Peter R. Demerjian

TL;DR: The authors proposed a measure of managerial ability, based on managers' efficiency in generating revenues, which is available for a large sample of firms and outperforms existing ability measures and finds that the measure is strongly associated with manager fixed effects, and that stock price reactions to CEO turnover are positive (negative) when assessing the outgoing CEO as low (high) ability.

TL;DR: A measure of managerial ability, based on managers' efficiency in generating revenues, which is available for a large sample of firms and outperforms existing ability measures is proposed, and it is found that the negative relation between equity financing and future abnormal returns documented in prior research is mitigated by managerial ability.

TL;DR: This paper examined the relation between managerial ability and earnings quality and found that more able managers are associated with fewer subsequent restatements, higher earnings and accruals persistence, lower errors in the bad debt provision, and higher quality accrual estimations.

TL;DR: This article examined the relation between managerial ability and earnings quality and found that more able managers are associated with fewer subsequent restatements, higher earnings and accruals persistence, lower errors in the bad debt provision, and higher quality accrual estimations.

TL;DR: The authors found that borrowers with higher volatility ratios are less likely to have balance-sheet-based covenants, which is consistent with reductions in the contracting usefulness of the balance sheet being associated with reduction in balance sheet covenants.