The present invention provides a method and apparatus for the production and labeling of objects in a manner suitable for the prevention and detection of counterfeiting. Thus, the system incorporates a variety of features that make unauthorized reproduction difficult. In addition, the present invention provides an efficient means for the production of labels and verification of authenticity, whereby a recording apparatus which includes a recording medium, having anisotrophic optical domains, along with a means for transferring a portion of the recording medium to a carrier, wherein a bulk portion of the recording medium has macroscopically detectable anisotrophic optical properties and the detecting apparatus thereon.

Authentication method and system

In this paper, we analyze ring oscillator (RO) based physical unclonable function (PUF) on FPGAs. We show that the systematic process variation adversely affects the ability of the RO-PUF to generate unique chip-signatures, and propose a compensation method to mitigate it. Moreover, a configurable ring oscillator (CRO) technique is proposed to reduce noise in PUF responses. Our compensation method could improve the uniqueness of the PUF by an amount as high as 18%. The CRO technique could produce nearly 100% error-free PUF outputs over varying environmental conditions without post-processing while consuming minimum area.

/pdf/improved-ring-oscillator-puf-an-fpga-friendly-secure-38f0ctjsa8.pdf

Improved Ring Oscillator PUF: An FPGA-friendly Secure Primitive

Security-critical products rely on the secrecy and integrity of their cryptographic keys. This is challenging for low-cost resource-constrained embedded devices, with an attacker having physical access to the integrated circuit (IC). Physically, unclonable functions are an emerging technology in this market. They extract bits from unavoidable IC manufacturing variations, remarkably analogous to unique human fingerprints. However, post-processing by helper data algorithms (HDAs) is indispensable to meet the stringent key requirements: reproducibility, high-entropy, and control. The novelty of this paper is threefold. We are the first to provide an in-depth and comprehensive literature overview on HDAs. Second, our analysis does expose new threats regarding helper data leakage and manipulation. Third, we identify several hiatuses/open problems in existing literature.

/pdf/helper-data-algorithms-for-puf-based-key-generation-overview-3ayq5zet5p.pdf

Helper Data Algorithms for PUF-Based Key Generation: Overview and Analysis

The reverse engineering (RE) of electronic chips and systems can be used with honest and dishonest intentions. To inhibit RE for those with dishonest intentions (e.g., piracy and counterfeiting), it is important that the community is aware of the state-of-the-art capabilities available to attackers today. In this article, we will be presenting a survey of RE and anti-RE techniques on the chip, board, and system levels. We also highlight the current challenges and limitations of anti-RE and the research needed to overcome them. This survey should be of interest to both governmental and industrial bodies whose critical systems and intellectual property (IP) require protection from foreign enemies and counterfeiters who possess advanced RE capabilities.

A Survey on Chip to System Reverse Engineering

Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) for authentication can be implemented in a variety of electronic devices including FPGAs, RFIDs, and ASICs. In some implementations, challenge-response pairs corresponding to individual PUFs can be enrolled and used to determine authentication data, which may be managed in a database. Later when a target object with a PUF is intended to be authenticated a set (or subset) of challenges are applied to each PUF device to authenticate it and thus distinguish it from others. In some examples, authentication is achieved without requiring complex cryptography circuitry implemented on the device. Furthermore, an authentication station does not necessarily have to be in communication with an authority holding the authentication data when a particular device is to be authenticated.

Authentication with physical unclonable functions

Theory of Security with Noisy Data.- Unbreakable Keys from Random Noise.- Fuzzy Commitment.- A Communication-Theoretical View on Secret Extraction.- Fuzzy Extractors.- Robust and Reusable Fuzzy Extractors.- Fuzzy Identities and Attribute-Based Encryption.- Unconditionally Secure Multiparty Computation from Noisy Resources.- Computationally Secure Authentication with Noisy Data.- Applications of Security with Noisy Data.- Privacy Enhancements for Inexact Biometric Templates.- Protection of Biometric Information.- On the Amount of Entropy in PUFs.- Entropy Estimation for Optical PUFs Based on Context-Tree Weighting Methods.- Controlled Physical Random Functions.- Experimental Hardware for Coating PUFs and Optical PUFs.- Secure Key Storage with PUFs.- Anti-Counterfeiting.

Security with Noisy Data: Private Biometrics, Secure Key Storage and Anti-Counterfeiting

A method of generating a response to a physically unclonable function, said response being uniquely representative of the identity of a device (2) having challengeable memory, the memory comprising a plurality of logical locations each having at least two possible logical states, the method comprising applying a challenge signal (A,B) to an input of said memory so as to cause each of said logical locations to enter one of said two possible logical states and thereby generate a response pattern of logical states, said response pattern (R) being dependent on said physically unclonable function which is defined by, the physical characteristics of said memory, the method further comprising reading out said response pattern (R).

Identification of devices using physically unclonable functions

Systems for generating an identifying response pattern comprising a memory (120) used as a physically unclonable function configured for generating a response pattern dependent on physical, at least partially random characteristics of said memory may be vulnerable to freezing attacks and to aging. A memory-overwriting device (110) configured for overwriting at least a first portion of the plurality of memory locations to obscure the response pattern in the memory avoids freezing attacks. An anti-degradation device (160) configured to write to each respective location of a second portion of the plurality of memory locations an inverse of a response previously read from the memory reduces the effects of aging.

Physically unclonable function with tamper prevention and anti-aging system

An electric physical unclonable function (PUF) (100) is provided comprising a semiconductor memory element (110) connectable to a PUF control means for reading content from the memory element and for deriving at least in part from said content a digital identifier, such as a secret key. Upon powering the memory element it settles into one of at least two different stable states. The particular stable state into which the memory element settles is dependent at least in part upon random physical characteristics of the memory element introduced during manufacture of the memory element. Settling of the memory element is further dependent upon a control input (112) of the memory element. The electric physical unclonable function comprises shielding means (142, 144) for shielding, during a time period including the power-up of the memory element and lasting at least until the settling of the memory element, the control input from receiving control signals upon which the particular stable state into which the memory element settles is dependent. In this way, the dependency of the memory element on its physical characteristics is improved, and dependency on possibly irreproducible control signals is reduced.

Physical unclonable function with improved start-up behavior

This invention relates to physical uncloneable function (PUF) devices for determining authenticity of an item, systems for determining authenticity of a physical item, and methods for determining authenticity of an item. A PUF pattern of the PUF device is damaged when using the item for the first time.

Pim T. Tuyls

Papers

Security with Noisy Data: Private Biometrics, Secure Key Storage and Anti-Counterfeiting

Identification of devices using physically unclonable functions

Physically unclonable function with tamper prevention and anti-aging system

Physical unclonable function with improved start-up behavior

Device, system and method for determining authenticity of an item