Economists have long puzzled over the astounding differences in productivity between firms and countries. For example, looking at disaggregated data on U.S. manufacturing industries, Syverson (2004a) found that plants at the 90th percentile produced four times as much as the plant in the 10th percentile on a per-employee basis. Only half of this difference in labor productivity could be accounted for by differential inputs, such as capital intensity. Syverson looked at industries defined at the four-digit level in the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system (now the North American Industry Classification System or NAICS) like 'Bakeries and Tortilla Manufacturing' or 'Plastics Product Manufacturing.' Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008) show large differences in total factor productivity even within very homogeneous goods industries such as boxes and block ice. Some of these productivity differences across firms and plants are temporary, but in large part they persist over time. At the country level, Hall and Jones (1999) and Jones and Romer (2009) show how the stark differences in productivity across countries account for a substantial fraction of the differences in average per capita income. Both at the plant level and at the national level, differences in productivity are typically calculated as a residual-that is, productivity is inferred as the gap between output and inputs that cannot be accounted for by conventionally measured inputs.

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Why Do Management Practices Differ across Firms and Countries

In developing countries, informal firms account for up to half of economic activity. They provide livelihood for billions of people. Yet their role in economic development remains controversial. Some, like Hernando De Soto (1989, 2000), see informal firms as an untapped reservoir of entrepreneurial energy, held back by government regulations. In this view, unleashing this energy by reducing entry regulations or improving property rights would fuel growth and development. Others, like Levy (2008), take a more cynical view, stressing the advantages enjoyed by informal firms and workers from avoiding taxes and regulations. A report from the McKinsey Global Institute describes informal firms as parasites competing unfairly with law-abiding formal firms (Farrell 2004). In this view, informality should be suppressed, not unleashed. Still others follow the development tradition of Lewis (1954), Harris and Todaro (1970), and more recently Rauch (1991) and see informality as a byproduct of poverty. From this dual perspective, formal and informal firms are fundamentally different. Productive formal entrepreneurs pay taxes and bear the cost of government regulation to reach new customers, raise capital, and access public goods. These entrepreneurs are often educated and find it more profitable to run bigger formal firms rather than the smaller informal ones. In contrast, informal entrepreneurs are typically uneducated and unproductive, and they run small businesses producing low-quality products for low-income customers using little capital and

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Informality and Development

We investigate the role of national institutions on subnational African development in a novel framework that accounts both for local geography and cultural-genetic traits. We exploit the fact that the political boundaries in the eve of African independence partitioned more than two hundred ethnic groups across adjacent countries subjecting similar cultures, residing in homogeneous geographic areas, to different formal institutions. Using both a matching-type and a spatial regression discontinuity approach we show that differences in countrywide institutional structures across the national border do not explain within-ethnicity differences in economic performance, as captured by satellite images of light density. The average non-effect of national institutions on ethnic development masks considerable heterogeneity partially driven by the diminishing role of national institutions in areas further from the capital cities.

National Institutions and Subnational Development in Africa

An increasing amount of high-resolution global spatial data are available, and used for various assessments. However, key economic and human development indicators are still mainly provided only at national level, and downscaled by users for gridded spatial analyses. Instead, it would be beneficial to adopt data for sub-national administrative units where available, supplemented by national data where necessary. To this end, we present gap-filled multiannual datasets in gridded form for Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Human Development Index (HDI). To provide a consistent product over time and space, the sub-national data were only used indirectly, scaling the reported national value and thus, remaining representative of the official statistics. This resulted in annual gridded datasets for GDP per capita (PPP), total GDP (PPP), and HDI, for the whole world at 5 arc-min resolution for the 25-year period of 1990–2015. Additionally, total GDP (PPP) is provided with 30 arc-sec resolution for three time steps (1990, 2000, 2015). Machine-accessible metadata file describing the reported data (ISA-Tab format)

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Gridded global datasets for Gross Domestic Product and Human Development Index over 1990–2015

Large cities produce more output per capita than small cities. This higher productivity may occur because more talented individuals sort into large cities, because large cities select more productive entrepreneurs and firms, or because of agglomeration economies. We develop a model of systems of cities that combines all three elements and suggests interesting complementarities between them. The model can replicate stylized facts about sorting, agglomeration, and selection in cities. It also generates Zipf’s law for cities under empirically plausible parameter values. Finally, it provides a useful framework within which to reinterpret extant empirical evidence.

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Productive Cities: Sorting, Selection, and Agglomeration

We investigate the determinants of regional development using a newly constructed database of 1569 sub-national regions from 110 countries covering 74 percent of the world's surface and 96 percent of its GDP We combine the cross-regional analysis of geographic, institutional, cultural, and human capital determinants of regional development with an examination of productivity in several thousand establishments located in these regions To organize the discussion, we present a new model of regional development that introduces into a standard migration framework elements of both the Lucas (1978) model of the allocation of talent between entrepreneurship and work, and the Lucas (1988) model of human capital externalities The evidence points to the paramount importance of human capital in accounting for regional differences in development, but also suggests from model estimation and calibration that entrepreneurial inputs and human capital externalities are essential for understanding the data

Human capital and regional development

We establish five facts about the informal economy in developing countries. First, it is huge, reaching about half of the total in the poorest countries. Second, it has extremely low productivity compared to the formal economy: informal firms are typically small, inefficient, and run by poorly educated entrepreneurs. Third, although avoidance of taxes and regulations is an important reason for informality, the productivity of informal firms is too low for them to thrive in the formal sector. Lowering registration costs neither brings many informal firms into the formal sector, nor unleashes economic growth. Fourth, the informal economy is largely disconnected from the formal economy. Informal firms rarely transition to formality, and continue their existence, often for years or even decades, without much growth or improvement. Fifth, as countries grow and develop, the informal economy eventually shrinks, and the formal economy comes to dominate economic life. These five facts are most consistent with dual models of informality and economic development.

We assemble and analyze a new data set of homeowner insurance claims from 28 independently operated country subsidiaries of a multinational insurance company. A fundamental feature of the data is that such claims are often disputed, and lead to rejections or lower payments. We propose a new model of insurance, in which consumers can make invalid claims and firms can deny valid claims. In this environment, trust and honesty are critical factors that shape insurance contracts and the payment of claims, especially when the disputed amounts are too small for courts. We characterize equilibrium insurance contracts, and show how they depend on the quality of the legal system and the level of trust. We then investigate the incidence of claims, disputes and rejections of claims, and payment of claims in our data, as well as the cost and pricing of insurance. The evidence is consistent with the centrality of trust for insurance markets, as predicted by the model.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

rafael laporta

Papers

Human capital and regional development

Informality and Development

Trust and Insurance Contracts