A Course in Game Theory presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the material in order to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, extensive games with imperfect information, and coalitional games. It includes over 100 exercises.

A Course in Game Theory

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Convex Analysisの二,三の進展について

The author's preface gives an outline: "This book is about weakconvergence methods in metric spaces, with applications sufficient to show their power and utility. The Introduction motivates the definitions and indicates how the theory will yield solutions to problems arising outside it. Chapter 1 sets out the basic general theorems, which are then specialized in Chapter 2 to the space C[0, l ] of continuous functions on the unit interval and in Chapter 3 to the space D [0, 1 ] of functions with discontinuities of the first kind. The results of the first three chapters are used in Chapter 4 to derive a variety of limit theorems for dependent sequences of random variables. " The book develops and expands on Donsker's 1951 and 1952 papers on the invariance principle and empirical distributions. The basic random variables remain real-valued although, of course, measures on C[0, l ] and D[0, l ] are vitally used. Within this framework, there are various possibilities for a different and apparently better treatment of the material. More of the general theory of weak convergence of probabilities on separable metric spaces would be useful. Metrizability of the convergence is not brought up until late in the Appendix. The close relation of the Prokhorov metric and a metric for convergence in probability is (hence) not mentioned (see V. Strassen, Ann. Math. Statist. 36 (1965), 423-439; the reviewer, ibid. 39 (1968), 1563-1572). This relation would illuminate and organize such results as Theorems 4.1, 4.2 and 4.4 which give isolated, ad hoc connections between weak convergence of measures and nearness in probability. In the middle of p. 16, it should be noted that C*(S) consists of signed measures which need only be finitely additive if 5 is not compact. On p. 239, where the author twice speaks of separable subsets having nonmeasurable cardinal, he means "discrete" rather than "separable." Theorem 1.4 is Ulam's theorem that a Borel probability on a complete separable metric space is tight. Theorem 1 of Appendix 3 weakens completeness to topological completeness. After mentioning that probabilities on the rationals are tight, the author says it is an

Convergence of probability measures

We investigate conditions sufficient for identification of average treatment effects using instrumental variables. First we show that the existence of valid instruments is not sufficient to identify any meaningful average treatment effect. We then establish that the combination of an instrument and a condition on the relation between the instrument and the participation status is sufficient for identification of a local average treatment effect for those who can be induced to change their participation status by changing the value of the instrument. Finally we derive the probability limit of the standard IV estimator under these conditions. It is seen to be a weighted average of local average treatment effects.

Evolution and Rationality Some Recent Game-Theoretic Results. Identification and Estimation of Local Average Treatment Effects

http://martinstrobel.net/Jena/literature/Dufwenberg-Kirchsteiger_GEB-2004_A-theory-of-sequential-reciprocity.pdf

A theory of sequential reciprocity

A game is better-reply secure if for every nonequilibrium strategy x * and every payoff vector limit u * resulting from strategies approaching x * , some player i has a strategy yielding a payoff strictly above u i * even if the others deviate slightly from x * . If strategy spaces are compact and convex, payoffs are quasiconcave in the owner's strategy, and the game is better-reply secure, then a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists. Better-reply security holds in many economic games. It also permits new results on the existence of symmetric and mixed strategy Nash equilibria.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2999512.pdf

On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games

I. ECONOMIC AGENTS. 1. Consumer Theory. 2. Topics in Consumer Theory. 3. Theory of the Firm. II. MARKETS AND WELFARE. 4. Partial Equilibrium. 5. General Equilibrium. 6. Social Choice and Welfare. III. STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR. 7. Game Theory. 8. Information Economics. 9. Auctions and Mechanism Design. Math Appendix. Appendix: Sets and Mappings. Appendix: Calculus and Optimization. List of Theorems. List of Definitions. Hints and Answers. References. Index.

Advanced microeconomic theory

In models of asymmetric information, possession of private information leads to rents for the possessors. This induces mechanism designers to distort away from efficiency. The authors show that this is an artifact of the presumption that information is independently distributed. Rent extraction in a large class of mechanism design games is analyzed, and a necessary and sufficient condition for arbitrarily small rents to private information is provided. Additionally, the two-person bargaining game is shown to have an efficient solution under first-order stochastic dominance and a hazard rate condition. Similar conditions allow full rent extraction in Milgrom-Weber auctions.

Correlated Information and Mechanism Design

A noncooperative implementation of the core is provided for games with transferable utility. The implementation obtained here is meant to reflect the standard motivation for the core as closely as possible. In the model proposed, time is continuous. This idealized treatment of time is most amenable for capturing an essential feature of the core - there is always time to reject a noncore proposal before it is consumated.

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A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core

A step toward a strategic foundation for rational expectations equilibrium is taken by considering a double auction with n buyers and m sellers with interdependent values and affiliated private information If there are sufficiently many buyers and sellers, and their bids are restricted to a sufficiently fine discrete set of prices, then, generically, there is an equilibrium in nondecreasing bidding functions that is arbitrarily close to the unique fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium of the limit market with unrestricted bids and a continuum of agents In particular, the large double-auction equilibrium is almost efficient and almost fully aggregates the agents' information

Philip J. Reny

Papers

On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games

Advanced microeconomic theory

Correlated Information and Mechanism Design

A Noncooperative View of Coalition Formation and the Core

Toward a Strategic Foundation for Rational Expectations Equilibrium