David Lewis is one of the most influential philosophers of our age, and On the Plurality of Worlds is his magnum opus. OPW offers an extended development and defense of the hypothesis that there are many universes, things of the same kind as the universe in which we all live, move, and have our being. Lewis calls these universes ―worlds‖, deliberately recalling the notion of a ―possible world‖ familiar from modal logic and the metaphysics of modality. The title invokes the thesis of the book: there are pluralities of worlds, things of the same kind as the world we inhabit, differing only with respect to what goes on in them. Lewis sought in earlier work (Lewis, 1973, pp. 84–86) to offer a direct argument from common sense modal commitments to the existence of a plurality of worlds. OPW offers a less direct argument. Here, Lewis supports the hypothesis by arguing that, if we accept it, we have the material to offer a wide range of analyses of hitherto puzzling and problematic notions. We thereby effect a theoretical unification and simplification: with a small stock of primitives, we can analyze a number of important philosophical notions with a broad range of applications. But the analyses Lewis proposes are adequate only if we accept the thesis that there are a plurality of worlds. Lewis claims that this is a reason to accept the thesis. In his words, «the hypothesis is serviceable, and that is a reason to think that it is true» (p. 3).

On the Plurality of Worlds

羟氨苄青霉素引起大疱性类天疱疮样疹

"The Encyclopedia of Neuroscience on CD-ROM" is designed to make the neurosciences readily accessible to both the specialist and non-specialist reader This landmark work, with its broad scope and interdisciplinary coverage, has become an essential reference and learning tool for everyone involved in the study of the brain and how it mediates behavior This Third Edition CD-ROM has been further expanded and significantly updated, in most cases by the original authors The Encyclopedia represents the culmination of a massive international effort to present the neurosciences in one concise source, and includes contributions from renowned experts in their respective fields from around the world, including several Nobel Prize winners 18 per cent of the approximately 900 entries are new, 60 per cent are completely revised and updated It includes more info - list of entries It has improved search functionality with extensive cross-linking between articles of relevance It includes over 100 completely new entries and over half of the original articles are revised and updated It provides useful weblinks to relevant neuroscience websites

Encyclopedia of Neuroscience

Preface. Acknowledgments. Introduction. 1. The Linguistic Turn and the Conceptual Turn. 2. Taking Philosophical Questions at Face Value. 3. Metaphysical Conceptions of Analyticity. 4. Epistemological Conceptions of Analyticity. 5. Knowledge of Metaphysical Modality. 6. Thought Experiments. 7. Evidence in Philosophy. 8. Knowledge Maximization. Afterword. Must Do Better. Appendix 1. Modal Logic within Counterfactual Logic. Appendix 2. Counterfactual Donkeys. Bibliography. Index

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The Philosophy of Philosophy

This magisterial work is the first comprehensive study of the ethics of killing, where the moral status of the individual is uncertain or controversial. Drawing on philosophical notions of personal identity and the immorality of killing, McMahan looks carefully at a host of practical issues, including abortion, infanticide, the killing of animals, assisted suicide, and euthanasia.

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The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life

In this stimulating and thought-provoking book, the author defends the thesis that free will is incompatible with determinism. He disputes the view that determinism is necessary for moral responsbility. Finding no good reason for accepting determinism, but believing moral responsibility to be indubitable, he concludes that determinism should be rejected.

An Essay on Free Will

In this chapter, the author argues that free will entails determinism, and, being itself a consistent thesis, is a fortiori compatible with determinism. Even if determinism cannot, like predestinarianism, be seen to be incompatible with free will on the basis of a simple formal inference, there is, nonetheless, a conceptual connection between the theses. The author describes that there is a great deal of confusion in the argument, but to expose this confusion would require a lengthy discussion of many fine points in the theory of agency. He argues that, if determinism is true, then that man could not have performed that act. Because this argument will not depend on any features peculiar to our imagined case, the incompatibility of free will and determinism in general will be established, since, as will be evident, a parallel argument could easily be constructed for the case of any agent and any unperformed.

The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism

[2] In content the book is, as its subtitle indicates, the edited text of his Gifford Lectures from 2003. Those lectures were themselves based on the Wilde Lectures from 2000, whichwere in turn an expanded version of the F.D.Maurice Lectures at the University of London from 1999. Other lectures that are related to the book’s material that van Inwagen gave are the Stewart Lectures at Princeton from 2002. So it may well be that many readers of this review (like the reviewer) first came across the content in spoken form. The chapters of the book wear their origin on their sleeve, frequently using phrases such as ‘in the previous lecture’. [3] In the first chapter, van Inwagen rejects as not useful the distinction between the logical problem of evil and the evidential problem of evil, focussing instead on the distinction between the global argument and the local argument. [4] In the second chapter, van Inwagen lays out a fairly standard conception of God by describing the individual attributes that he is assuming that God possesses, though it seems to me that some of the details of his treatment are worth discussion. [5] For example, van Inwagen defines ‘omniscience’ thus: ‘an omnipotent being is also omniscient if it knows everything it is able to know’ (p. 82). It is not explained why the definition is framed only for an omnipotent being, but the definition will not suffice in full generality (‘a being is omniscient if it knows everything it is able to know’), as it would then be subject to a version of Plantinga’s famous McEar objection: it is metaphysically possible that there be a being, McStupid, that is able to know only that it is McStupid, which fact it does know.

Peter van Inwagen

Papers

An Essay on Free Will

The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism

The Problem of Evil

The doctrine of arbitrary undetached parts

Free Will Remains a Mystery