We consider the effect that national culture has on the propensity for small, independent manufacturing enterprises to (1) cooperate with other firms for technological innovation and (2) use equity...

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/1556421.pdf

The Influence of National Culture on the Formation of Technology Alliances by Entrepreneurial Firms

A tremendous amount of research has explored the relationship between managerial pay and firm performance. We argue that this research has generally been limited because it ignores other criteria t...

Managerial compensation and firm performance : A general research framework

In today’s world, the corporate image of the largest companies is closely linked to their performance in the field of corporate social responsibility and the disclosure of information on that topic, specifically, on climate change. Since the Board of Directors is the body responsible for this process, the aim of this article is to show the role that companies’ Boards of Directors play in the accountability process vis-a-vis stakeholders in relation to one specific aspect which has enormous significance in environmental information: practices used to monitor greenhouse gas emissions. In order to achieve this, we shall verify certain business characteristics, in addition to the size and activity of the Board of Directors, and we shall take different dependence models into consideration. These models will include variables related to the level of independence and diversity of the Board of Directors, which interact with dummy variables representing the company’s litigation risks regarding environmental behavior and the institutional macro-context of the organization’s country of origin. The results make it clear that Boards of Directors are basically focused on the traditional responsibility of creating economic value, instead of dealing with today’s broader business world concepts, which include social responsibility. This focus, therefore, does not favor the accountability process before other stakeholders, if this makes it more difficult to protect the interests of shareholders.

The Role of the Board of Directors in Disseminating Relevant Information on Greenhouse Gases

Although there has been an intensive debate on the relative merits of different sys- tems of corporate governance, empirical evidence on the link between corporate governance and firm performance almost exclusively refers to the market-oriented Anglo-Saxon system. This paper therefore investigates the more network- or bank-oriented German system. In panel regressions for 361 German corporations over the time period 1991 to 1996, we find ownership concentration to affect profitability significantly negatively. However, this effect depends intricately on stock market exposure, the location of control rights, and the time horizon (short-run vs. long-run). We conclude from our results that (1) the presence of large shareholders does not necessarily enhance profitability, (2) ownership concentration seems to be sub-optimal for many German corporations, and, finally, (3) having financial institutions as largest shareholders of traded corporations improves corporate performance.

/pdf/does-the-governed-corporation-perform-better-governance-504mx32y4k.pdf

Does the Governed Corporation Perform Better? Governance Structures and Corporate Performance in Germany

https://wps-feb.ugent.be/Papers/wp_98_53.pdf

Determinants of required return in venture capital investments: a five-country study

Corporate systems across the industrialized world differ markedly with respect to their historical origins, their methods of capital mobilization, and their structures of ownership and control. Those institutional differences seem to have an influence on economic behaviour, including the manner in which corporate restructurings take place. Whereas in the Anglo-Saxon world hostile takeovers are commonplace, they are virtually unknown in most countries of continental Europe and in Japan. In these latter countries other disciplinary mechanisms are at work, especially through the intense involvement of universal banks and financial holding companies in corporate decision-making and restructuring. These salient differences raise a number of interesting questions concerning the relationships between varying institutional settings and corporate behaviour, control and performance. This study provides a comparative analysis of market-oriented corporate systems on the one side and network-oriented corporate systems on the other. It indicates significant differences in the way the inherent agency conflicts are resolved. The typical disciplinary mechanisms employed in either system have a number of pros as well as cons, which suggests that the implied optimization of economic organization leaves room for multiple configurations.

Alternative disciplinary mechanisms in different corporate systems

This paper analyzes the economic fundamentals of the corporate firm with publicly held shares and the salient characteristics of varying corporate systems, focusing on international differences in ownership and control structures, including alternative disciplinary mechanisms. Those international differences seem to influence economic behavior and corporate performance, including the way in which corporate restructurings take place. Market-oriented corporate systems and network-oriented corporate systems are likely to mutually converge in the future.

Corporate ownership and control structures: An international comparison

Corporate Governance : Theorie en Praktijk in Internationaal Perspectief

https://mab-online.nl/article/16753/download/pdf/

Pieter W. Moerland

Papers

Alternative disciplinary mechanisms in different corporate systems

Corporate ownership and control structures: An international comparison

Corporate Governance : Theorie en Praktijk in Internationaal Perspectief

De overnemingsmarkt: theorie, empirie en regelgeving

Comment on De Jong's ‘European capitalism: Between freedom and social justice’