/pdf/convex-analysisnoer-san-nojin-zhan-nituite-5dl2rbmoyr.pdf

Convex Analysisの二,三の進展について

This study examines how much, if any, of the differences in retail gasoline prices between markets is attributable to differences in the composition of vertical contract types at gasoline stations in each market. The purchase of the independent retail gasoline chain, Thrifty, by ARCO provides a unique opportunity to examine the effects of changes in different vertical contract types on local retail prices. This event caused sharp changes in the market share of i) fully vertically integrated stations, and ii) independent stations; differentially affecting local markets in the Los Angeles and San Diego Metropolitan areas. Using unique and detailed station-level data, this study examines how these sharp changes affected local retail prices. The detailed data and the research design based on the Thrifty station conversions allow for credible estimation of the effects of the market share of independent retailers and vertically integrated retailers on local market prices, controlling for any omitted factors at the station level, and the city level over time. Results for the Los Angeles and San Diego metropolitan areas indicate that a decrease in the market share of independent stations has a significant positive impact on local retail price. However, a change in the market share of refiner owned and operated branded stations does not have a significant impact on local market price. These results have important implications as policy makers consider the regulation of vertical contracts as a means to increase competition in gasoline markets. The research design and detailed data also allow for inference on the underlying nature of retail gasoline competition.

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Vertical Relationships and Competition in Retail Gasoline Markets: Empirical Evidence from Contract Changes in Southern California: Comment

How do extended benefits affect unemployment duration? A regression discontinuity approach

We use a 1998-2002 cross-section dataset to analyze the claim of losses due to internet piracy made by the record industry. The results suggest that internet piracy played a significant role in the decline in music sales during the early days of file-sharing networks.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1145904_code1038977.pdf?abstractid=1145904&rulid=211315&mirid=2

The effect of internet piracy on music sales: cross-section evidence

We analyse the effect of competition on quality in hospital markets with regulated prices, considering the effect of both introducing competition (monopoly versus competition) and increasing competition through either lower transportation costs (increased substitutability) or a higher number of hospitals. With semi-altruistic providers and a fairly general cost structure, we show that the relationship between competition and quality is generally ambiguous. In contrast to the received body of theoretical literature, this is consistent with, and potentially explains, the mixed empirical evidence.

/pdf/hospital-competition-and-quality-with-regulated-prices-4a9ox7xik9.pdf

Hospital Competition and Quality with Regulated Prices

http://www.crest.fr/ckfinder/userfiles/files/Pageperso/laroque/revffin.pdf

Optimal incentives for labor force participation

We model asymmetric information arising from physician agency and its effect on the design of payment and health care quantity. The physician aims to maximize a combination of physician profit and patient benefit. The degree of substitution between profit and patient benefit in the physician agency is the physician's private information, as is the patient's intrinsic valuation of treatment quantity. The equilibrium mechanism depends only on the physician agency parameter, and exhibits extensive pooling, with prescribed quantity and payment being insensitive to the agency characteristic or patient's actual benefit. The optimal mechanism is interpreted as managed care where strict approval protocols are placed on treatments.

/pdf/optimal-health-care-contract-under-physician-agency-3y70lyem57.pdf

Optimal Health Care Contract under Physician Agency

We use French household data to estimate a structural model of female labor supply and use of paid child care outside the home. Child care costs are found to have little impact on the labor market participation decision of mothers. The model is used to study various policy issues. The influence of the current tax credit on child care expenditures on the mothers’ labor supply is weak. Suppressing the APE (Parental Allowance for the Education) would cause the female participation rate in our sample to rise by 4 points and the proportion of mothers using paid care to rise by 2 points. The responses of women to policy changes are very heterogenous. Macroeconomic changes in female labor supply are equally due to switches between non-participation and participation and switches between working hours by working women.

http://www.crest.fr/ckfinder/userfiles/files/Pageperso/chone/textchildcare.pdf

Female labor supply and child care in france

http://www.crest.fr/ckfinder/userfiles/files/Pageperso/chone/Efficiency_November_2006.pdf

Assessing horizontal mergers under uncertain efficiency gains

This paper examines the strategic effects of case preparation in litigation. Specifically, it shows how the pretrial efforts incurred by one party may alter its adversary's incentives to settle. We build a sequential game with one-sided asymmetric information where the informed party first decides to invest, or not, in case preparation, and the uninformed party then makes a settlement offer. Overinvestment, or bluff, always prevails in equilibrium: with positive probability, plaintiffs with weak cases take a chance on investing, and regret it in case of trial. Furthermore, due to the endogenous investment decision, the probability of trial may (locally) decrease with case strength. Overinvestment generates inefficient preparation costs, but may trigger more settlements, thereby reducing trial costs.

Philippe Choné

Papers

Optimal incentives for labor force participation

Optimal Health Care Contract under Physician Agency

Female labor supply and child care in france

Assessing horizontal mergers under uncertain efficiency gains

Optimal Litigation Strategies with Signaling and Screening