The Tragedy of Great Power Politics

The World is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century

What is likely to be the future character of the relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China? Will it be marked by convergence toward deepening cooperation, stability,...

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The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?

Charles I concentrated his energies on the construction of a new royal palace at Whitehall. Designed in the classical style by John Webb, the new Whitehall was to be the fulallment of the king’s lifelong dream to replace the sprawling and obsolete palace that he had inherited from the Tudors with one that would match the splendor and majesty of the Louvre or the Escorial. Charles I desired nothing else than that his surroundings should reoect the magniacence of his rule: “Here, at last, would be a seat of government appropriate to the system of ‘Personal Rule’ Charles I had established since dispensing with Parliament in 1629. At least until 1639, it was from here that Charles could expect to govern his realms, resplendent amid Webb’s Baroque courtyards and colonnades, during the next decade and beyond.”1 In making such ambitious plans, Charles I displayed supreme conadence that his regime would not only survive but thrive well into the future. Unfortunately for the king, his reign did not last out the 1630s. If the conventional historical wisdom that “the collapse of Charles I’s regime during the 1630s appeared ‘inevitable’” is correct, then Charles obviously suffered from selfdelusion—an unreality all too characteristic of remote and isolated rulers.2 International politics, too, has seen many instances of this type of folly, where threatened countries have failed to recognize a clear and present danger or, more typically, have simply not reacted to it or, more typically still, have responded in paltry and imprudent ways. This behavior, which I call “underbalancing,” runs directly contrary to the core prediction of structural realist

Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing

For nearly a quarter-century the military balance in the Pacific rested on the clearly perceived parameters of the cold war, namely parallel Soviet and Chinese anti-imperialism and American containment policies which compelled the smaller states to align themselves with one or other of the opposing blocs. One of the more beneficial Nixon shocks reopened the traditional American 'Open Door* policy toward China. This single move granted the United States important diplomatic initiative in the Far East, shifted the fulcrum of political and military attention from southeast Asia to the northwest Pacific, and destroyed the main pillar of Moscow's Asian policy which rested on indefinite ChineseAmerican animosity. This realignment of the Pacific power configuration also raised fundamental questions about the future military balance in this theatre. The purpose of this essay is to analyse the present military postures of the principal actors and to develop several questions about future problems. An assessment of comparative military strengths and strategies must be predicated upon presumptions of political policy and orientation. Let us turn first therefore to some assumptions about the political Dositions of the various national actors in the Pacific region.

The Military Balance

Influenced by the resurgence of nationalism in the post-Cold War era, international relations scholars have produced a pessimistic evaluation of ways that nationalism increases the chances of international conflict. Three broad themes have emerged in the literature. The first focuses on the use of nationalism to divert attention from the state's inability to meet societal demands for security, economic development, and effective political institutions.' Illegitimate regimes may seek to bolster their grip on power by blaming foreigners for their own failures, increasing international tensions.' The second looks at groups within the state that have expansionist or militarist goals. By propagating nationalist or imperialist myths, they can generate broad public support for their parochial intere s t ~ . ~ The third emphasizes how political elites can incite nationalism to gain an advantage in domestic political competition. Nationalism can be used both to mobilize support for threatened elites and to fend off potential challenger^.^ This function can be particularly important in democratizing or liberalizing authoritarian regimes, which lack established political institutions to channel

Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands

China's rising power and increased global activism have attracted increasing attention, with particular focus on whether a stronger China is likely to be a revisionist or status quo state. Power transition theory highlights the potential for a dissatisfied rising power to challenge the existing international order, but it is difficult to evaluate whether a rising power is dissatisfied. Where Chinese leaders choose to travel can offer insights into whether China's behavior is more consistent with that of a revisionist or status quo state and into China's broader diplomatic priorities. We present a series of expectations concerning how the travel patterns of a challenger state are likely to differ from the travel patterns of a status quo state. Using a newly compiled data set, we then analyze the correlates of travel abroad by top Chinese leaders from 1998 to 2008. Our results are more consistent with a status quo conceptualization of China, though there are some important exceptions such as willingness to travel to rogue states. We also use travel data to test other hypotheses about Chinese foreign policy behavior.

Is China a Status Quo or Revisionist State? Leadership Travel as an Empirical Indicator of Foreign Policy Priorities

: Chinese leaders are pursuing a long-term grand strategy based on maintaining a peaceful international environment that allows China to build the economic and technological foundations necessary to become a rich and powerful country. China's increased global activism is intended to secure inputs for the economy; protect against a possible U.S. containment strategy; expand Chinese political influence; and pursue Chinese commercial interests. The timing and pattern of China's increased activism in different regions has evolved along largely independent strategic and economic tracks. This paper analyzes the rationale and drivers for China's increased global activism; examines the tools China is employing and how they are being used; assesses the empirical evidence about priorities and patterns in China's global activities; and considers whether these activities reflect an underlying strategic design. The paper concludes with an overview of likely future developments and an assessment of the implications for the United States.

China's Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools

By propagating nationalist or imperialist myths, they can generate broad public support for their parochial interest~.~ The third emphasizes how political elites can incite nationalism to gain an advantage in domestic political competition. Nationalism can be used both to mobilize support for threatened elites and to fend off potential challenger^.^ This function can be particularly important in democratizing or liberalizing authoritarian regimes, which lack established political institutions to channel ~~~~~~ ~~ Erica Strecker Downs is a Ph.D. candidate in the Politics Department at Princeton University. She has worked on Chinese security issiies for RAND. Phillip C. Saunders is a Ph.D. candidate at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University. He has zuorked on Asian issues for the United States Air Force, RAND, and the Council on Foreign Relations, and is currently completing a doctoral dissertation on priorities in U.S. China policy since Tiananmen Square.

Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism

In Taiwan’s 2008 presidential election, both candidates advocated signing a peace agreement with China, and Chinese leaders have also expressed interest in reaching such an agreement. Although substantial obstacles remain in the way of a cross-strait peace agreement, this increased interest on both sides of the Taiwan Strait suggests that a closer examination of an agreement’s possible dimensions and consequences is warranted. This analysis considers what an agreement might look like, whether and how it might be effective in reducing the possibility of cross-strait military conflict, the relevant barriers to an agreement, and whether an agreement—if reached—would be likely to endure.

Phillip C. Saunders

Papers

Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands

Is China a Status Quo or Revisionist State? Leadership Travel as an Empirical Indicator of Foreign Policy Priorities

China's Global Activism: Strategy, Drivers, and Tools

Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism

Bridge over Troubled Water?: Envisioning a China-Taiwan Peace Agreement