Ethical regulation of social research has increased considerably in the UK in the past few years, not least as a result of the ESRC’s Research Ethics Framework. This article questions whether ethics committees are capable of making sound judgments about the ethics of what is proposed and practised in particular research projects. In addition, the legitimacy of such regulation is questioned, on ethical grounds. Finally, it is argued that increased regulation will not raise the ‘ethical standard’ of social science and will probably worsen the quality of what it produces.

Against the ethicists: on the evils of ethical regulation

The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism

Despite the rapid spread of Buddhism, the historical origins of Buddhist thought and practice remain obscure. This ground breaking work describes the genesis of the Tantric movement in early medieval India. Drawing on primary documents, many translated for the first time, from Sanskrit, Pakrit, Tibetan, Bengali and Chinese, the author shows the many changes in medieval India society.

Indian Esoteric Buddhism: A Social History of the Tantric Movement

Introduction Hellenistic political philosophy has had a bad press. In lectures published in 1983 the distinguished and influential ancient historian Moses Finley gave it as his view that Plato and Aristotle ‘were the first genuine political theorists of antiquity, and the last’. For only they attempted ‘a complete and coherent account’ of the ideal society ‘grounded in systematic metaphysics, epistemology, psychology and ethics’. Some thirty years earlier, in what remains an eminently serviceable general account of Greek political thought, T. A. Sinclair wrote as follows: Looking back over the political thought of the third century BC one cannot help being struck with its barrenness. This is of course due in part to the decline in the polis and in part to the loss of contemporary writings on the subject. But it is also due to the refusal or inability to relate political thinking to the material conditions in which men lived. Epicurus and Chrysippus did their best to help men to face life cheerfully, but the men whom they helped were the few, who had sufficient education to understand their message and sufficient leisure for lessons in philosophy. Finley and Sinclair are only echoing a long entrenched judgement which finds a classic formulation in the third volume of Zeller's great history of Greek philosophy, first published in 1852. For Zeller the Hellenistic period found the Greeks coping with a deterioration in their external circumstances, and particularly with loss of political self-determination as the monarchies of Alexander's successors eclipsed the city-state, by withdrawing into the inner world of self-consciousness.

Social and political thought

Preface 1. Author and text 2. Plato the etymologist 3. Linguistic science 4. Etymology at work 5. The dominance of flux 6. The limits of etymology 7. A Platonic outcome References Index locorum General index.

Plato's Cratylus

Abbreviations Introduction, Richard Bett Part I. Origins and Development: 1. Antecedents in early Greek philosophy Mi-Kyoung Lee 2. Pyrrho and early Pyrrhonism Svavar Hrafn Svavarsson 3. Arcesilaus and Carneades Harald Thorsrud 4. The sceptical academy: decline and afterline Carlos Levy 5. Aenesidemus and the rebirth of Pyrrhonism James Hankinson 6. Sextus Empiricus Pierre Pellegrin Part II. Topics and Problems: 7. Scepticism and belief Casey Perin 8. Scepticism and action Katja Maria Vogt 9. Scepticism and ethics Richard Bett 10. Academics versus Pyrrhonists, reconsidered Gisela Striker 11. The Pyrrhonian modes Paul Woodruff 12. Pyrrhonism and medicine James Allen 13. Pyrrhonism and the specialized sciences Emidio Spinelli Part III. Beyond Antiquity: 14. The rediscovery and posthumous influence of scepticism Luciano Floridi 15. Descartes' transformation of the sceptical tradition Michael Williams Bibliography.

The Cambridge companion to ancient scepticism

It is frequently alleged that the Sophists were relativists. Claims to this effect can be found in general histories of philosophy, in histories of Greek philosophy, in studies of the Sophists, in studies of relativism, and elsewhere. Sometimes it is moral or ethical relativism specifically that is ascribed to them, at other times a broader relativism concerning knowledge, truth or reality in general; but that the Sophists were some species of relativists is something of a commonplace.' In fact, I am not aware that it has ever been explicitly contested in print. My contention, however, is that this view of the Sophists is largely erroneous. There is but one Sophist, Protagoras, whom we have reason to regard as a relativist in any deep or interesting sense. It is not entirely clear whether even he deserves this label. But if he does, it is solely on the basis of his famous doctrine that "Man is the measure of all things" (DK 80B1) a doctrine which he is never said to have shared with any of the other Sophists. The tendency to describe the Sophists as a group as relativists derives, I think, from at least two sources; first, from a tendency to regard Protagoras as representative of, and indeed authoritative for, the whole movement, and second, from a too hasty examination of the relation between the Sophists and Plato. On the first point, it is no doubt true that

