/pdf/the-theory-of-industrial-organization-19bejph0ej.pdf

The Theory of Industrial Organization

Perspectives in supply chain risk management

This exciting and pioneering new overview of multiagent systems, which are online systems composed of multiple interacting intelligent agents, i.e., online trading, offers a newly seen computer science perspective on multiagent systems, while integrating ideas from operations research, game theory, economics, logic, and even philosophy and linguistics. The authors emphasize foundations to create a broad and rigorous treatment of their subject, with thorough presentations of distributed problem solving, game theory, multiagent communication and learning, social choice, mechanism design, auctions, cooperative game theory, and modal logics of knowledge and belief. For each topic, basic concepts are introduced, examples are given, proofs of key results are offered, and algorithmic considerations are examined. An appendix covers background material in probability theory, classical logic, Markov decision processes and mathematical programming. Written by two of the leading researchers of this engaging field, this book will surely serve as THE reference for researchers in the fastest-growing area of computer science, and be used as a text for advanced undergraduate or graduate courses.

Multiagent Systems: Algorithmic, Game-Theoretic, and Logical Foundations

A new era of theoretical computer science addresses fundamental problems about auctions, networks, and human behavior.

http://www.maths.lse.ac.uk/Personal/stengel/TEXTE/agt-stengel.pdf

Algorithmic Game Theory

We consider the problem of routing traffic to optimize the performance of a congested network. We are given a network, a rate of traffic between each pair of nodes, and a latency function for each edge specifying the time needed to traverse the edge given its congestion; the objective is to route traffic such that the sum of all travel times---the total latency---is minimized.In many settings, it may be expensive or impossible to regulate network traffic so as to implement an optimal assignment of routes. In the absence of regulation by some central authority, we assume that each network user routes its traffic on the minimum-latency path available to it, given the network congestion caused by the other users. In general such a "selfishly motivated" assignment of traffic to paths will not minimize the total latency; hence, this lack of regulation carries the cost of decreased network performance.In this article, we quantify the degradation in network performance due to unregulated traffic. We prove that if the latency of each edge is a linear function of its congestion, then the total latency of the routes chosen by selfish network users is at most 4/3 times the minimum possible total latency (subject to the condition that all traffic must be routed). We also consider the more general setting in which edge latency functions are assumed only to be continuous and nondecreasing in the edge congestion. Here, the total latency of the routes chosen by unregulated selfish network users may be arbitrarily larger than the minimum possible total latency; however, we prove that it is no more than the total latency incurred by optimally routing twice as much traffic.

/pdf/how-bad-is-selfish-routing-g644vu88rg.pdf

How bad is selfish routing

combinatorial auctions What to say and what to do when mostly your friends love reading? Are you the one that don't have such hobby? So, it's important for you to start having that hobby. You know, reading is not the force. We're sure that reading will lead you to join in better concept of life. Reading will be a positive activity to do every time. And do you know our friends become fans of combinatorial auctions as the best book to read? Yeah, it's neither an obligation nor order. It is the referred book that will not make you feel disappointed.

Combinatorial Auctions

Marketing-production joint decision-making

In a noncongested transportation network where each user chooses his quickest route, the creation of an additional route between some origin-destination pair clearly cannot result in an increase in travel time to users traveling between that o-d pair. It seems reasonable to assume the same can be said of congested networks. In 1968, D. Braess presented a remarkable example demonstrating this is not the case: a new route can increase travel time for all. The present paper gives, under reasonable assumptions, necessary and sufficient conditions for “Braess' Paradox” to occur in a general transportation network. As a corollary, we obtain that Braess' Paradox is about as likely to occur as not occur.

The Prevalence of Braess' Paradox

This paper considers the relationship between pricing and ordering decisions for a monopolistic retailer facing a known demand function where, over the inventory cycle, the product may exhibit: i physical decay or deterioration of inventory called wastage; and ii decrease in market value called value drop associated with each unit of inventory on hand. The retailer is allowed to continuously vary the selling price of the product over the cycle. We introduce a notion of instantaneous margin, and use it to derive profit maximizing conditions for the retailer.

The model explains the markdown of retail goods subject to decay. It also provides guidance in determining when price changes during the cycle are worthwhile due to product aging, how often such changes should be made, and how such changes affect ordering intervals and quantities.

Dynamic Pricing and Ordering Decisions by a Monopolist

This paper presents a model that considers the interface between marketing and production decisions in a channel of distribution of industrial goods comprised of a manufacturer and a distributor. The key issue investigated is the nature of the coordination within the channel in light of an unstable pattern of seasonal demand. The investigation, which focuses on dynamic issues, considers production activities such as product delivery and inventory policy, and their link to marketing strategies such as pricing policies. The focus here is on the dynamic nature of the coordinational aspects of the various policies. For example, the following questions are addressed: What is the distributor's pricing strategy throughout the season? What is the nature of the contractual price in the channel? Under what conditions should the distributor carry no inventory throughout the seasonal period? Under what conditions should the manufacturer carry no inventory? What is the impact of the seasonal parameters and differing h...

https://www.jstor.org/stable/info/2632173

Richard Steinberg

Papers

Combinatorial Auctions

Marketing-production joint decision-making

The Prevalence of Braess' Paradox

Dynamic Pricing and Ordering Decisions by a Monopolist

Marketing-production decisions in an industrial channel of distribution