2 1 The innovative transport systems and the CityMobil project 10 1.1 The research questions 10 2 The state of art in the field of automatic transport systems 12 2.1 Case studies and demand studies for innovative transport systems 12 3 The design and implementation of surveys 14 3.1 Definition of experimental design 14 3.2 Questionnaire design and delivery 16 3.3 First analyses on the collected sample 18 4 Calibration of Logit Multionomial demand models 21 4.1 Methodology 21 4.2 Calibration of the “full” model. 22 4.3 Calibration of the “final” model 24 4.4 The demand analysis through the final Multinomial Logit model 25 5 The analysis of interaction between the demand and socioeconomic attributes 31 5.1 Methodology 31 5.2 Application of Mixed Logit models to the demand 31 5.3 Analysis of the interactions between demand and socioeconomic attributes through Mixed Logit models 32 5.4 Mixed Logit model and interaction between age and the demand for the CTS 38 5.5 Demand analysis with Mixed Logit model 39 6 Final analyses and conclusions 45 6.1 Comparison between the results of the analyses 45 6.2 Conclusions 48 6.3 Answers to the research questions and future developments 52

The European commission

This article examines to what extent European interest associations combine public political strategies with traditional forms of inside lobbying or the seeking of access to public officials. I compare two theoretical perspectives: a resource-based explanation focusing on the nature of the mobilized interest and an institutional account emphasizing the explanatory power of varying institutional conditions. My data show that institutional variables have a significant effect on whether and how public and inside strategies are combined. Although the institutional supply of access favours specific interests, the European Union contains important institutional opportunities for diffuse interests that aim to expand the scope of political conflict or signal policy concerns by using public political strategies.

Voice and Access Political Practices of European Interest Associations

While understanding interest group systems remains crucial to understanding the functioning of advanced democracies, the study of interest groups remains a somewhat niche field within political science. Nevertheless, during the last 15 years, the academic interest in group politics has grown and we reflect on the state of the current literature. The main objective is to take stock, consider the main empirical and theoretical/conceptual achievements, but most importantly, to reflect upon potential fertile future research avenues. In our view interest group studies would be reinvigorated and would benefit from being reintegrated within the broader field of political science, and more particularly, the comparative study of government.

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/01402380802370443

Researching Interest Group Politics in Europe and Elsewhere: Much We Study, Little We Know?

The aim of this article is to test empirically a theory of access that investigates the logic behind the apparent ad hoc lobbying behavior of business interests in the European Union (EU) multi-level system. First, a theoretical framework is set out that attempts to explain the access of different organizational forms of business interest representation - companies, associations and consultants - to the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. The degree of access to these institutions is explained in terms of a theory of the supply and demand of access goods. Access goods concern information that is crucial in the EU policy-making process. In return for access to an EU institution, business interests have to provide the access good(s) demanded by that institution. A number of specific hypotheses about access are analyzed in an extensive empirical study of the EU financial services sector. On the basis of 126 exploratory and semi-structured interviews, the hypotheses are checked across the three EU institutions.

Exchanging access goods for access: A comparative study of business lobbying in the European Union institutions

Although many believe that companies' political activities improve their bottom line, empirical studies have not consistently borne this out We investigate the relationship between corporate political activity (CPA) and financial returns on a set of 943 S&P 1500 firms between 1998 to 2008 We find that firms' political investments are negatively associated with market performance and cumulative political investments worsen both market and accounting performance Firms placing former public officials on their boards experienced inferior market performance and similar accounting performance than firms without such board members We find, however, that CPA is positively associated with market performance for firms in regulated industries Our results challenge the profit-maximizing assumptions underlying CPA research and focus on agency theory to better understand CPA Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd

In Search of El Dorado: The Elusive Financial Returns on Corporate Political Investments

The complexity and diversity of European interest politics is exem- plie ed by the multitude of channels and targets that private actors use to lobby in the EU multi-level system. The aim of this article is to investigate the logic behind the apparent ad hoc lobbying behaviour of private interests. A theoretical framework is developed in order to explain the access of business interests to the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. The degree of access to these institutions is explained in terms of a theory of demand and supply of access goods. Access goods concern information that is crucial in the EU policy-making process. In order to gain access to an EU institution, business interests have to provide the access good(s) demanded by that institution. Organizational form is introduced as the innovative unit of analysis. It follows that associative business action is unconventionally studied in relation to two other organizational forms: individual company action and third- party representation.

Corporate lobbying in the European Union: the logic of access

This article is an attempt to test empirically a theory of access that investigates the logic behind the lobbying behaviour of business interests in the European Parliament. The theoretical framework tries to explain the degree of access of different organizational forms of business interest representation (companies, associations and consultants) to the supranational assembly in terms of a theory of the supply and demand of 'access goods'. On the basis of 14 exploratory and 27 semi-structured interviews, the hypotheses are checked in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) of the European Parliament. Surprisingly, European and national associations enjoy a similar degree of access to the Parliament. Individual companies and consultants have a much lower degree of access than the two collective forms of interest representation. In the conclusion, these results are analysed in the light of the existing literature on party cohesion and coalition formation in the European Parliament.

The Logic of Access to the European Parliament: Business Lobbying in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

This article is an attempt to test empirically a theory of access that investigates the logic behind the lobbying behaviour of business interests in the European Parliament. The theoretical framework tries to explain the degree of access of different organizational forms of business interest representation (companies, associations and consultants) to the supranational assembly in terms of a theory of the supply and demand of ‘access goods’. On the basis of 14 exploratory and 27 semi-structured interviews, the hypotheses are checked in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) of the European Parliament. Surprisingly, European and national associations enjoy a similar degree of access to the Parliament. Individual companies and consultants have a much lower degree of access than the two collective forms of interest representation. In the conclusion, these results are analysed in the light of the existing literature on party cohesion and coalition formation in the European Parliament.

The Logic of Access to the European Parliament: Business Lobbying in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs*

This article investigates how informal rules in the European Union change in the periods between formal treaty revisions. On the basis of a case study on the White Paper on Governance presented by the European Commission in July 2001, it shows how institutional change is driven by conflict between the Commission and the European Parliament. The conflict concerns the development of informal rules to structure the interaction of the Commission and the Parliament with Europe's civil society. The interaction with civil society organisations is very important for the EU bodies because it allows them to acquire resources that are indispensable in order to fulfil and expand their organisational role. An additional aim of this article is to examine how these institutional developments might influence the long-term development of formal treaty rules.

Pieter Bouwen

Papers

Corporate lobbying in the European Union: the logic of access

Exchanging access goods for access: A comparative study of business lobbying in the European Union institutions

The Logic of Access to the European Parliament: Business Lobbying in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs

The Logic of Access to the European Parliament: Business Lobbying in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs*

Competing for consultation: Civil society and conflict between the European Commission and the European Parliament