Showing papers by "Rafael La Porta published in 2009"
TL;DR: The authors found that informal firms are small and extremely unproductive compared with even the small formal firms in the sample, and especially relative to the larger formal firms, which supports the dual economy theory of development, in which growth comes about from the creation of highly productive formal firms.
Abstract: In developing countries, informal firms account for up to about half of all economic activity. Using data from World Bank firm-level surveys, we find that informal firms are small and extremely unproductive compared with even the small formal firms in the sample, and especially relative to the larger formal firms. Formal firms are run by much better educated managers than informal ones and use more capital, have different customers, market their products, and use more external finance. Few formal firms have ever operated informally. This evidence supports the dual economy (“Wal-Mart”) theory of development, in which growth comes about from the creation of highly productive formal firms. Informal firms keep millions of people alive but disappear as the economy develops.
648 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors collected data on the rules and practices of financial and conflict disclosure by politicians in 175 countries and found that disclosure is correlated with lower perceived corruption when it is public, when it identifies sources of income and conflicts of interest, and when a country is a democracy.
Abstract: We collect data on the rules and practices of financial and conflict disclosure by politicians in 175 countries. Although two thirds of the countries have some disclosure laws, less than a third make disclosures available to the public. Disclosure is more extensive in richer and more democratic countries. Disclosure is correlated with lower perceived corruption when it is public, when it identifies sources of income and conflicts of interest, and when a country is a democracy.
119 citations
TL;DR: This paper examined the design of the legal process for civil litigation in 40 countries between 1950 and 2000 and found that large differences in procedural formalism between common and civil law countries existed in 1950 and widened by 2000.
Abstract: dural formalism every year since 1950 We find that large differences in procedural formalism between common and civil law countries existed in 1950 and widened by 2000 For this area of law, the find ings are inconsistent with the hypothesis that national legal systems are converging, and support the view that legal origins exert long lasting influence on legal rules (JEL K41, 017) oth the standard historical narrative and recent empirical research show that national legal systems vary systematically according to the legal traditions or origins that countries belong to In particular, both substantive and procedural legal rules and regulations of civil (or Roman) law countries differ systematically from those of common (or English) law countries (Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz 1998; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2008) The observed variation raises a number of questions Are these observed differences in laws and regulations merely a figment of recent data, or have they been present historically as well? Are legal rules coming from different legal traditions converging? Answers to these questions are central to the interpretation of legal origins, since some degree of permanence of their influence is central to the accounts of why they matter today In addition, we wish to know which factors economic, political, or even internal to the legal system itself determine the nature and the pace of legal change In this paper, we examine the design of the legal process for civil litigation in 40 countries between 1950 and 2000 We focus on civil procedure, defined as the "body of law concerned with methods, procedures and practices used in civil liti
34 citations
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TL;DR: In this article, the authors studied the evolution of legal rules between 1950 and 2000 and found that between the two simple disputes, the formalism of legal procedure did not converge, and possibly diverged, between common law and French civil law countries.
Abstract: Djankov et al. (2003a) propose and measure for 109 countries in the year 2000 an index of formalism of legal procedure for two simple disputes: eviction of a non-paying tenant and collection of a bounced check. For a sub-sample of 40 countries, we compute this index every year starting in 1950, which allows us to study the evolution of legal rules. We find that between 1950 and 2000, the formalism of legal procedure did not converge, and possibly diverged, between common law and French civil law countries. At least in this specific area of law, the results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that national legal systems are converging, and support the view that legal origins exert long lasting influence on legal rules.
32 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors collected data on the rules and practices of financial and conflict disclosure by politicians in 175 countries and found that disclosure is correlated with lower perceived corruption when it is public, when it identifies sources of income and conflicts of interest, and when a country is a democracy.
Abstract: We collect data on the rules and practices of financial and conflict disclosure by politicians in 175 countries. Although two thirds of the countries have some disclosure laws, less than a third make disclosures available to the public. Disclosure is more extensive in richer and more democratic countries. Disclosure is correlated with lower perceived corruption when it is public, when it identifies sources of income and conflicts of interest, and when a country is a democracy.
22 citations