The Civil War was a tumultuous time in U.S. history. Not only was the young nation in the grips of a bloody war, but it was in a battle with its own brethren. Though hundreds of thousands of individuals lost their lives, thousands gained their freedom. In addition, the war restructured institutions in the United States, affecting the moral, social, and political landscape of the country. Important for those interested in the office of the presidency, it enlarged the scope of presidential powers. In order to protect the government from potential threats during the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus challenging Congress's sole right to make this determination. (1) Despite this precedent, however, Lincoln commanded his troops to suspend habeas corpus to any individual suspected of conspiring against the federal government. One of his generals, George Cadwallader, even refused Chief Justice Taney's grant of habeas corpus for suspected conspirator John Merryman, stating, "the privilege had been suspended by the President" further legitimizing Lincoln's expanding power. Eventually the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863, passed during the midst of the crisis, would officially grant this right to the President (Fisher 1888). Clearly, though, this privilege was not one inherent to the office of the presidency but one that grew over time. The Founding Fathers left the power of the executive branch vague and, whether intentional or not, open for interpretation. From George Washington who refused to turn over documents regarding the Jay Treaty, all the way to George W. Bush's controversial U.S.A. Patriot Act, presidents have tested the bounds of their power, often succeeding in expanding them even further (Pious 2007, 68). The result is a much more powerful office than our forefathers had in mind. Argument A president looks for chances to increase his power (Moe and Howell 1999). Windows of opportunity provide those occasions. These openings create an environment where the president faces little backlash from Congress, the judicial branch, or even the public. Though institutional and behavioral conditions matter, domestic and international crises play a pivotal role in aiding a president who wishes to increase his power (Howell and Kriner 2008, 475). These events overcome the obstacles faced by the institutional make-up of government. They also allow a president lacking in skill and will or popular support the opportunity to shape the policy formation process. In short, focusing events increase presidential unilateral power. Many scholars have argued a president has the ability to act unilaterally if certain institutional factors are amenable, if the popularity of the president is high, whether or not the president centralizes or decentralizes the policy-making process, or even if there is legislative gridlock or divided government (Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004; Howell 2003; Neustadt 1990; Rudalevige 2002; Wildavsky 1966). Although these arguments provide insight into foundations of presidential power, they neglect the importance of exogenous events. What happens if institutional factors are not agreeable for the president to force his agenda, or if public opinion surrounding the president is not favorable, or if the president is unable to successfully use his power of persuasion? Are uncharismatic leaders facing unfavorable institutional conditions powerless? Because the perfect environment that fosters unilateral power happens infrequently, the president must seize other opportunities to achieve his goals. I argue focusing events present the president with a unique opportunity to shape the policy agenda. Not all crises are the same, however. Consistent with Aaron Wildavsky's (1966) "Two Presidencies" theory, a foreign policy crisis will likely open the largest window for the president. A natural disaster or economic crisis, events typically falling under the realm of domestic policy, will not carry the same impact. …

Unilateral Presidential Policy Making and the Impact of Crises

The crisis management literature suggests that under crisis pressures decision makers (1) develop a highly negative attitude, and (2) move toward centralizing the decision process in policy areas. It is hypothesized here that these behavioral consequences do not accompany all cases of crisis confrontation but occur when the decision maker perceives a significant discrepancy between one's coping abilities and what is viewed to be necessary to abate the crisis. This hypothesis has been empirically tested. The evidence supports this perceptual nature of organizational crisis management.

Perception and organizational crisis management

Because diplomatic historians Gilbert and Lauren are enthusiastic and effective exponents of interdisciplinary collaboration, it is fitting that they should assess the current state of theory on international crises. This essay evaluates four major charges in their critique: conceptual confusion, theoretical difficulties, prescriptive inadequacies, and historical insensitivity. The essay supports their premise that communication and collaboration between diplomatic historians and social scientists are essential if we are to develop empirical, policy-relevant theories of crisis. But it concludes that their interesting essay is flawed in two respects. Gilbert and Lauren aim a rather poorly calibrated shotgun at a large and diverse literature, whereas the situation would appear to call for carefully aimed rifle shots; thus, some of their shots hit the mark, but many others fly rather wide of the target. They have also missed an excellent opportunity to instruct us in ways that crisis research might be improved.

Historians, Social Scientists, and Crisis Management An Alternative View

Recently, the question of whether the Schengen agreement is reaching the end of its lifespan has been broadly discussed. However, Schengen is still alive. Drawing on Koselleck, this paper examines whether a state of crisis can be identified within Schengen. Whereas in research, reimpositions of internal borders are seen as the main reason for the crisis and as an expression of inadequate trust, the discourse analysis indicates that in the EU discourse, reimpositions are perceived as a justified means to deal with an emergency, which is in line with the Schengen acquis, and the main problem that must be addressed are inefficient external controls. Hence, it is crucial to ask not only whether Schengen is in crisis but also what the crisis represents. Key words: Schengen, discourse analysis, border kontrols, crisis.

Currernt development in schengen: a proof of its crisis or flexibility?

In recent years, the focus of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency/Cybernetics Technology Office (DARPA/CTO) has become increasingly applied in nature. Concurrently, an explicit concern with coordinating and integrating research and analysis has pervaded the DARPA/CTO milieu. These emphases mirror trends in certain segments of political science; both policy‐relevance and cumulativeness have emerged as prominent themes in disciplinary communication and research evaluation processes.1

Crisis analysis: Indicators and models

A grasp of crisis forecasting requires a working knowledge of (1) international crisis research–including conceptual and operational definitions of “crisis,” crisis escalation, perceptions and behavior during crises, crisis decision-making, crisis management, and specific case studies of individual crises; and (2) general forecasting—necessitating analyses of epistemological questions concerning forecasting, of forecasting methods both objective and subjective, and application of specific methods to problems in international relations. Crisis forecasting research itself is best broken down into the forecasting of levels of conflict, of war and violence, and of crises per se. After examining each area, the author argues that a great deal of research has been completed and that the prospects are excellent for future crisis, forecasting, and crisis forecasting research of a much more varied and comprehensive nature.

Richard W. Parker

Papers

An Examination of Basic and Applied International Crisis Research