................................................................................................................................ 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................ 3 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .............................................................................................................. 9 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ......................................................................................................... 10 CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 12 Background and Context ..................................................................................................... 12 I. Problem and Aim of the Thesis ........................................................................................... 13 II. Key Concepts and their Application in this Thesis ............................................................. 16 III. Effectiveness and Fairness ............................................................................................. 17 A. The notion of effectiveness ..................................................................................... 17 1. Notions of fairness ................................................................................................... 18 2. Reconciling Effectiveness and Fairness in Competition Law Enforcement .................. 18 B. Theories of punishment .......................................................................................... 21 1. a. Deterrence ......................................................................................................... 21 b. Retribution ......................................................................................................... 25 c. A mixed theory of punishment ......................................................................... 27 i. Approximation of the theories .................................................................... 28 ii. Application in cartel enforcement ............................................................... 29 Summary .................................................................................................................. 30 2. Application of the Key Notions throughout the Thesis ................................................. 31 C. Effectiveness ............................................................................................................ 31 1. Fairness .................................................................................................................... 32 2. Effectiveness through fairness ................................................................................ 33 3. Methodology ....................................................................................................................... 35 IV. Contribution and Scope ....................................................................................................... 36 V. Structure .............................................................................................................................. 37 VI. CHAPTER 2: EFFECTIVENESS AND FAIRNESS IN EU CARTEL ENFORCEMENT ............................ 40 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 40 I. Legitimacy in EU cartel enforcement .................................................................................. 41 II.

Reconciling effectiveness and fairness in the EU leniency policy

During the last years, the European Union has faced the questions of its legitimacy, its role and its future more fiercely than ever since the European project was initiated. One of the key questions is when it is desirable and necessary to introduce new European rules. This thesis offers an answer to this question from a Law and Economics perspective in the area of EU private law, focusing on consumer contract law and antitrust damages actions.

The thesis relies on the framework provided by the economic theory of federalism, which postulates that centralising a policy needs to be justified by a particular benefit, to compensate for the lower correspondence to local preferences and lost possibilities for regulatory experimentation. Against this theoretic background, the thesis advocates that the subsidiarity principle, which governs the exercise of competences by the EU institutions, ought to be an efficiency principle that weighs the various economic arguments in favour and against harmonisation.

The thesis extends the framework of the economics of federalism in several ways. First, the thesis explores the link between the economics of federalism and the economics of integration. It is found that there are hardly any limits to the possibilities to harmonise rules for completing the internal market if one follows the logic of the economic concept of market integration, which also underlies the internal market's legislative competence of the EU. Almost any variation in Member States' legal rules could be considered as an obstacle to the internal market. An overarching economic theory of harmonisation needs to take account not only of reductions in transaction costs and other trade barriers, but also of broader welfare effects. By incorporating heterogeneous preferences into a trade model, the thesis illustrates that harmonising rules involves a trade-off between enhancing competition by reducing transaction costs, and ensuring that policies correspond to citizens' preferences.

Further extensions of the economics of federalism framework are identified in the scope and enforcement of EU legislation. The limited scope of the Antitrust Damages Directive in terms of its rules on limitation periods may limit the extent to which the Directive can achieve its goal of providing a level playing field' for antitrust damages claims throughout the EU. The second goal of this Directive, to balance public and private antitrust enforcement, may require an adjustment to some of the substantive rules on liability, in order to prevent that damages claims undermine the success of the leniency program.

Building upon the insights from the economics of federalism, the thesis aims to show that the effects of harmonisation lie not only in a reduction of transaction costs, but also in the substantial rules included in the EU policy, their scope of application, and their enforcement. The implication for policy making is that the justification for further harmonisation should go beyond the limited focus on the beneficial effects on the internal market, to include a wider range of welfare considerations.

Harmonisation and the EU Internal Market : a Law and Economics Approach

Directive EU/2014/104 is the latest legal instrument that crystalizes the evolution of EU competition law enforcement. This paper assesses critically the features of the Directive and the challenges it poses for its implementation by Member States. The Directive codifies the case law of the EUCJ and it encroaches upon the autonomy of Member States in setting the institutions, remedies and procedures available for victims’ of antitrust infringements. Although the Directive provides a fragmented and incomplete set of rules that only partially harmonizes antitrust damages claims in the EU, and it’s slanted towards follow-on cartel damages claims, it has publicised the availability of damages claims, creating momentum that will transform how competition law is enforced in the future.

