisheries through restrictions on fishing times, places and gear have led to development of management systems based on individual fishers' quotas. But this shift from input controls to output controls calls for much more accurate and timely stock assessments. The risk of stock collapse resulting from overfishing, coupled with growing pressure for low-risk resource management policies, call for conservative quota-setting in the face of uncertain stock information. Under existing assessment systems, quotas may need to be so conservative that foregone catches could wipe out the economic gains from quota management. This problem might be overcome by taking advantage of the incentives of quota-holders to contribute to, and invest in, the gathering of information to improve stock assessments.

Stock information requirements for quota management systems in commercial fisheries

Harvesting regulation under quota management systems for ocean fisheries

This paper presents empirical evidence on the relationship between forest tenure and investment in silviculture. Silvicultural activities and expenditures on a large number of recently logged tracts in British Columbia, under four distinct forms of tenure, are assessed using a silvicultural investment model based on the conventional theory of capital. The empirical results indicate that silvicultural investment is correlated with security of tenure, and the level of investment under the most secure form--private land--is more than 67% greater than that under the least secure form--Forest Licences. FoR. Scl. 42(4):442-449.

Differences in silvicultural investment under various types of forest tenure in British Columbia.

The influence of the form of tenure on reforestation in British Columbia

As pressures on ocean fisheries have grown, pervasive evidence of over‐exploited resources and economic distress has revealed fundamental weaknesses in traditional regulatory policies. In their search for new management approaches, fishing nations have recently turned their attention to the nature of fishing rights, and the trend is clearly toward more well‐defined, exclusive property rights. In a remarkably short time the tradition of open access to ocean fisheries has waned; rights to most of the world's fish resources have been appropriated by coastal states, their governments have excluded everyone from access to the stocks except those who hold licenses, and increasingly, the rights of license holders are quantitatively specified. Experience so far suggests that strengthening the property rights of fishing enterprises is a promising means of improving the management of marine resources as well as the economic performance of fishing industries, and it portends profound changes in fishing regimes.

Peter H. Pearse

Papers

Stock information requirements for quota management systems in commercial fisheries

Harvesting regulation under quota management systems for ocean fisheries

Differences in silvicultural investment under various types of forest tenure in British Columbia.

The influence of the form of tenure on reforestation in British Columbia

From open access to private property: Recent innovations in fishing rights as instruments of fisheries policy