Offering a unifying theoretical perspective not readily available in any other text, this innovative guide to econometrics uses simple geometrical arguments to develop students' intuitive understanding of basic and advanced topics, emphasizing throughout the practical applications of modern theory and nonlinear techniques of estimation. One theme of the text is the use of artificial regressions for estimation, reference, and specification testing of nonlinear models, including diagnostic tests for parameter constancy, serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, and other types of mis-specification. Explaining how estimates can be obtained and tests can be carried out, the authors go beyond a mere algebraic description to one that can be easily translated into the commands of a standard econometric software package. Covering an unprecedented range of problems with a consistent emphasis on those that arise in applied work, this accessible and coherent guide to the most vital topics in econometrics today is indispensable for advanced students of econometrics and students of statistics interested in regression and related topics. It will also suit practising econometricians who want to update their skills. Flexibly designed to accommodate a variety of course levels, it offers both complete coverage of the basic material and separate chapters on areas of specialized interest.

Estimation and Inference in Econometrics

Corruption and Growth

Study in administration

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/BF00683953.pdf

Privatizing Russia: Maxim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny. Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press 1995. 165 + ix pp

This paper analyzes an emergent stream of research shedding light on the institutional factors shaping entrepreneurial activity and its effect on economic growth. This integrative analysis spanning a broad spectrum of diverse literature enables a distinction between two different research lines in the field of entrepreneurship. The findings of this study, based on articles from the journals included in the Web of Science database, facilitate a broader comprehension of two separate lines of research, which allows an analysis of the interaction among institutions, entrepreneurship, and economic growth. The systematic literature analysis over the last 25 years (1992–2016) of research reveals that institutions could be related to economic growth through entrepreneurship, which would open new research questions about what institutional factors are conducive to entrepreneurship, which in turn spurs economic growth. Thus, not only is understanding both complex relationships and their possible sequence useful for planning strategies and public policies, but it is also helpful for advancing and providing new insights in these research fields, which could be complementary and interdisciplinary.

/pdf/twenty-five-years-of-research-on-institutions-52z9t5zkvb.pdf

Twenty-five years of research on institutions, entrepreneurship, and economic growth: what has been learned?

The adoption of lotteries by state governments has received significant attention in the economics literature, but the issue of casino adoption has been neglected by researchers. Casino gambling is a relatively new industry in the United States, outside Nevada and New Jersey. As of 2007, 11 states had established commercial casinos; several more states are considering legalization. We analyze the factors that determine a state’s decision to legalize commercial casinos, using data from 1985 to 2000, a period which covers the majority of states that have adopted commercial casinos. We use a tobit model to examine states’ fiscal conditions, political alignments, intrastate and interstate competitive environments, and demographic characteristics, which yields information on the probability and timing of adoptions. The results suggest a public choice explanation that casino legalization is due to state fiscal stress, to efforts to keep gambling revenues (and the concomitant gambling taxes) within the state, and to attract tourism or “export taxes.”

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/40541949.pdf

Determinants of the probability and timing of commercial casino legalization in the United States

In this article, we examine how the level of regulation affects the size distribution of businesses. To the extent that regulation functions as a fixed cost, it should lead to larger firm size. However, regulations may also lead to smaller establishments with firms outsourcing regulated activities or staying small to take advantage of state exemptions for small businesses from regulations. We empirically examine the relationship between the size distribution of establishments and the level of regulation using state- and industry-level panel data from 1992 to 2004. Our results suggest that regulation decreases the proportion of zero employee and 1–4 employee establishments. The proportion of establishments in the 5–9 employee range generally increases with the level of regulation. Thus, regulation appears to operate as a fixed cost causing establishments to be larger.

Regulatory costs on entrepreneurship and establishment employment size

The literature on voter turnout focuses on the determinants of the electorate’s vote supply. There is growing recognition, however, that the demanders of votes—candidates, political parties, and interest groups—have strong incentives to invest resources in mobilizing support on Election Day. The authors test the hypothesis that corruption rents increase the value of holding public office and, hence, elicit greater demand-side effort in building winning coalitions. Analyzing a pooled time-series data set of public officials convicted of misusing their offices between 1979 and 2005, we find, after controlling for other influential factors, that governmental corruption raises voter turnout rates in gubernatorial elections.

/pdf/corruption-and-voter-participation-evidence-from-the-us-2y8azqsnvf.pdf

Corruption and Voter Participation: Evidence from the US States

The literature on US state government fiscal performance has examined the role of institutional factors such as budget rules and divided government, but has largely ignored the impact of party alternation. This paper primarily focuses on whether party alternation in the governor’s office affects fiscal performance. Our hypothesis is that frequent party changes create a political environment that impacts fiscal performance. To further assess the impact of party alternation on fiscal performance, we consider our primary hypothesis in conjunction with the degree of division that exists between the governor’s office and the legislature. Using panel data from 37 states between 1971 and 2000 we test the hypothesis that frequent party alternation can be expected to affect fiscal performance and find strong support for the hypothesis.

Party alternation, divided government, and fiscal performance within US States

This article estimates the effects of state economic incentives during the 1980s and interprets results in the context of a general-equilibrium specific-factors model of production. The issue is whether investment incentives had a net positive impact on manufacturing value added because subsidized firms would pull resources from the rest of the state economy. The public finance literature provides the foundation of the econometric model. Empirical results are consistent with theoretical predictions of the specific-factors model that resources would come from other sectors. Incentives are associated with a reduction in manufacturing value added.

Peter T. Calcagno

Papers

Determinants of the probability and timing of commercial casino legalization in the United States

Regulatory costs on entrepreneurship and establishment employment size

Corruption and Voter Participation: Evidence from the US States

Party alternation, divided government, and fiscal performance within US States

State Economic Incentives: Stimulus or Reallocation?