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Promotion and Harmonization of Antitrust Damages Claims by Directive EU/2014/104?

markdownCriminological study of the social organisation of business cartels. How are business cartels embedded in existing professional networks, both relational and structurally. 
How do cartelists succees to sustain their illegal cartel agreements despite the increased efforts by governments and regulators to detect and punish them.

/pdf/cooperation-against-the-law-criminological-study-of-the-4b8ft8r0px.pdf

Cooperation Against the Law: Criminological study of the social organisation of business cartels

Modern antitrust engenders a possible conflict between public and private enforcement due to the central role of Leniency Programs. Damage actions may reduce the attractiveness of Leniency Programs for cartel participants if their cooperation with the competition authority increases the chance that the cartel’s victims will bring a successful suit. A long legal debate culminated in a EU directive, adopted in November 2014, which seeks a balance between public and private enforcement. It protects the effectiveness of a Leniency Program by preventing the use of leniency statements in subsequent actions for damages and by limiting the liability of the immunity recipient to its direct and indirect purchasers. Our analysis shows such compromise is not required: limiting the cartel victims’ ability to recover their loss is not necessary to preserve the effectiveness of a Leniency Program and may be counter-productive. We show that damage actions will actually improve its effectiveness, through a legal regime in which the civil liability of the immunity recipient is minimized (as in Hungary) and full access to all evidence collected by the competition authority, including leniency statements, is granted to claimants (as in the US).

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID2716020_code1354678.pdf?abstractid=2566774&mirid=1&type=2

Leniency and Damages

Some of the measures proposed by the Commission are likely to have the opposite effect of discouraging the parties from reaching amicable settlements. Jeroen Kortmann & Rein Wesseling (Univ. of Amsterdam & Stibbe)

Two concerns regarding the European Draft Directive on Antitrust Damage Actions

In 2011, the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union rendered two important judgments about the compatibility of an administrative system for the enforcement of competition rules with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Menarini and KME/Chalkor). Both jurisdictions consider that these systems meet the requirements imposed by these provisions, provided that the decisions taken by the administrative enforcement body are subject to independent judicial review. In a judgment issued in 2012, the EFTA Court provided further clarifications on the nature of the judicial review (Posten Norge). The present article concerns the intensity of this review. It is argued that the review should focus on the specific facts of the case and that the reviewing courts should be cautious when applying abstract concepts and presumptions.

The Lawfulness and Acceptability of Enforcement of European Cartel Law

Reconsidering the leniency option: if not first in, good reasons to stay out

Bij aanvang van deze kroniekperiode ging de Autoriteit Consument en Markt, waarin een aantal toezichthouders op het gebied van mededinging zijn opgegaan, van start. Vooralsnog lijkt deze nieuwe Autoriteit weinig tijd en energie te hebben voor de handhaving van het eigenlijke mededingingsrecht. Naarmate de Nederlandse mededingingsautoriteit meer verwordt tot een consumentenautoriteit zal het zwaartepunt van de handhaving van de mededingingsregels in Brussel komen te liggen en moet de civiele rechter steeds vaker oordelen over mededingingsrechtelijke aspecten van een zaak. Desondanks moest de ACM in een aantal besluiten de moeizame verhouding tussen publieke belangen en de handhaving van mededingingsregels in een vat gieten. De Europese Commissie publiceerde richtsnoeren met betrekking tot ‘technologieoverdrachtovereenkomsten’ die in ieder geval begrijpelijker zijn dan de huidige, een nieuwe groepsvrijstellingsverordening en een concept-Richtlijn over de behandeling van op het mededingingsrecht gebaseerde schadevergoedingsprocedures voor civiele rechters in de EU lidstaten. Verder is de Commissie bezig de Europese concentratiecontroleregelge- ving te herzien. Er zijn nationale en Europese uitspraken te melden over de onderzoeksbevoegdheden van handhavende autoriteiten en de rechten van de verdediging. Op misbruikgebied was het rustig maar de strijd om toegang tot documenten die het dossier vormen van mededingingsautoriteiten in kartelzaken blijft hevig.

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Kroniek van het mededingingsrecht

Arguably, however, the factors preventing the cartel concept from widening and becoming more blurred are no longer as pre-eminent as the concept has moved away from the U.S. criminal law framework. Rein Wesseling (Stibbe)

R. Wesseling

Papers

Two concerns regarding the European Draft Directive on Antitrust Damage Actions

The Lawfulness and Acceptability of Enforcement of European Cartel Law

Reconsidering the leniency option: if not first in, good reasons to stay out

Kroniek van het mededingingsrecht

Is the definition of a cartel ballooning