The Sophists and Relativism

The skepticism of Sextus Empiricus is different in spirit from the skepticism of today. Skepticism is important today for epistemologists, but one can perhaps be forgiven for thinking it mainly an academic exercise. In contrast, Sextus’ skepticism, Pyrrhonism, was, like most ancient philosophy, a route to happiness. As he explains in Outlines of Pyrrhonism (henceforth PH from its Greek title), the Pyrrhonist sought happiness and tranquility by finding the answers to his most troubling questions. Having tried as hard as he could, he still found himself at an impasse: there seemed to be equally good reasons to accept each side of the debates. Being unable to determine the right answer, he suspended his judgment though he continued searching. Upon suspending his judgment, he found that the tranquility he had sought was effortlessly his. He no longer worried about the truth of the matter, but was content being led by appearances. In particular, he no longer regarded any state as good or bad in itself. Therefore, he was less concerned with his worldly situation. Indeed, he is like the painter Apelles who was painting a horse and wanted to represent the froth on its mouth. Though he tried, he could not paint it. He was so upset with himself that he threw his sponge at the painting. To his wonder, the smudge where the sponge had hit exactly captured the look of the froth. So too, the Pyrrhonist finds what he seeks exactly when he thinks he cannot resolve his vexing questions (PH, 1. 28-29).

Sextus Empiricus: Against the Logicians

Introduction 1. Pyrrho the Non-Sceptic 2. Putting it into Practice 3. Looking Backwards 4. Looking Forwards References Index of Names Index Locorum Index of Subjects

Pyrrho, His Antecedents, and His Legacy

Ancient sceptics, unlike their modern counterparts, claim to live their scepticism. Nowadays scepticism, whether epistemological, moral, or of any other variety, is seen as a purely theoretical position, with no direct bearing on the actual living of one's life; this is because philosophical theories and everyday attitudes are taken to be in some way "insulated" from one another. Serious questions may be raised about the character of this alleged "insulation," but these are not my present concern; the fact is that no such split between "the philosophical" and "the ordinary" was entertained in the ancient world.1 It follows that the viability of scepticism as a way of life is a crucial issue for ancient sceptics. It is no accident that one of the most enduring objections to ancient scepticism is to the effect that the sceptical attitude?that is, the posture of universal suspension of judgement?is incompatible with any kind of normal human action; this was known in antiquity as the charge of apraxia, "inaction." The sceptics for their part, were just as persistent in arguing that suspension of judge ment had no such damaging consequences. In as much as the assessment of actual or imaginable types of human life is the province of ethics, I take this debate between ancient sceptics and their detractors to be, in a broad sense, an ethical debate.2 My focus in this paper is on the Academic sceptic Carneades, and on whether he can defend himself against the objection just mentioned. Unlike the Pyrrhonean sceptics and unlike even his Academic predecessor Arcesilaus, Carneades does not appear to have explicitly promoted, or recommended, the sceptical attitude as desirable;3 indeed, he appears to have been singularly reticent about the very notion of suspension of judge ment (epoche). But whatever his reasons for this silence, he is said by his in terpreter and closest associate Clitomachus to have "rid our minds of as sent;"4 and suspension of judgement is, precisely, the witholding of assent.5 Moreover, assent itself is described in the same passage in mythical terms, as a "wild and savage monster" (feram et immanen beluam), needing Her culean powers to overcome, and also, more soberly, as a form of "rashness" {temeritatem). If we may take Clitomachus' description as

Richard Bett

Papers

The Cambridge companion to ancient scepticism

The Sophists and Relativism

Sextus Empiricus: Against the Logicians

Pyrrho, His Antecedents, and His Legacy

Carneades' Distinction between Assent and Approval